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Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
THE LONDON MARKET EXCESS OF LOSS SPIRAL 
Caroline Hélène Christiane Bell 
 
This thesis explores the London Market Excess of Loss Spiral (“LMX Spiral”), a 
phenomenon based upon excess of loss reinsurance contracts that developed 
within the London reinsurance market of the 1980s.  The unwinding of the LMX 
Spiral was a key factor in the crisis the Lloyd’s insurance market had to face in the 
early 1990s.  However, whilst the crisis resulted in a wave of litigation in the 
English courts, there is no legal appraisal of the additional element of risk 
brought by the LMX Spiral itself.  The case law instead focuses on the duties of 
the underwriters and various agents that fuelled its development.   
This situation is unsatisfactory for two reasons.  Firstly, reinsurance spirals are a 
potential side-effect of XL reinsurance markets and therefore other spirals may 
develop in the future.  Secondly, this thesis shows that once a reinsurance spiral 
reaches a certain point, it becomes unsustainable, generating instability within 
the relevant reinsurance market.   
This thesis provides a detailed legal appraisal of reinsurance spirals and a new 
analysis of excess of loss reinsurance contracts.  The first part sets out the 
relevant legal principles and describes the LMX Spiral and its impact; listing, for 
the first time, the “Spiral Effects” identified through reports and actuarial models.  
The second part reviews the case law and assesses the legal nature of the excess 
of loss “Spiral Contracts” at the core of any reinsurance spiral, concluding that the 
Spiral Effects can distort the Spiral Contracts to the point where they become 
simple contracts of indemnity.  The third part explores the nature of excess of 
loss reinsurance in light of the review of the Spiral Contracts, submitting that 
excess of loss reinsurance contracts cover both the liability of the reinsured and 
the relevant insured peril.      
  iii     
Contents 
ABSTRACT  ............................................................................................................ i 
Contents ............................................................................................................ iii 
Table of Cases.................................................................................................... ix 
Table of Statutes ...............................................................................................xiii 
DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP ..........................................................................  xv 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................... 16 
PART I: THE LMX SPIRAL .................................................................................... 17 
1  Thesis on the LMX Spiral: Overview ............................................................. 17 
1.1  Thesis on the LMX Spiral: Methodology  ................................................. 17 
1.1.1  Establishing the Facts and the Law ................................................. 17 
1.1.2  The Analysis and Hypothesis .......................................................... 19 
1.1.3  Overview of the Thesis ................................................................... 20 
1.2  The LMX Spiral: Legal Definition ........................................................... 21 
2  Insurance and Reinsurance ......................................................................... 22 
2.1  Insurance as a Risk Sharing Tool  ........................................................... 22 
2.1.1  Definition and Purpose of Insurance ............................................... 22 
2.1.2  Managing the Risk  .......................................................................... 23 
2.1.3  Distinguishing Features of Contracts of Insurance .......................... 25 
2.1.4  Insurable Interest ........................................................................... 28 
2.2  Reinsurance as a Spreading Mechanism ................................................ 30 
2.2.1  Definition and Purpose of Reinsurance ........................................... 30 
2.2.2  Types of Reinsurance Agreements  .................................................. 32 
2.2.3  The Use and Development of XL Reinsurance ................................. 35 
2.2.4  Specific Features of XL Reinsurance ................................................ 37 
2.3  The Legal Nature of Reinsurance........................................................... 46 
2.3.1  Reinsurance as Further Insurance ................................................... 46 
2.3.2  Insurable Interest in Reinsurance  .................................................... 49 
2.4  Concluding Remarks  ............................................................................. 53  
  iv 
3  Factual Overview of the LMX Spiral ..............................................................  55 
3.1  The Lloyd’s Insurance Market  ................................................................  55 
3.1.1  Origins of Lloyd’s ...........................................................................  55 
3.1.2  Lloyd’s Members and their Agents ..................................................  57 
3.1.3  Lloyd’s on the Eve of the LMX Spiral  ................................................  59 
3.2  Key Features of the LMX Spiral ..............................................................  62 
3.2.1  The Nature of the LMX Spiral: Intertwining Reinsurances  .................  62 
3.2.2  London: the Hub of the LMX Spiral  ..................................................  64 
3.2.3  The 1980s: an Era of Rapid Expansion ............................................  68 
3.2.4  LMX Market Participants .................................................................  70 
3.3  The Demise of the LMX Spiral  ................................................................  72 
3.3.1  A Series of Unprecedented Catastrophes  .........................................  72 
3.3.2  The Collapse of the LMX Spiral  ........................................................  78 
3.4  Reconstruction and Renewal .................................................................  80 
3.4.1  The Lloyd’s Crisis ...........................................................................  80 
3.4.2  The Risk of Insolvency ....................................................................  83 
3.4.3  Equitas ...........................................................................................  85 
3.4.4  The LMX Spiral in Lockdown ...........................................................  88 
3.5  Concluding Remarks .............................................................................  90 
4  Analysis of the LMX Spiral and its Effects  .....................................................  91 
4.1  The Paucity of Reports on the LMX Spiral ..............................................  91 
4.2  The Walker Report ................................................................................  92 
4.2.1  The Walker Report: Parameters .......................................................  92 
4.2.2  The Walker Report: Key Findings  .....................................................  93 
4.2.3  The LMX Spiral according to the Walker Report ...............................  95 
4.3  The LMX Working Party Report ..............................................................  98 
4.3.1  The LMX Working Party ...................................................................  98 
4.3.2  The LMX Working Party Report: Key Findings ..................................  99 
4.3.3  The Actuarial Model  ......................................................................  102      
  v     
4.4  Professor Andrew Bain  ........................................................................ 104 
4.4.1  Some Key Features of Reinsurance ............................................... 105 
4.4.2  Professor Bain’s Actuarial Models ................................................. 106 
4.4.3  Features of Reinsurance Spirals .................................................... 109 
4.5  Spiral Effects....................................................................................... 111 
4.5.1  The Spiral Effects ......................................................................... 111 
4.5.2  Simply a Market Phenomenon? ..................................................... 115 
4.6  Concluding Remarks  ........................................................................... 117 
PART II: LEGAL APPRAISAL OF REINSURANCE SPIRALS ....................................... 119 
5  The Case Law  ............................................................................................ 119 
5.1  The Lloyd’s Litigation ......................................................................... 119 
5.1.1  A Wave of Litigation ..................................................................... 119 
5.1.2  The Cresswell Order ..................................................................... 121 
5.1.3  Litigating Names .......................................................................... 122 
5.2  LMX Judgments................................................................................... 123 
5.2.1  Overview ...................................................................................... 123 
5.2.2  Core LMX Cases ........................................................................... 124 
5.2.3  Portfolio Selection Cases .............................................................. 126 
5.2.4  LMX Spiral as a Fraudulent Device ................................................ 126 
5.2.5  LMX Business as a More Risky Type of Business  ............................ 130 
5.3  Legal Principles Pertaining to the LMX Spiral ....................................... 133 
5.3.1  Duties Owed................................................................................. 133 
5.3.2  The LMX Spiral ............................................................................. 137 
5.3.3  Reasonable LMX Underwriter ........................................................ 142 
5.4  Concluding Remarks  ........................................................................... 145 
6  Legal Appraisal of Reinsurance Spirals ...................................................... 147 
6.1  XL Reinsurance and Spirals ................................................................. 147 
6.1.1  Reasonable Risk Taking? .............................................................. 147 
6.1.2  Reinsurance Spirals as a Side Effect of XL Reinsurance  .................. 148  
  vi 
6.1.3  The Need for Legal Principles  ........................................................  150 
6.2  The Legality of Reinsurance Spirals .....................................................  153 
6.2.1  Illegality .......................................................................................  153 
6.2.2  Pyramid Schemes  ..........................................................................  157 
6.3  Legal Issues with Reinsurance Spirals  ..................................................  159 
6.3.1  The Problem with Negligence........................................................  159 
6.3.2  The Case Law Conundrum ............................................................  161 
6.3.3  The Use and Abuse of Arbitrage ...................................................  163 
6.3.4  Good Faith is Not the Answer........................................................  166 
6.3.5  Current Legal Position ..................................................................  170 
6.4  Concluding Remarks ...........................................................................  171 
7  The Preferred Legal Solution  ......................................................................  173 
7.1  Spiral Contracts Defeat the Purpose of Reinsurance ............................  173 
7.1.1  Reinsurance Spirals Defeat the Purpose of Reinsurance  .................  173 
7.1.2  Spiral Contracts at the Root of XL Reinsurance Spirals  ...................  174 
7.1.3  Are Spiral Contracts Truly Contracts of Reinsurance? ....................  175 
7.2  A Study of Spiral Contracts  ..................................................................  177 
7.2.1  How the Spiral Effects distort Spiral Contracts...............................  177 
7.2.2  How Spiral Contracts are at odds with Reinsurance Principles .......  180 
7.3  The True Nature of Spiral Contracts ....................................................  183 
7.3.1  Spiral Contracts Distinguished from Wagers .................................  183 
7.3.2  The Hypothesis: Spiral Contracts as Contracts of Indemnity ..........  185 
7.4  Regulatory Consequences ...................................................................  187 
7.4.1  The General Prohibition ................................................................  187 
7.4.2  The Insurance Companies Acts 1982 and 1974 ............................  188 
7.4.3  The Financial Services Act 1986  ....................................................  190 
7.4.4  The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ................................  192 
7.4.5  Duties as Between Reinsurers .......................................................  194 
7.5  Concluding Remarks ...........................................................................  198      
  vii     
PART III: THE NATURE OF XL REINSURANCE  ...................................................... 199 
8  Analysis of Excess of Loss Reinsurance ..................................................... 199 
8.1  The Mechanics of XL Reinsurance ....................................................... 199 
8.1.1  XL Reinsurance Makes the Underlying Risk More Remote  .............. 199 
8.1.2  A Typical XL Contract ................................................................... 204 
8.1.3  A Mathematician’s Perspective ..................................................... 207 
8.2  XL Reinsurance Wordings: the Case Law  .............................................. 210 
8.2.1  Charter Re v Fagan ....................................................................... 211 
8.2.2  Further Case Law on XL Reinsurance ............................................ 215 
8.2.3  Concluding Remarks .................................................................... 219 
9  The Nature of XL Reinsurance ................................................................... 221 
9.1  Challenges to the Traditional View  ...................................................... 221 
9.1.1  Facultative Reinsurance as Liability Insurance ............................... 221 
9.1.2  The Case Law Terminology is Confused  ........................................ 225 
9.2  The Preferred View ............................................................................. 228 
9.2.1  The Parameters: Loss and Insured Event  ....................................... 228 
9.2.2  The Proposition  ............................................................................ 230 
9.2.3  The Case for the Unifying Factor .................................................. 234 
9.3  Concluding Remarks  ........................................................................... 235 
10  Conclusion ............................................................................................ 237 
Appendices ..................................................................................................... 241 
Appendix A ..................................................................................................... 243 
Appendix B ..................................................................................................... 253 
Appendix C ..................................................................................................... 269 
Glossary  .......................................................................................................... 275 
Interviews ....................................................................................................... 281 
Bibliography  ........................................................................................................ 1 
 
      
  ix     
Table of Cases 
Aldrich and Others v Norwich Union Life Insurance Co Ltd [2000] LRIR 1 ......... 132 
Allianz Marine Aviation v GE Frankona Reinsurance Ltd (the “Treasure Bay”) [2005] 
EWHC 101 (Comm), [2005] Lloyd's Rep IR 437.............................................. 218 
Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgins Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
565  ...................................................................................... 131, 132, 143, 145 
Arbuthnott v Feltrim Underwriting Agencies Ltd & ors [1995] CLC 437 ..... 44, 115, 
125, 137, 138, 139, 144, 147 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance plc ("Generali") [2004] 
EWCA Civ 429, [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 457  ..................................................... 203 
Assicuraziono Generali SpA v CGU International Insurance plc [2003] EWHC 1073, 
[2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 725 ............................................................................ 215 
Avon Insurance Plc and ors v Swire Fraser Ltd and another [2000] Re LR 535 .. 132 
Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field [1996] 1 WLR 1026 ....................................... 224 
Barrow v Bankside Members Agency Ltd and ors [1996] 5 Re LR 1 ................... 119 
Bates v Robert Barrow Ltd [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 680 ........................................ 190 
Bedford Insurance Co. Ltd v Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil [1984] 3 All E.R. 
766  .............................................................................................................. 188 
Berriman and ors v Rose Thompson Young (Underwriting) Ltd [1996] 5 Re LR 117
  .................................................... 115, 119, 125, 137, 139, 143, 144, 160, 207 
Bonner and ors v Cox and ors [2005] EWCA Civ 1512  ...................... 166, 195, 196 
Boobyer v David Holman & co and the Society of Lloyd’s (No 2) [1993] Lloyd’s Rep 
96  ................................................................................................................ 127 
British Dominions General Insurance Co Ltd v Duder [1915] 2 KB 394 ............. 226 
Brown v KMR Services Ltd and ors [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 513  ...................... 69, 126 
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1892] 2 Q.B. 484  ........................................... 184 
Carter v Boehm (1736) 3 Burr 1905 ................................................................... 27 
Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313, [1996] 5 Re LR 411 ........... 50 
Commercial Union Assurance Co plc v NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd [1998] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 600 ............................................................................................. 76 
Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 437  ............... 136, 217 
Deeny & ors v Gooda Walker Ltd (in voluntary liquidation) & ors. [1994] CLC 1224
  ... 21, 42, 43, 45, 46, 64, 79, 99, 119, 128, 137, 138, 142, 144, 147, 160, 163, 
182, 283 
Deeny v Walker and ors and same v Littlejohn & Co and ors [1996] Re LR 276  . 136 
Delver, Assignee of Bunn v Barnes (1807) 1 Taunt 48 ................................ 46, 222  
  x 
Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 ...............................................................  181 
DR Insurance Co v Seguros America Banamex [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 120 ..........  221 
Economic v Le Assicurazioni d’Italia (unreported 27 November 1996)  ......  195, 196 
Egerton v Earl Brownlow (1853) 4 H.L.C. 1 .......................................................  154 
Equitas Ltd v Walsham Brothers & Company Ltd [2013] EWHC 3264 (Comm), 
[2014] Lloyd’s Rep IR 12  .................................................................................  60 
Equitas v R&Q Reinsurance Company (UK) Limited [2009] EWHC 2787 (Comm), 
[2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 600  ....  21, 52, 63, 64, 65, 70, 76, 89, 111, 116, 137, 151, 
191, 215, 281 
Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada [2003] EWCA Civ 885, [2003] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 587 ...........................................................................................  28, 177 
Forsikringsaktieselskabet National (of Copenhagen) v Attorney-General [1925] AC 
639 ........................................................................................................  47, 227 
Frederick Thomas Poole and ors v Her Majesty’s Treasury [2006] EWHC 2731, 
[2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 255 .................................................................  121, 123 
Hampden v Walsh (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 189 ............................................................  184 
HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co  [2001] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 596  ........................................................................................  177 
Hill and ors v Mercantile and General Reinsurance Company [1996] 1 WLR 1239
 ......................................................................................................  50, 215, 229 
Home Insurance Company of New York v Victoria Montreal Fire Insurance 
Company [1907] AC 59 ................................................................................  222 
In re Eddystone Marine Insurance Co., ex parte Western Insurance Co. [1892] 2 
Ch. 423 ........................................................................................................  216 
Initial Services Ltd v Putteril [1968] 1 Q.B. 396  .................................................  154 
Insurance Company of Africa v Scor Reinsurance [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312  ......  202 
IRB Brazil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2010] EWHC 974 
(Comm), [2010] Lloyd's Rep IR  ......................................................  191, 201, 215 
Jaffray v Society of Lloyd’s [2002] EWCA Civ 1101  ............................................  123 
Janson v Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd [1902] A.C. 484  ..........................  154 
John Robert Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Plc and Another 
[1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 607  .............................................................................  156 
King v Brandywine Reinsurance Co [2005] EWCA 235, [2005] Lloyd's Rep IR 509  89 
King v Brandywine Reinsurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd [2004] EWHC 1033 (Comm), [2004] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 670  ...........................................................................................  75      
  xi     
Kler Knitwear Ltd v Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 47
  .................................................................................................................... 177 
McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 ............................................................ 154 
Montefiore v Menday Motor Components Co [1918] 2 KB 241 ......................... 154 
Napier & Ettrick v Kershaw Ltd [1996] EWCA Civ 796, [1997] LRLR 1  ................ 122 
National Oilwell (UK) Ltd v Davy Offshore Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 582  ............. 30 
Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow Ernst & Young 
[1997] LRLR 678 .............................................. 43, 77, 115, 130, 131, 133, 139 
North Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Bishopsgate Insurance Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
459  ...................................................................................................... 216, 229 
Norwich Union Life Insurance v Qureshi and Qureshi [1999] Re LR 263 ... 132, 137 
Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v ADAS [1987] 2 All ER 152  .......... 189 
Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co. Ltd [1986] 1 
All ER 908 .................................................................................... 189, 195, 196 
Pugh v Jenkins (1841) 1 Q.B. 631 .................................................................... 184 
R v Lloyd’s of London ex parte Briggs and ors [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 176  .......... 128 
Re Cavalier Insurance Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 430.  ................................... 189 
Re Digital Satellite Warranty Cover Ltd v FSA [2011] EWCA Civ 1413 [2012], [2012] 
2 All ER (Comm) 38 ........................................................................................ 22 
Re Senator Hanseatische Verwaltungs Gesellschatf mbH [1996] EWCA Civ 1344, 
[1997] 1 WLR 515 ........................................................................................ 157 
Re Whiteley Insurance Consultants (A Firm) [2008] EWHC 1782, [2009] Lloyd's Rep 
IR 212  .......................................................................................................... 193 
Rourke v Short (1856) 5 E. & B. 904  ................................................................. 184 
Scott v Copenhagen Reinsurance (UK) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 688, [2003] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 696 ..................................................................................................... 89 
Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance (The Moonacre) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 501 ........ 30 
Simner v New India [1995] LRLR 240. ...................................................... 168, 194 
Skandia International Corp v NRG Victory Reinsurance Limited [1998] Lloyd’s Rep 
IR 439  .................................................................................................... 50, 228 
Society of Lloyd’s v Henderson and ors [2005] EWHC 850 (Comm) . 129, 130, 137, 
159 
Society of Lloyd’s v Jaffray [2000] EWHC 51 (Comm)  ................................ 121, 123 
Sphere Drake Insurance v Euro International Underwriting [2003] EWHC 1636 
(Comm)  . 21, 129, 137, 145, 148, 149, 153, 156, 158, 165, 167, 168, 174, 194, 
196  
  xii 
Stewart v Oriental Fire and Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1984] 3 All ER 777  ..........  188 
Stockwell & ors v Society of Lloyd’s [2007] EWCA Civ 930, [2008] 1 WLR 2255 123, 
130 
Sword-Daniels v Pitel and ors, Brown v KMR Services Ltd [1994] 3 Re LR 10 ....  126, 
134, 138 
Teal Assurance Co Ltd v W R Berkley Insurance (Europe) Ltd and Another [2013] 
UKSC 57, [2014] Lloyd's Rep IR 56.  ...............................................  217, 225, 229 
The Lloyd’s Litigation: the Merrett, Gooda Walker and Feltrim cases [1995] 2 AC 
145. .......................................................................................................  59, 135 
Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd [2013] 
EWHC 3362 (Comm) .....................................................  201, 218, 223, 224, 230 
Toomey v Eagle Star Insurance [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 516 ...................  48, 177, 227 
Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2008] EWCA Civ 
150, [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 1085 .........................................................  48, 226 
Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2009] UKHL 40, 
[2010] 1 AC 180  .....................................................................................  48, 191 
Wilson v Carnley [1908] 1 K.B. 729 ..................................................................  154 
Wynniatt-Hussey v RJ Bromley (Underwriting Agencies) plc and ors [1996] Re LR 
310 ..............................................................  115, 125, 139, 142, 144, 145, 160 
 
      
  xiii     
Table of Statutes 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 1980 
(US)  ................................................................................................................ 80 
Financial Services Act 1986 s 132(1)................................................................ 190 
Financial Services Act 1986 s 132(6)................................................................ 190 
Financial Services Act 1986, s 132(3)............................................................... 190 
Financial Services Act 1986, s 132(4)............................................................... 190 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ........................................................... 58 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000  s 23(3), (4) and (5)  ........................... 192 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 s 23  .................................................. 192 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 s 26(2)  .............................................. 192 
Gambling Act 2005 ................................................................................... 29, 183 
Gambling Act 2005, 334(1) ............................................................................. 183 
Gambling Act 2005, s 335  ................................................................................. 29 
Gaming Act 1710 ............................................................................................ 183 
Gaming Act 1835 ............................................................................................ 183 
Gaming Act 1845 ............................................................................................ 183 
Gaming Act 1845, s 18...................................................................................... 29 
Gaming Act 1892 ............................................................................................ 183 
Gaming Act 1968 ............................................................................................ 183 
Insurance Companies Act 1974 ....................................................................... 188 
Insurance Companies Act 1982 ....................................................................... 188 
Lloyd’s Act 1911 ............................................................................................... 56 
Lloyd’s Act 1951 ............................................................................................... 56 
Lloyd’s Act 1982 ................................................................................... 56, 58, 59 
Lloyd’s Acts 1871  .............................................................................................. 58 
Marine Insurance Act 1745, s 4 ......................................................................... 47 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 s.33(1) .................................................................... 26 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 18(1) ................................................................... 27 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 18(2). .................................................................. 27 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 33(3) ................................................................... 26 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 4 ......................................................................... 29 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 5(2) ..................................................................... 29 
Reinsurance Directive (2005/68/EC)  ................................................................ 151 
Solvency I Directive (2002/13/EC) ................................................................... 151 
Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) ................................................................ 151  
  xiv 
      
  xv     
DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP 
I Caroline Hélène Christiane Bell 
 
declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been 
generated by me as the result of my own original research. 
 
The London Market Excess of Lloyd’s Spiral 
 
I confirm that: 
 
1.  This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research 
degree at this University; 
 
2.  Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or 
any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been 
clearly stated; 
 
3.  Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly 
attributed; 
 
4.  Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With 
the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work; 
 
5.  I have acknowledged all main sources of help; 
 
6.  Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have 
made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed 
myself; 
 
7.  None of this work has been published before submission: 
 
Signed:  ..............................................................................................................  
 
Date:  .................................................................................................................  
 
  
  16 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank Tony Berry and John Emney, the “doyens of the LMX Spiral” 
for having agreed to share their experience of the spiral and the London 
reinsurance market.  Their insight has been invaluable.  I am also particularly 
indebted to Tony Berry for his careful review of several chapters of this thesis 
when they were in draft form.  I have been fortunate enough to be able to 
interview several people who knew about the LMX Spiral and the market.  
Amongst these Julian Burling stands out for his encouragement and for his useful 
comments on the draft thesis.   
I would also like to thank Dr Aysegul Bugra for her proof-reading of the thesis as 
well as Dr Özlem Gürses, a reinsurance specialist who is both an inspiration and a 
friend. 
I am very grateful to Professor Rob Merkin for his support, enthusiasm and 
patience throughout the long process of researching and writing the thesis.  
Despite his extremely busy schedule Rob always found the time to respond to 
queries and review chapters quickly.   
The process has been a long one indeed, from 2008 when I enrolled as a part-
time PhD student at Southampton University, to 2014 when I finally submitted the 
thesis.  There are good reasons for this.  One is that I have continued to work 
part-time at City law firm Addleshaw Goddard.  I am grateful that the partners 
who employ me, particularly Richard Leedham but also more recently Mark Pring, 
have shown interest in my research and allowed me the flexibility I needed to 
progress the thesis. 
The other reason the thesis has taken so long to come to fruition is very close to 
my heart.  In 2008 when I started I was the proud mother of a two-year old boy 
called Anton.  In April 2009 his little sister Amélie came along, followed by their 
baby brother Nathan in November 2012.  I adore my three children.  I also know 
that I would not have been able to find the time for the thesis were it not for the 
support of my husband, James, who took his fair share of the household and 
parental duties despite his full time job as a lawyer in the City.  My biggest thanks 
go to him.    Part I/Chapter 1 
  17     
 
PART I: THE LMX SPIRAL 
 
1  Thesis on the LMX Spiral: Overview  
 
This thesis explores the London Market excess of loss Spiral (LMX Spiral), a 
phenomenon that developed within the London reinsurance market of the 1980s.  
Its collapse in the early 1990s caused serious difficulties to the reinsurance 
market in London generally and the Lloyd’s insurance market in particular.  
Before delving into the detail of our analysis, we describe the methodology used 
to research and write the thesis and we set out the most authoritative legal 
depiction of the LMX Spiral from case law, which provides a useful starting point. 
 
1.1  Thesis on the LMX Spiral: Methodology 
The research question at the heart of this thesis is “what is the legal nature of 
reinsurance spirals”, using the LMX Spiral as an example.  Because this is a legal 
thesis, it is based principally on doctrinal research.  Nevertheless, given the 
factual complexity of the LMX Spiral, non legal sources of information were used 
to establish the facts.  The thesis only reports on the laws of England and Wales. 
 
1.1.1  Establishing the Facts and the Law 
This thesis initially set out to explore the LMX Spiral from a legal perspective and 
consider its impact on the Lloyd’s crisis of the early 1990s.  The starting point 
was the factual description of the LMX Spiral as it seemed fundamental to 
establish the facts accurately to be in a position to appraise the law.  This aspect 
of the research proved to be difficult because of there is a paucity of 
contemporaneous documentation concerning the LMX Spiral.  The case law 
describes the LMX Spiral to a certain extent but it gives limited information on the 
functioning of the spiral in practice.  In order to gain better practical knowledge 
of the LMX Spiral, the author conducted a number of interviews with individuals 
who had an interest in, or who had been involved in the development of the LMX Part I/Chapter 1 
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Spiral and related case law.  A list of interviewees is provided at the end of the 
thesis.   
Other sources of factual information about the LMX Spiral included journal 
articles, speeches, expert and underwriting reports, studies from the insurance 
institute as well as a report commissioned by the Lloyd’s insurance market, the 
Walker Report, which is described in some detail in this thesis.  In addition, the 
author found several examinations of the LMX Spiral produced by a 
mathematician, an economist and several actuaries, including actuarial models.  
All these documents were reviewed, compared and cross-referred for accuracy 
before being synthesised and relied upon to describe and then to appraise the 
LMX Spiral.   
The next stage was to locate all primary sources of law concerning the LMX Spiral.  
A total of 47 cases mention the LMX Spiral.  The author read all of these cases 
and many of the 120 cases engendered by the Lloyd’s crisis.  The key judgments 
concerning the LMX Spiral were analysed to establish their findings and the most 
significant decisions were also categorised.   
The LMX Spiral was built upon excess of loss (“XL”) reinsurance contracts.  There 
is no “XL reinsurance law” as such but XL reinsurance contracts are subject to a 
few specific rules applicable to insurance and reinsurance agreements.  These 
rules are restated in the thesis, together with a short history of the development 
of XL reinsurance. 
Another source of primary law reviewed for the purposes of this thesis are the 
statutes and secondary legislation that regulate the business of reinsurance in the 
UK.  In addition, the author examined the mechanics of XL reinsurance contracts 
to identify their true nature.  Once it became clear that the thesis would end with 
a wider study on the nature of XL reinsurance contracts, further academic studies, 
textbooks and cases on reinsurance generally and XL reinsurance specifically 
were reviewed and synthesized. 
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1.1.2  The Analysis and Hypothesis 
The review of all of the documentation described above brought the following to 
light: 
1.  Reinsurance spirals are side effect of XL reinsurance and so new spirals 
may develop in the future.   
2.  Many of the documents, written by a wide variety of unrelated individuals 
at different points in time, acknowledged the same features the LMX Spiral 
and some proved that those features would apply to all reinsurance spirals.  
This enabled the author to produce a definitive list of the so called “Spiral 
Effects”.   
3.  Once they reach a certain point, because of the Spiral Effects reinsurance 
spirals become unsustainable, generating instability in the markets they 
inhabit. 
4.  The sole source of law so far on reinsurance spirals has been the case law.  
The cases require disclosure of the spiral element and they prescribe 
prudential steps for underwriters to follow when they engage in LMX Spiral 
business.  Those steps however are ineffective because they do not deal 
with the Spiral Effects.  This is what the thesis refers to as the “case law 
conundrum”.   
Relying on analogy and further legal analysis the author sought to identify a 
better legal solution to deal with reinsurance spirals, considering for instance 
whether reinsurance spirals may be illegal or whether the law of negligence or the 
principles of good faith may provide a more effective legal tools, without success.   
On the basis that the Spiral Effects have to be at the heart of any legal solution, 
the author analysed their impact first on the underwriting and then on the “Spiral 
Contracts” at the heart of reinsurance spirals.  This lead to the first hypothesis 
presented in this thesis, which is that the Spiral Effects can distort the Spiral 
Contracts to the point where they become simple contracts of indemnity.  The 
regulatory consequences of this are explored in the thesis.   
The close examination of the Spiral Contracts made it clear that the nature of the 
risk being reinsured changes as it makes it way up an XL reinsurance tower.  This 
is at odd with the current common law view of reinsurance contracts as further 
independent contracts providing cover for the risk insured under the primary 
insurance contract.  The author examined the mechanics of a typical XL wording Part I/Chapter 1 
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and reviewed literature and cases concerning XL reinsurance and the nature of 
reinsurance contracts generally.  This led to the second hypothesis presented in 
this thesis, which is that XL reinsurance covers the reinsured’s liability arising 
from perils that have caused the original loss and that are covered under both the 
original contract of insurance and the XL reinsurance. 
 
1.1.3  Overview of the Thesis 
The first part of this thesis sets out the relevant legal principles and describes the 
LMX Spiral and its impact.  It starts with this introductory chapter (Chapter 1); 
then describes the relevant rules of insurance and reinsurance law and provides a 
history of the development of XL reinsurance (Chapter 2) before giving a factual 
description of the LMX Spiral and its collapse, explaining how this has shaped the 
development of the Lloyd’s insurance market (Chapter 3); and providing a factual 
appraisal of the LMX Spiral and identifying the Spiral Effect (Chapter 4). 
The second part assesses the legal nature of reinsurance spirals.  It starts with a 
detailed account of the Lloyd’s litigation that gave rise to the many cases 
concerning the LMX Spiral (Chapter 5), before providing a detailed legal appraisal 
of reinsurance spirals and identifying the “case law conundrum” (Chapter 6).  The 
final chapter of this second part (Chapter 7) sets out the first hypothesis 
presented in this thesis concerning the Spiral Contracts.   
The third part explores the nature of excess of loss reinsurance in light of the 
review of the Spiral Contracts.  It starts with an analysis of XL reinsurance 
contract wordings, both factual and legal (Chapter 8), before assessing the 
current legal view of reinsurance contracts in literature and case law (Chapter 9), 
submitting that excess of loss reinsurance contracts cover both the liability of the 
reinsured and the relevant insured peril, which is the second hypothesis 
presented in this thesis. 
       Part I/Chapter 1 
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1.2  The LMX Spiral: Legal Definition 
Whilst it relates to all reinsurance spirals, this thesis started with, and focuses on, 
the LMX Spiral.  Therefore it is worth setting out at the outset the most 
authoritative legal account of the LMX Spiral, which was provided by Phillips J in 
the Gooda Walker case
1: 
“The working of the LMX Spiral was complex, and whether by diagrams or in 
words it is only possible to attempt to describe it in a simplified form. My attempt 
is as follows.  Many syndicates which wrote [excess of loss] cover took out [excess 
of loss] cover themselves. Those who reinsured them were thus writing [excess of 
loss] on [excess of loss]. They, in their turn, frequently took out their own [excess 
of loss] cover. There thus developed among the syndicates and companies which 
wrote LMX business a smaller group that was largely responsible for creating a 
complex intertwining network of mutual reinsurance, which has been described 
as the LMX Spiral. When a catastrophe led to claims being made by primary 
insurers on their excess of loss covers, this started a process whereby syndicates 
passed on their liabilities, in excess of their own retentions, under their own 
excess of loss covers from one to the next, rather like a multiple game of pass the 
parcel. Those left holding the liability parcels were those who first exhausted their 
layers of excess of loss reinsurance protection.”
2  
 
This definition provides a useful starting point to apprehend the LMX Spiral and 
in the next chapters we endeavour to explain and to provide a legal analysis of 
this unusual phenomenon.  In the process, as set out above we will analyse the 
true nature of the excess of loss reinsurance agreements at the core of the LMX 
Spiral and we will evaluate current legal thinking concerning the nature of excess 
of loss reinsurance.   
 
                                           
1Deeny & ors v Gooda Walker Ltd (in voluntary liquidation) & ors. [1994] CLC 1224.  This 
description is quoted and relied upon in several other cases, including the two other 
major decisions concerning spirals: Sphere Drake Insurance v Euro International 
Underwriting [2003] EWHC 1636 (Comm) and Equitas v R&Q Reinsurance Company (UK) 
Limited [2009] EWHC 2787 (Comm), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 600. 
2 Gooda Walker (n 1) 1231. Part I/Chapter 2 
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2  Insurance and Reinsurance 
 
The LMX Spiral was based upon a specific type of reinsurance called “excess of 
loss” (XL).  To understand XL reinsurance, it is necessary to explore some of the 
features that make insurance and reinsurance contracts different from standard 
commercial contracts.  This analysis will also be relevant to our critical 
assessment of the LMX Spiral where we will consider the impact it had on the XL 
contracts that were at its core. 
 
2.1  Insurance as a Risk Sharing Tool 
2.1.1  Definition and Purpose of Insurance 
Defining insurance is not an easy task
3 and even though insurance business is 
regulated under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), the FSMA 
and relevant regulatory instruments describe rather than define insurance
4. 
There are, however, tentative definitions dotted within the case law.  Those 
include the following:  
“an agreement to confer upon the insured a contractual right which, prima facie, 
comes into existence immediately when loss is suffered by the happening of an 
event insured against, to be put by the insurer into the same position in which the 
insured would have been had the event not occurred, but in no better position
5”. 
The above definition describes contractual rights that are triggered upon the 
happening of an event.  A key element of an insurance contract is the event 
                                           
3 Department of Trade and Industry v St Christopher Motorists’ Association Ltd [1974] 1 
All ER 395; Medical Defence Union v Department of Trade [1979] 2 All ER 421, 429. 
4  The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (the 
Order),  SI  2001/544,  art  3  and  sch  1.    Sch  1  provides  a  list  of  types  of  insurance 
contracts covered by the FSMA.  In Re Digital Satellite Warranty Cover Ltd v FSA [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1413 [2012], [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 38, the Court of Appeal noted obiter that 
the FSA was probably correct when it argued that the Order provides a complete code for 
the regulation of insurance contracts although it can be argued that this would only be 
relevant as far as the regulation of insurance is concerned.  For more discussion on this, 
see The Law of Insurance Contracts, para 1-1(a) (R March 2014). 
5 Callaghan v Dominion Insurance Co [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 541.     Part I/Chapter 2 
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insured against: it must be uncertain in that it may or may not happen, or may 
happen at a time no one can predict.  An insured obtains insurance because he 
does not want to carry the risk associated with the happening of the event.  At its 
heart, insurance is about the transfer of that risk
6.  In fact “risk carriers” is a term 
often used in the insurance industry when referring to insurers or reinsurers.  As 
a result, contracts of insurance have been described as aleatory contracts 
“depending upon an uncertain event or contingency as to both profit and loss
7”.   
Insurance and reinsurance business is intrinsically risky because it is based on 
uncertainty.  Some of the underwriters who became involved in the LMX Spiral in 
the 1980s overlooked that element of risk, or at least miscalculated it.  The LMX 
Spiral comprised principally XL contracts covering risks associated with 
catastrophes
8.  During the 1980s the market benefited from a few years with a 
relatively low level of catastrophes, making the business seem highly profitable.  
The business, however, still carried a high level of risk as many of the LMX Spiral 
participants found out to their detriment.  The good years ended with a series of 
catastrophes between 1987 and 1992 which caused serious financial difficulties 
to those who were less well prepared. 
 
2.1.2  Managing the Risk 
Insurance is about the transfer of risk to an insurer.  The insurer is better placed 
to manage risk because he benefits from the effect of mutualisation.  At its most 
basic level, insurance works as follows: the insurer pools resources by charging a 
premium when taking on risks from a large number of insureds.  Only a small 
portion of those insureds will suffer loss, and those losses will be paid for with 
the pooled premium.  Insurance is, therefore, a risk sharing tool administered by 
insurers. 
                                           
6 The transfer of risk is only one element of many that define a contract of insurance.  A 
full analysis of what amounts to insurance is outside the scope of this thesis.  For further 
reading on this a good starting point is the first chapter of The Law of Insurance 
Contracts (n 4) which famously states “The English courts know an elephant when they see 
one, so too a contract of insurance” para 1.1 (R March 2014) to make the point that there 
is, indeed, no definite legal definition of insurance under English law.  
7 Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, para A-0001 (R March 2011). 
8 The relevant XL market also covered non catastrophic risks within its ‘working layers’. 
For more details see section 2.2.4 below. Part I/Chapter 2 
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In practical terms, in exchange for receiving the premium the insurer assumes the 
risk of suffering losses associated with the risk materialising.  Legally speaking, 
this works through the insurer undertaking to pay claims made by the insured 
within the parameters of the insurance policy.  The insurer’s liability under the 
contract of insurance arises regardless of its financial position.  It is up to the 
insurer to ensure that its “pooled resources” are sufficient to pay the claims it is 
contractually obliged to meet.  It has been said that “the entire insurance industry 
has existed for many years on its’ (sic) ability to pay yesterday’s losses out of 
tomorrow’s premium”
9.   
The reality is obviously more complex as premiums are then invested and 
insurers’ financial resources are used not only to pay claims but to meet running 
costs.  The insurance industry nowadays is heavily regulated with insurers being 
required to keep appropriate amounts of capital reserves.  To set those premiums 
and capital reserves at an adequate level, insurers must assess the risks they have 
underwritten and estimate the value of claims they may have to pay.  They must 
also apply prudential risk management techniques to manage these risks.  This 
includes spreading the risk to make it less likely the insurer will be overwhelmed 
with claims emanating from a single event (for instance widespread floods).   
Risk can be spread geographically or by type or category.  For instance, an 
insurer should balance a book of business so as to prevent large exposure to 
geographical areas prone to flooding caused by the same weather event.  A 
balanced portfolio would include exposure to different areas (of the UK or 
elsewhere) which are unlikely to be affected at the same time by the same 
adverse weather.  Another option is to offer different types of insurance, such as 
casualty or motor as well as property.  In order to balance their portfolios, 
insurers must keep a close eye on accumulation of risk in one area or of one type. 
The nature of the business that made its way to the LMX Spiral made it more 
difficult for underwriters to monitor their exposure to a particular risk or event.  
The relevant XL contracts covered entire portfolios of business and as such they 
did not identify the risks they covered.  They also covered catastrophes which are 
a more difficult risk to balance, as will be seen later on in this thesis.  However, 
some underwriters managed their exposure effectively.  Much of the case law 
dealing with the losses caused by the LMX Spiral explores standards of care and 
the concept of the reasonably prudent underwriter.  Ultimately, the issue was 
                                           
9 John Emney, ‘The Spiral – 2 years on’ (Insurance Institute, London, 16 October 1989).     Part I/Chapter 2 
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whether the underwriters were collecting sufficient premiums to pay for the 
claims made to them.  In many cases they did not and failed the balancing act. 
 
2.1.3  Distinguishing Features of Contracts of Insurance 
As they govern the transfer of a risk the law treats contracts of insurance as 
different from standard commercial contracts.  Insurance policies are subject to 
the usual general contractual rules but in addition, there are a few legal principles 
that apply only to insurance and reinsurance policies.  These are the principle of 
indemnity, the legal status of warranties and the doctrine of uberrimae fides
10.   
 
A Contract of Indemnity 
Most commercial contracts of insurance are a subspecies of a contract of 
indemnity
11.  A contract of indemnity is “a contract whereby the insurer 
undertakes to indemnify the assured, in the manner and to the extent thereby 
agreed, against losses.”
12  The insured can only recover under the insurance to the 
extent that he has suffered a loss.  In other words, the insured cannot make a 
profit.  This close connection between the payment due under a policy of 
insurance and the actual loss suffered is an important aspect of insurance law
13.   
                                           
10 Colinvaux & Merkin (n 7) para A-0030. 
11 Arguably contracts of life assurance or the so called “valued policies” are not contracts 
of indemnity since under those policies the assured receives a pre-agreed fixed sum upon 
the insured event happening.  See Colinvaux & Merkin (n 7) A-0388. 
12 Colinvaux & Merkin (n 7) para 0003. 
13 Such is this connection that the Law  Commission and the Scottish Law Commission 
considered the view that the principle of indemnity in practice has the same effect as the 
requirement that the insured should have an insurable interest.  It therefore proposed 
abolishing the requirement for an insurable interest for indemnity insurance contracts.  
See Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Insurable Interest (Insurance Contract 
Law, Issue Paper 4, January 2008) para 8.4.  This however has now been abandoned in 
favour  of  a  proposal  that  there  should  be  a  new  statutory  requirement  for  insurable 
interest.   See Law  Commission and Scottish Law Commission,  Insurance Contract Law: 
Post Contractual Duties and Other Issues (Insurance Contract Law, Consultation Paper No 
201, December 2011). Part I/Chapter 2 
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As will be seen later in this thesis, the LMX Spiral operated to disconnect 
payments made by reinsurers from the original loss.  However, the payments 
made under the XL contracts that formed the LMX Spiral were based on the 
principle of indemnity: the reinsureds received payment based on their loss.  The 
difficulty arose from the fact that the amalgamated losses of all reinsureds 
outweighed by far the original loss suffered by the primary insured.  The gross 
amount of claims paid to all reinsureds could be 10 times higher in value than the 
original loss
14.  Some consider this gearing effect to be a harmless feature of the 
LMX Spiral
15.  Nevertheless, it added a sizeable administrative and financial cost 
to those who participated in the LMX Spiral.   
 
Warranties 
Warranties are not particularly relevant to this thesis but it is worth noting that 
the law of insurance warranties has developed to protect insurers against the risk 
of the adverse event becoming more likely to happen.  A warranty is a term that 
goes to the root of the contract of insurance
16.  A breach of a warranty, no matter 
how trivial, automatically discharges insurers from liability
17, even if there is no 
causal link between the breach and the loss in question.   
 
The Doctrine of Utmost Good faith 
The doctrine of uberrimae fidei, or good faith, has been developed to protect 
insurers because they are underwriting an unknown risk.  The duty, which applies 
                                           
14 For more information on the gearing effect see s 3.2.1 of this thesis. 
15  Tony Berry, a leading XL underwriter takes the view that the LMX Spiral does not 
increase the loss but only redistributes it.  See Tony Berry, ‘TR Berry Marine Syndicate 536 
Underwriter’s Report’ (1992). 
16 The Marine Insurance Act 1906 s.33(1), which applies to all types of insurance contracts 
and not just marine insurance, defines a warranty as follows: “A warranty, in the following 
sections relating to warranties, means a promissory warranty, that is to say, a warranty 
by which the assured undertakes that some particular thing shall or shall not be done, or 
that some condition shall be fulfilled, or whereby he affirms or negatives the existence of 
a particular state of facts”. 
17 MIA, s 33(3).     Part I/Chapter 2 
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to both parties to the insurance contract, requires them to act in good faith.  It is 
enshrined in section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (MIA) as follows: 
“17 Insurance is uberrimae fidei 
A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good 
faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the 
contract may be avoided by the other party.” 
In practice the duty has been most significant at the pre-contract stage as it 
imposes on the insured a duty to disclose all “material circumstances”
18 known to 
him, and circumstances are material if they “would influence the judgment of a 
prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the 
risk”
19.  Failure to comply with the duty of utmost good faith has drastic 
consequences: the insurer is entitled to avoid the policy of insurance ab initio i.e. 
act as if the policy never existed.  The rationale behind this rule is that the insurer 
is taking on a risk he knows nothing about and therefore he must rely on the 
openness of the insured to decide whether he has the means to carry the risk and 
at what price
20.   
Much has been written about the duty of disclosure and whether its rationale still 
applies today.  The duty was developed at a time when a large proportion of 
insurance contracts covered perilous marine voyages.  Insurers had no control 
over the voyages themselves or the ship or the crew, and potentially little 
knowledge of the perils of the sea.  This does not necessarily apply today: 
insurers can gather information on the insured and the risk, and even direct the 
ways in which the insured will manage the subject matter of the insurance.   
As will be seen later in this thesis, however, XL reinsurers are in a situation not 
dissimilar to their predecessors at the turn of the century which provided cover 
                                           
18 MIA, s 18(1). 
19 MIA, s 18(2). 
20 This reasoning originates from the well known case of Carter v Boehm (1736) 3 Burr 
1905 where Lord Mansfield said: “Insurance is a contract upon speculation.  The special 
facts,  upon which the contingent balance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the 
knowledge of the insured only: the under-writer trusts to his representation, and proceeds 
upon the confidence that he does not keep back any circumstances in his knowledge, to 
mislead the under-writer into a belief that the circumstances does not exist, and to induce 
him to estimate the risque as if it did not exist.” 
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for marine voyages.  XL reinsurers who became involved in the LMX Spiral 
reinsured large portfolios with minimal information concerning the individual 
risks they were taking on.  Some blamed this lack of information for their poor 
performance although the more competent XL underwriters managed their 
portfolios successfully.   
 
2.1.4  Insurable Interest 
Another way in which contracts of insurance differ from standard commercial 
contracts is the requirement that the insured must have an insurable interest in 
what is being insured.  What constitutes an insurable interest has been the 
subject of much case law as it varies depending on the subject matter of the 
insurance
21.  In their report on insurable interest
22 the Law Commission and 
Scottish Law Commission (together Law Commission) describe the concept as 
follows: 
“At its simplest, the doctrine of insurable interest requires that someone taking 
out insurance gains a benefit from the preservation of the subject matter of the 
insurance or suffers a disadvantage should it be lost.” 
The need for an insurable interest is usually justified on two grounds.  Firstly, 
such interest distinguishes insurance from wagers.  The Life Insurance Act 1774, 
also known, tellingly, as the Gambling Act 1774
23, made it a statutory 
requirement that the assured should have an insurable interest in the life being 
insured at the inception of the policy.  Its aim was to prevent the use of life 
insurance as a means to gamble on people’s life expectancy.  Secondly, and 
certainly more critically nowadays, an insured without an interest may stand to 
benefit from the early destruction of what is being insured.  This was recognised 
in the Marine Insurance Act 1745 which stated in its preamble: 
“It hath been found by experience, that the making of insurances, interest or no 
interest, or without further proof of interest than the policy, hath been productive 
                                           
21  Feasey  v  Sun  Life  Assurance  Co  of  Canada  [2003]  EWCA  Civ  885,  [2003]  2  All  ER 
(Comm) 587 para 71 per Waller LJ who said ‘it is difficult to define insurable interest in 
words which will apply in all situations. The context and the terms of a policy... will be all 
important’. 
22 Law Commission, Insurable Interest (n 13) para 1.8. 
23 See Colinvaux & Merkin (n 7) para A0387.     Part I/Chapter 2 
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of many pernicious practices, whereby great numbers of ships, with their cargo, 
have…been fraudulently lost or destroyed”.
24 
The rationale behind the requirement for an insurable interest therefore is to 
reduce risks associated with fraud and, more generally, moral hazard.  It has to 
be said however that moral hazard and fraud remain major issues for the 
insurance and reinsurance industry despite a long history of requiring insurable 
interest.   
The law on insurable interest may have changed in 2006 following the 
implementation of the Gambling Act 2005 (GA 2005)
25.  Those changes, however, 
are outside the scope of this thesis given that the LMX Spiral developed mainly 
during the 1980s and collapsed in the early 1990s.  In the 1980s, insurable 
interest was required for all types of insurance under complex and sometimes 
inconsistent sets of rules.  Under the MIA, which still applies today
26, the insured 
has an insurable interest in the “marine adventure” if “he stands in any legal or 
equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable property at risk” which 
means that he may benefit from the safe arrival of the insured property, or may 
be prejudiced if it is lost, damaged or detained; or he may incur liabilities in 
respect of the insured property
27.  This is a relatively restrictive view of insurable 
interest which requires the insured to hold legal or equitable rights or obligations 
concerning the subject matter of the insurance.  The principles applicable to 
                                           
24 As quoted in Colinvaux & Merkin (n 7) para A0385. 
25 Prior to the Gambling Act 2005 gaming or wagering contracts were null and void under 
s 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 .  The GA 2005 repealed this section with  effect from 1 
September 2006.  A new section 335 under the GA 2005 provides that gambling contracts 
are now enforceable but this is without prejudice to  “any  rule  of  law  preventing  the 
enforcement  of  a  contract  on  the  grounds  of  unlawfulness  (other  than  a  rule  relating 
specifically to gambling)”.   The impact of section 335  on the various rules concerning 
insurable interest varies depending on the type of insurance being considered.  There is, 
however, a view that many of those contracts still require something akin to an insurable 
interest because they are indemnity contracts and the insured cannot claim an indemnity 
until he/she has suffered a loss.  This area is currently under review.  See note on Law 
Commission proposals (n 13). 
26 Note that arguably the sections requiring an insurable interest have been nullified by s 
335 of the GA 2005.   See Colinvaux & Merkin (n 7) paras A-0393 and A-0393/1 for a 
detailed analysis of the impact of the GA 2005 on s 4 of the MIA. 
27 MIA, s 5(2). Part I/Chapter 2 
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marine risks are seen as “broadly applicable to non-marine risks”
28.  However, in 
some non-marine cases more tenuous connections between the insured and the 
subject matter of the insurance have been found to amount to an insurable 
interest.  This includes being in possession of the subject matter of the insurance 
and being under a duty to exercise reasonable care in respect it
29, or being in 
close physical relation to it
30.   
The significance of insurable interest for the thesis is that the requirement 
applies in the context of reinsurance.  A reinsured is required to have an 
insurable interest which is identified by reference to the original policy.  This 
chapter will show how this legal requirement is ill-fitted to the realities of XL 
reinsurance, where long chains of reinsurance disconnect the ultimate reinsured 
from the primary loss.  Such disconnection was a typical trait of the LMX Spiral.  
The workings of the LMX Spiral thus challenged the suitability of a well 
established legal principle to XL reinsurance.  The law concerning insurable 
interest is under review by the Law Commission.  After considering whether it 
should be abolished, the Law Commission’s current thinking is to retain the 
requirement that an insured should have an insurable interest in the subject 
matter of the insurance but to provide a clear statutory basis for this 
requirement
31. 
 
2.2  Reinsurance as a Spreading Mechanism 
2.2.1  Definition and Purpose of Reinsurance 
A well known definition of reinsurance is that it is the practice of “insuring 
insurers”
32.  More colloquially, it has been described as “insurance between 
                                           
28 MacGillivray, MacGillivray on Insurance Law (11th ed, 2008) 1-050. 
29 Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance (The Moonacre) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 501.  Here the 
insured was in possession of a yacht and responsible for its upkeep but did not own it. 
30 National Oilwell (UK) Ltd v Davy Offshore Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 582, where 
subcontractors who supplied goods constituting part of the overall works were found to 
have an insurable interest in the entire contract works due to their close physical relation 
to the insured property. 
31 See n 13 above. 
32 R Kiln and S Kiln, Reinsurance in Practice (4th edn, Witherby & Co Ltd, 2001) 1.       Part I/Chapter 2 
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consenting adults”
33.  Reinsurance is a contract of insurance entered into by two 
insurers.  The entity seeking the reinsurance, an insurer, is the reinsured, also 
called the cedant.  The entity offering cover is the reinsurer.  There is no limit on 
how many times the same risk can be reinsured.  Beyond the first level, the 
reinsurance is sometimes referred to as a ‘retrocession’, with reinsurers called 
retrocessionaires and their reinsured occasionally referred to as the retrocedant.  
There is no rule concerning the terminology, such that the terms reinsurer, 
reinsured and cedant are also used at the highest levels of reinsurance.  The only 
defining factor is that a retrocession is necessarily a reinsurance of a reinsurance.  
The contract being reinsured is sometimes referred to as the ‘inward reinsurance’ 
and the reinsurance contract that provides the cover is the ‘outward reinsurance.’   
The purpose of reinsurance is simply to spread the risk further amongst a larger 
number of players.  As world economies have become more sophisticated, 
globalised and technologically advanced, the need for reinsurance has increased.  
Nowadays reinsurance has evolved from simple risk sharing to become a 
sophisticated financial tool for insurers, always with the aim of spreading the risk 
further.  It has been said that:  
“the reinsurance market is a secondary market which serves the primary 
insurance market as an avenue for expansion and a means of procuring a variety 
of services which reduce risk on insurance portfolios.”
34 
By way of a brief overview, below are three of the main purposes served by 
reinsurance
35: 
1.  Increasing the capacity of insurers to accept risks.  Reinsurance allows the 
insurer to rely on the capital base of the reinsurer, thereby enabling the 
insurer to take on larger risks, or more risks than it would be able to if it 
only had its own capital to rely on. 
2.  Promoting financial stability.  Reinsurance can be used to “take out the 
peaks” of an insurer’s loss history by providing cover against the risk of 
accumulation of losses or of very large single losses due to a catastrophe.  
XL reinsurance is often used for this purpose. 
                                           
33 Reinsurance Practice and the Law, para 1-1 (R 39 February 2014). 
34 D E Ayling, Underwriting Decisions Under Uncertainty (Ashgate, 1984) 3. 
35 O’Neill and Woloniecki, The Law of Reinsurance in England and Bermuda (3rd ed, Sweet 
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3.  Strengthening the solvency of the insurer.  As noted above, insurers must 
now follow strict capital solvency requirements.  Reinsurance improves 
their solvency margin, which is calculated as a ratio of net premium 
income over capital and free reserves, because reinsurance frees capital. 
 
Reinsurance can be used for other specific purposes such as “fronting” 
arrangements.  These apply, for instance, where for regulatory reasons only local 
insurers are allowed to provide cover in a specific jurisdiction: they can then 
reinsure the entirety of the risk with the reinsurer.  The local insurer is used as a 
“front” to enable the reinsurer to access the relevant jurisdiction.  
At this point it is important to note that if the primary purpose of reinsurance is 
the spreading of risk, the LMX Spiral failed to achieve this by concentrating the 
losses amongst a few reinsurers rather than allowing their dispersal.  Likewise, 
the LMX Spiral did not deliver on financial stability, instead causing turmoil within 
the reinsurance markets when it collapsed.   
 
2.2.2  Types of Reinsurance Agreements 
Reinsurance contracts come in many varieties.  The usual way to categorise them 
is as follows: 
1.  firstly by reference to the two “basic” ways in which reinsurance contracts 
can be classified: proportional and non proportional;  
2.  secondly, by describing the two principal methods of effecting reinsurance: 
facultative reinsurance and non facultative reinsurance
36. 
This thesis is only concerned with XL contracts, which are a type of non 
proportional and, for most of those in use within the LMX Spiral, non facultative 
reinsurance.  However, it is worth explaining briefly how XL reinsurance fits 
within the general range of reinsurance products.   
 
Proportional/non-proportional reinsurance 
In proportional reinsurance the reinsurer underwrites a proportion of the risk and 
receives in exchange the same proportion of the premium.  Thus a reinsurer who 
takes on 20% of a risk would receive 20% of the premium paid to the reinsured.  
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By contrast, in non proportional reinsurance the reinsurer agrees to underwrite a 
tranche of the risk written by the reinsured.  The premium paid is not necessarily 
proportionate to the amount reinsured, as much will depend on the level of risk 
the reinsurer agrees to take on.   
 
Facultative/non facultative reinsurance 
Facultative reinsurance is understood to be the oldest form of reinsurance
37.  A 
facultative contract of reinsurance usually covers one specific risk, although some 
contracts may cover several risks and will still be considered to be facultative 
contracts of reinsurance.  The defining factor of facultative reinsurance is that the 
risk(s) subject to the cover are identifiable and the premium will be set 
specifically for those risks.  The scope of cover is also usually negotiable.  
Facultative reinsurance is therefore ‘tailor made’, meaning that it is set up for a 
particular risk such as a large property, refinery, oil platform or a specific event 
(concert, festival), etc.   
At the other end of the spectrum are reinsurance treaties, a form of non 
facultative reinsurance that provides cover for a multitude of similar risks.  A 
treaty reinsurance contract for instance would cover a direct insurer’s portfolio of 
motor insurance policies.  Usually risks are automatically covered, so that the 
reinsurer does not necessarily know at any one time what risks are included 
within the treaty.  In the above example, each time the direct insurer agrees to 
insure a new car, the new primary policy will automatically be covered by the 
reinsurance treaty.   
Facultative reinsurances can be both proportional and non proportional and the 
same can be said of non facultative reinsurances, although some combinations 
are more common than others.   
 
Most common types of reinsurance agreements: an overview 
There is a wide spectrum of reinsurance agreements between the “pure” 
facultative policy and a straightforward treaty reinsurance.  This section provides 
a brief overview of some of the most common types of reinsurance contracts. 
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1.  Quota Share: a quota share is a form of reinsurance where the reinsured 
cedes a fixed portion of each and every risk to the reinsurer who receives 
in exchange the same fixed portion of the premium.  As such it is the 
archetypal proportional reinsurance contract where the reinsurer shares in 
the fortunes of the ceding company.  It is also typically a non facultative 
type of treaty reinsurance
38. 
2.  Surplus Treaty: a surplus treaty is a form of quota share reinsurance where 
the reinsured only cedes a “surplus” liability over the retention the 
reinsured has set for itself.  The Surplus treaty is a proportional form of 
reinsurance because it provides cover on a proportional basis over the 
retention.  Since it is a treaty, it is a non facultative form of reinsurance. 
3.  Facultative/Obligatory Treaty also known as ‘fac./oblig.’.  A fac./oblig. is 
another variation of the Quota Share treaty, but in this case the reinsured 
selects either the risks he wants to cede and/or what proportion of his 
participation in the risk he intends to cede.  This is the facultative element.  
The reinsurer is obliged to accept these cessions.  This is the obligatory 
element.  A fac./oblig. is a facultative but proportional form of 
reinsurance. 
4.  XL. This is the most common form of non proportional reinsurance 
contract where the reinsurer takes on losses above a certain monetary limit 
up to a maximum figure.  XL can be facultative in which case it will cover 
only one risk; or non facultative where, for instance, the cover is in respect 
of any one event.  This is explained later on in this thesis.   
5.  Stop Loss.  A Stop Loss reinsurance is a form of XL reinsurance where the 
point at which the risk is ceded is not based on a fixed sum but on the 
cedant’s loss ratio, calculated by applying losses to the cedant’s total 
premium income.  Only once the ratio exceeds a pre-agreed point will the 
reinsurer become liable under the policy, up to an agreed percentage of 
the cedant’s premium income or up to a fixed monetary limit.  Stop Loss 
reinsurances are non proportional, and since they cover the cedant’s entire 
portfolio, they are non facultative.
39 
                                           
38 The phrase ‘quota share treaty’ is often treated as synonymous with the phrase ‘quota 
share  reinsurance’.    This  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  a  quota  share  reinsurance 
contract is necessarily non facultative. 
39 Stop loss policies are sometimes used as a technique to allow an insurer or reinsurer to 
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6.  Aggregate Excess of Loss.  Aggregate Excess of Loss reinsurances are 
similar to Stop Loss policies but they provide cover once the losses exceed 
a specified amount.  These are also non proportional and non facultative 
reinsurances. 
 
The closeness of the relationship between the reinsured and reinsurer and 
amount of control the latter has over the risk in question will vary depending on 
the type of contract entered into.  In the case of a proportional facultative 
reinsurance, for instance, where the reinsurer is underwriting 20% of a large 
refinery and receiving 20% of the premium, the reinsurer will certainly have some 
level of involvement once a claim is made by the underlying insured.  Another 
reinsurer providing Stop Loss cover at a much higher level for the same refinery 
as part of a portfolio of risks will not be so concerned with the one individual 
claim. 
 
2.2.3  The Use and Development of XL Reinsurance 
As explained above, XL is a non proportional form of reinsurance where the 
reinsurer provides cover above a specified amount, usually up to a maximum 
figure.  The sum below which no XL reinsurance is provided is called the 
deductible, priority, excess point or threshold.  The purpose of XL reinsurance is 
to limit the exposure of the insured either to a large individual risk (e.g. a high-
value property such as a refinery) or to an aggregation of losses caused by a 
single event (e.g. a natural disaster such as a hurricane)
40.  Thus cover is provided 
in respect of any one risk, or any one event.  The latter form of cover is more 
common nowadays.  XL cover per risk is now mainly used in the property 
branches of the reinsurance companies
41. 
This form of reinsurance is considered to be relatively new although it is unclear 
when XL reinsurance was first used in reinsurance markets
42.  Its invention is 
                                                                                                                                 
entity against all future liabilities.  Those “run-off” policies are sometimes considered to 
be another form of reinsurance but they are, in truth, a type of stop loss policy. 
40 David Walker and others, ‘Report of an Inquiry into Lloyd’s Syndicate Participations and 
the LMX Spiral’ (June 1992) para 2.2. 
41 The Insurance Institute of London, ‘Developments in Excess of Loss Reinsurance’ 
(Advance Study Group Report 244, Insurance Institute of London, May 2000) 34. 
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often attributed to Cuthbert Heath, a leading Lloyd’s broker and underwriter.  The 
story goes that after the devastating San Francisco earthquake of 1906, Heath 
was approached by Hartford Company of America with the request to provide 
cover for future catastrophes in a new format that would make the reinsurance 
simpler to administer.  (Treaty reinsurance requires the submission of monthly 
bordereaux and accounts detailing risks attaching to the treaty, premium due, 
claims made etc.)  It is said that Heath in response devised the first XL contract: a 
reinsurance that provided cover for catastrophes only and required less clerical 
work
43. 
Whilst interest in XL reinsurance grew steadily over the next few years, it was not 
until after the Second World War that XL reinsurance became widely used.  This 
was due to a combination of factors identified as follows: 
a)  The change in nature of the risks being insured including the arrival of the 
jumbo jet, supertankers, offshore rig installations, nuclear power stations 
etc.  All these required higher levels of insurance and, therefore, 
reinsurance cover. 
b)  Increasing liability risks connected to innovations in chemical, industrial, 
pharmaceutical and surgical industries. 
c)  An increase in administrative costs and court awards, and 
d)  The extension of traditional cover (i.e. proportional cover) to include 
extraneous perils
44. 
 
The above factors all point to an increase in the need for reinsurance, not all of 
which could be met by the providers of the more traditional proportional type 
reinsurance.  XL reinsurance offered many advantages to those in need of 
additional cover: it was simple and cheaper to administer, the cedant could retain 
a larger proportion of the original premium whilst providing a maximum limit to 
the retained cost of claims for a particular event.  There were disadvantages for 
the cedant too, one being the disassociation between its fortunes and that of the 
reinsurer.  This meant that on a given year the cedant could suffer a loss due to a 
multitude of small claims whilst its XL reinsurer made a profit on the same 
contract.  Another disadvantage of XL reinsurance is that the major part, or 
sometimes all, of the premium is payable at the outset, whilst in proportional 
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44 ibid 25.     Part I/Chapter 2 
  37     
reinsurance payment is usually quarterly or half quarterly in arrears.  The latter 
creates a positive cash flow for the reinsured as he receives the premium before 
some of it has to be passed on to the reinsurer.  By contrast, XL reinsurance can 
create a negative cash flow by requiring the reinsurance to be paid up front, 
sometimes prior to receipt of the reinsured premium.  Nevertheless XL 
reinsurance has grown steadily in popularity in the post-war years and it is now a 
major form of reinsurance used worldwide. 
 
2.2.4  Specific Features of XL Reinsurance 
An XL contract is a specialised form of reinsurance and, as such, it contains 
unique features, some of which became key elements in the development of the 
LMX Spiral.  To facilitate our analysis of these features, this section includes a 
very simple example of an XL reinsurance programme as set out below. 
 
The Reinsurex Programme 
A reinsurance company called ‘Reinsurex’ holds a reinsurance portfolio and 
calculates its Probable Maximum Loss
45 as amounting to £100 million.  The 
portfolio covers worldwide property risks.  More specifically, it comprises 
reinsurance contracts covering primary insurers from various global locations 
including the US and the Caribbeans, the UK and Europe.  Reinsurex decides to 
retain the first £10 million and to reinsure the remaining £90 million on the XL 
reinsurance market.  Reinsurex places its £90 million exposure on a ‘per event’ 
basis as follows: 
 
Reinsurance programme 
XL reinsurer C – £20 million excess £80 million 
XL reinsurer B – £30 million excess £50 million 
XL reinsurer A – £40 million excess £10 million 
Reinsurex – £10 million 
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Reinsurex suffers three 3 losses during the currency of the policies in the 
following order:  
a)  Loss 1: £60 million; 
b)  Loss 2: £40 million; and  
c)  Loss 3: £100 million. 
The scenario below is based on the assumption that none of the policies contains 
reinstatement so the layers will pay up only once.  In reinsurance parlance, once 
they have paid losses up to the limit of each policy, the layers have become 
‘exhausted’. 
Loss 1 (60 million):  The first £10m is retained by Reinsurex with the balance of 
the loss being recovered under layers A (£40 million) and B (£10 million). This 
loss exhausts layer A.  Layer B is still available to pay a further loss but this is 
limited to the £20 million cover remaining on that layer. 
Loss 2 (40 million):  This loss would have had an impact on layer A but since it 
was exhausted by Loss 1 it is no longer available. This means Reinsurex has to 
retain this loss in full. 
Loss 3 (£100 million):  Reinsurex has to retain the first £50 million of this loss 
because layer A was exhausted by Loss 1. In addition, layer B only has £20 million 
available coverage due to Loss 1.  Thus the £10 million that falls outside layer B 
will be retained by Reinsurex. This increases its retained loss to £60 million (£50 
million + £10 million).  Layer C will pay a total loss of £20 million and will become 
exhausted. 
After Loss 3 Reinsurex has no available reinsurance for any further losses it may 
suffer on the relevant property portfolio. 
The above is a much simplified example.  In reality, Reinsurex would probably 
have a combination of proportional and XL reinsurances in place in addition to 
the above.  It may also have sought cover of the lowest layers on a ‘per risk’ 
basis.  The same risk would then be reinsured under the above reinsurance 
programme prior to being bundled with other parts of Reinsurex’s portfolio 
(including, for instance, non property risks) to be protected by a Stop Loss 
reinsurance.  Reinsurex’s £10 million retention could well be reinsured in part 
too.   
In addition, there may be several reinsurers participating in one layer, each taking 
what is called a ‘line’ which is a certain percentage of the risk.  In our example     Part I/Chapter 2 
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there could be reinsurers A1 with a 10% line (an exposure of only £4 million), A2 
with a 20% line (£8 million) etc.  A group of reinsurers participating in the same 
layer is often led by a specialist in the particular type of risk who takes the largest 
line and is normally empowered to make decisions on behalf of the other 
reinsurers (the Leader).  Because they follow the Leader, the other reinsurers 
involved in the programme are referred to as ‘the following market’. 
Finally, each of the reinsurers involved will have its own reinsurance programme 
in place, most likely a mix of proportional and non proportional reinsurance 
covering their property and other exposures.  Reinsurer A1 for instance may have 
its own XL programme as well as a Quota Share reinsurance in place.   
The result is a very complex web of contractual relationships covering the same 
risks.  However, despite the complexity of its arrangements, reinsurance usually 
works as an efficient spreading mechanism for the world’s largest risks.   
 
Layering 
Each reinsurer provides cover for a tranche, or a layer, of Reinsurex’s portfolio.  A 
reinsurance programme of this type is sometimes called a “reinsurance tower”.  
The layering enables the business to be placed more easily.  More reinsurers will 
be able to participate in a smaller tranche, often because they follow an 
underwriting policy that imposes a limit on their level of participation in any one 
contract, known as the ‘maximum line in any one contract’
46.  In our example, 
more reinsurers could participate in a layer with a maximum liability of £40 
million (e.g. layer A which is £40 million excess £10 million) than a layer with a 
potential liability of up to £90 million (this would be a layer covering the entire 
programme of £90 million excess £10 million).   
Also, different reinsurers will be interested in providing cover at different levels 
thus widening the pool of interested parties.  Some reinsurers for instance 
specialise in catastrophe cover and would only quote for layer C, whilst others 
may prefer to be involved at a lower layer such as layer A.  
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Working v Catastrophe layers 
In the London reinsurance market the lower layers are often called ‘working 
layers’: they are the ones that are ‘worked’ the hardest because they are affected 
more often.  Layers sitting higher up in the reinsurance tower are known as the 
catastrophe layers.  As with so many things concerning reinsurance in the London 
market, there is no scientific or official definition of what a working or 
catastrophe layer is.  As a rule of thumb, however, a layer would qualify as a 
catastrophe layer if it requires two or more of the original policies to be affected 
by the same event
47.  It is worth clarifying here that ‘per event’ XL reinsurance will 
cover a section of a reinsurer’s account or even its entire portfolio
48.  This 
necessarily includes a multitude of policies.  Facultative XL policies do exist (these 
would be ‘per risk’) but they are less usual as mentioned previously. 
In the above example, layer A is a working layer (bearing in mind the relatively 
small retention of £10 million) whilst layer C is a catastrophe layer.  Taking the 
above losses as an example, only Loss 3, at £100 million, was large enough to 
reach layer C.  Such a large loss would have been caused by one event, for 
instance a hurricane, damaging properties covered by more than one of the 
Reinsurex policies (being the policies under which Reinsurex provides reinsurance 
to the primary insurers). 
 
Premium 
As shown in the Reinsurex example, the likelihood of a risk reaching a layer 
depends on the size of the original loss, with the upper layers being impacted 
only by the largest losses.  Premiums are calculated accordingly: they decrease as 
the risk makes its way up the reinsurance programme, diminishing with each 
layer.  Logically, working layers cost more than catastrophe layers.  It is 
                                           
47 The Insurance Institute of London, ‘Excess of Loss Methods of Reinsurance’ (Report by 
Advance  Study  Group  218,  Insurance  Institute  of  London,  1988)  para  2.1.2.    See  also 
Ayling  (n  34)  8.  This has been confirmed by lead LMX underwriter Tony Berry during 
interviews with the author of this thesis. 
48 There are called, respectively, “specific treaties” (accounts that contain the same type of 
risks such as hull, cargo, oil rigs etc.) or “whole account” (entire portfolio).  For a more 
detailed analysis of this type of XL coverage see s 3.2.2 of this thesis.     Part I/Chapter 2 
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understood that at the time of the LMX Spiral, rates at the higher level of XL 
reinsurance tended to be similar
49. 
In the context of the LMX Spiral, some brokers put together entire reinsurance 
programmes with pre-established fixed premiums based on ‘rate on line’ (ROL) 
calculations.  The ROL was the ratio the premium bore to the line underwritten.  
Those ROLs were usually very crudely calculated by fixing a premium on the 
bottom layer and applying a discount for each layer up the chain of reinsurances.  
Whilst there is nothing wrong in principle with using ROL to fix a premium, 
pricing entire reinsurance programmes in advance based purely on the layering 
was inappropriate, because the price was unrelated to the amount of exposure 
taken on by the reinsurers.  This approach overlooks the very nature of insurance 
and reinsurance set out earlier in this chapter which is all about quantifying and 
managing the risk being taken on.   
Fixing the premium for an XL contract is a complex exercise dependent on much 
more than the position of the particular reinsurance layer.  The premium should 
include provisions for the risk of loss, a reserve, provisions for catastrophe 
losses, brokerage, management expenses and a margin, including a contribution 
towards a solvency margin
50.  There were also countless ways of charging a 
premium, all of which were well known in the mid 1980s when the LMX Spiral 
developed.  These included the straightforward flat premium (a single figure 
covering the entirety of the life of the contract) or a variable premium based on 
changes in exposure, such variations to be calculated by reference to a fixed rate 
or a rate that varied in accordance with the claims experience.  Some reinsurers 
also offered profit commission or rebates based on the claims experience, 
sometimes computed over a number of years
51.  At the time “payback” was also 
widespread.  This was a practice whereby the reinsured would pay back over a 
number of years any claims monies received from the reinsurer.  The amount to 
be repaid was added to the premium for the relevant years.   
 
                                           
49  The  premium  would  still,  however,  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  account  being 
reinsured.    For  instance  there  would  be  little  difference  in  pricing  between  two 
catastrophe layers protecting hull accounts, but a catastrophe layer protecting a property 
account would be priced differently. 
50 The Insurance Institute of London 1988 (n 47) para 2.3.4. 
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Balancing the portfolio 
As explained above an insurer must ensure its portfolio is well balanced by 
avoiding over-exposure to a single loss.  This requires risks to be spread by type 
and/or geographically
52.  XL business, however, is more volatile than traditional 
insurance: it is a high risk/high reward type of business where the balancing act 
is more difficult to achieve. 
This difficulty is due to the fact that many XL contracts, particularly catastrophe 
layers, cover losses of low frequency but very high magnitude.  The basic 
principle that premiums and other income earned must pay for the claims 
remains.  However, profits can only be conceived over the long term: when there 
are no catastrophes the business is highly profitable, but one catastrophe can 
wipe out all profits achieved over a number of years.  The balancing act therefore 
takes longer.  In additions, reinsurers in the UK at the time of the LMX Spiral were 
discouraged from building up funds in the good years because rules concerning 
the tax treatment of reserves only allowed capital to be retained for outstanding 
claims or estimated future claims known as Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) 
claims
53. 
It was also more difficult for XL underwriters to spread the risk geographically 
because natural catastrophes tend to concentrate in a few specific areas of the 
world.  For instance, the west coast of the US is a major source of hurricane 
losses whilst Japan is prone to earthquakes.  It is difficult to balance those risks 
elsewhere.  This was articulated by the defendant underwriters in the lead case on 
the LMX Spiral, Deeny v Gooda Walker:
54 
“It has always been the defendants' case that the type of balance that I have just 
described, achieved year by year, is not compatible with writing excess of loss 
business on any scale. In so far as it concerns the concept of achieving balance by 
dispersing the business written over different classes or geographical areas of 
risk, the defendants' stance on this point was supported by a number of witnesses 
including, most authoritatively, Mr Fryer. He told me that it was impossible to 
write an excess of loss account of any significance covering catastrophe perils 
and to achieve internal balance by such means. Most of the demand for excess of 
                                           
52 See section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
53 This was explained to the author of this thesis by Tony Berry. 
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loss cover came from the US and Europe and insufficient business could be 
written in other parts of the globe to balance exposure to those areas”
55. 
 
Vertical exposure 
One of the aims of XL reinsurance is to smooth the cedant’s results by taking the 
peaks out of the cedant’s loss records.  A well placed XL reinsurance portfolio 
should ensure that there is a line above which losses will be taken on by the XL 
reinsurers.  However, XL reinsurers provide cover up to a certain point.  This, in 
effect, creates a second line above which the particular XL policy offers no 
protection.  It is up to the cedant to keep a close eye on its aggregated exposure 
to ensure that it has additional cover in the event a loss breaches its reinsurer’s 
limit of liability.  Such additional cover can be purchased in the form of another 
layer of XL reinsurance to sit above the one in question, or the wider Stop Loss or 
Aggregate Excess of Loss contracts.  A reinsured’s exposure to losses on a 
vertical basis is aptly called the vertical exposure
56. 
Calculating a reinsured’s maximum exposure is not as simple as putting together 
the aggregate sum of all liabilities it has taken on.  If a reinsured has balanced its 
portfolio by spreading its risks, the likelihood of all policies turning into total loss 
due to the same event should be reduced.  Thus underwriters instead calculate 
the “Probable Maximum Loss” (PML), based on their analysis of the risk of several 
policies being impacted by the same event.  The PML is calculated by identifying 
those risks that may be exposed to the same catastrophe and applying a ‘PML 
factor’ to their cumulative value.  Depending on the risk profile of the aggregated 
risks, the PML factor could vary from 30% to 100%
57.  Based on its PML 
calculations, the underwriter would assess the level of reinsurance protection it 
required.   
                                           
55 ibid para 1240. 
56 This is the term used in the Gooda Walker judgment (n 1) 1244. 
57 For a detailed analysis of how a prudent underwriter would calculate its PML, see  Tony 
Berry,  ‘Expert  Report  on  Underwriting  Issues  by  Tony  Robert  Berry’  (Nederlandse 
Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow Ernst & Young [1997] LRLR 678) para 
8.2.    Mr  Berry’s  PML  factors  in  the  mid  1980s  were  as  follows:  100%  for  “XL  on  XL 
worldwide”,  “London  Market  Hull”,  “London  Market  Cargo”  as  well  as  “Specie  and  Rigs 
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Failure to appreciate the risk of losses breaching the upper limits of an XL 
programme lead to the risk of a cedant having insufficient reinsurance to meet 
the larger losses.  Those losses would then ‘come out of the top’ of the 
reinsurance tower and come back to the cedant.  This lack of reinsurance ‘at the 
top’ was a major issue within the LMX Spiral. 
Going back to our example, Reinsurex may have miscalculated its exposure, for 
instance by overlooking the fact that properties in the US and the Bahamas could 
be damaged by the same hurricane
58.  Reinsurex’s PML may therefore have been 
£150 million.  Even if the programme had remained untouched with no layers 
exhausted, if a loss of £150 million had gone through the reinsurance 
programme, £50 million would have ‘come out at the top’ which would have had 
to be paid by Reinsurex in addition to its £10 million retention. 
 
Horizontal exposure 
As illustrated with the Reinsurex example above, a succession of losses may have 
an impact on the same reinsurance programme and exhaust XL layers, 
particularly the working layers.  XL reinsurers can, however, provide additional 
cover by allowing the policy to be reinstated should a loss impact the layer.  Once 
reinstated, the same policy can be used to cover another event provided it falls 
within the parameters of the policy.  In the 1980s it was not unusual for XL 
reinsurance policies on the London market to contain one or two 
reinstatements
59.  Usually an additional premium has to be paid when the policy is 
reinstated, although in the heyday of the LMX Spiral such additional cover was 
sometimes given for free
60.   
                                           
58  This  is  what  happened  with  Hurricane  Andrew  in  1992  which  remains  one  of  the 
costliest natural disasters to date.  See section 3.3.2 of this thesis for more detail. 
59 D E A Sanders, ‘When the Wind Blow: An Introduction to Catastrophe Excess of Loss 
Reinsurance’ (C.A.S. Fall Forum 1995) p.158.  See also Arbuthnott v Feltrim Underwriting 
Agencies Ltd & Ors [1995] CLC 437.  At page 445 Phillips J states “It was the general 
practice of those writing marine catastrophe business to buy and sell cover that provided 
for two reinstatements.” 
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The additional exposure created by reinstatements is called the horizontal 
exposure
61.  Each reinstatement is, in effect, a new policy which requires its own 
reinsurance.  The easiest way to obtain such additional cover for the cedant is to 
ensure its reinsurance mirrors the number of reinstatements contained in the 
cedant’s own policies.  This was not always done by those who participated in the 
LMX Spiral. 
 
Underwriting discipline 
The above shows that XL reinsurance is a specialist and more risky type of 
reinsurance business which requires specialist knowledge and underwriting 
discipline.  In the context of the LMX Spiral such discipline was seriously lacking 
amongst a number of underwriters.  The following have been identified as the 
three “important decision areas over which the underwriter may exercise skill and 
judgement”
62 when writing catastrophe cover: 
 
1.  Pricing.  Setting the premium right is paramount in the context of 
insurance and reinsurance as this will determine the profitability of the 
business.  As we have seen, there are many sophisticated ways to set a 
premium for XL reinsurance.  The pricing of XL reinsurance programmes 
using ROL based purely on the level of a layer, as described above, was 
clearly inadequate yet it gained in popularity in the mid 1980s when the 
LMX Spiral developed.   
2.  Portfolio construction.  For the reasons stated above, achieving a balanced 
portfolio is more difficult in the context of catastrophe reinsurance.  
Catastrophe reinsurers must take a long-term, prudential view of their 
business but this was overlooked in the mid 1980s when few catastrophes 
made the business seem unrealistically lucrative. 
3.  Own reinsurance.  This requires the underwriter to monitor its aggregated 
exposure and calculate its PML, decide on the level of risk it is able to 
retain and reinsure the rest.  As shown above in the context of XL 
reinsurance such reinsurance must cover both vertical and horizontal 
exposure.  Many underwriters who chose to dabble in XL business in the 
                                           
61 This is the term used in the Gooda Walker judgment (n 1) 1244. 
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mid 1980s, and fuelled the development of the LMX Spiral, lacked the 
specialised knowledge to aggregate their exposure and calculate their 
PMLs. 
 
Case law concerning the LMX Spiral has explored how an underwriter using 
reasonable care and skill (the Reasonable LMX Underwriter) would have 
exercised its judgment when underwriting XL contracts.  A Reasonable LMX 
Underwriter would have formulated an underwriting plan encompassing all of the 
above points, with particular focus on aggregation, a careful consideration of the 
PML figure and the adequacy of its reinsurance protection
63. This is explored later 
on in this thesis. 
 
2.3  The Legal Nature of Reinsurance  
2.3.1  Reinsurance as Further Insurance 
We have described reinsurance as a contract of insurance between two insurers.  
The following definition by Lord Mansfield provided in the very early days of 
reinsurance law has been described as the “classic definition”’
64 for legal 
purposes: 
“This contract, although it much resembles, yet does not fully amount to a 
reassurance, which consists of a new assurance, effected by a new policy, on the 
same risk which was before insured, in order to indemnify the underwriters from 
their previous subscription and both policies are in existence at the same time.”
65 
Thus from a legal perspective the key components of a contract of reinsurance 
were as follows
66: 
1.  A contract of reinsurance is a contract of insurance.  This means the 
special insurance rules described above apply to reinsurance.  By way of 
reminder, this includes the principle of indemnity, the importance of 
warranties, the duty of utmost good faith and the need for insurable 
interest. 
                                           
63 See Gooda Walker (n 1) 1258–74. 
64 O’Neill and Woloniecki (n 35) para 1-27. 
65 Delver, Assignee of Bunn v Barnes (1807) 1 Taunt 48. 
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2.  The contract of reinsurance is a separate contract which is distinct from 
the underlying contract of insurance.  Thus the coverage offered by the 
insurance and reinsurance might differ in scope.  The overlap in coverage 
is largely dictated by the type of reinsurance agreement entered into.  A 
one off proportional facultative reinsurance contract is more likely to 
provide “matching cover” than catastrophe XL reinsurance covering a 
cedant’s entire portfolio.  
3.  The contract of reinsurance is also a contract of indemnity which covers 
the “same risk” as the underlying insurance.  In other words, reinsurance is 
not liability insurance triggered upon the liability the insurer to pay under 
the policy of insurance.  It is another insurance of the underlying risk.  This 
aspect of reinsurance is controversial and has been the source of recent 
case law which will be discussed later. 
4.  The contracts of insurance and reinsurance are “in existence at the same 
time”.  Given that the contracts may be entered into at different times, it 
may be more accurate to say that the contracts cover the same period of 
time. 
 
Defining and identifying contracts of reinsurance was of paramount importance at 
the time because the Marine Insurance Act 1745 rendered contracts of 
reinsurance unlawful
67.  This prohibition can certainly be explained by the then 
propensity of market players to use reinsurance contracts as a means of 
gambling.  The legal prohibition on reinsurance was lifted in 1864.   
As reinsurance has grown in popularity, its legal definition has remained 
unchanged.  Most notably, the principle remains that reinsurance is not a form of 
liability insurance.  This was already well established by 1925, when in the case of 
Forsikringsaktieselskabet National (of Copenhagen) v Attorney-General
68 the court 
noted that: 
 
 
                                           
67 S 4 of the Marine Insurance Act 1745 provided that “it shall not be lawful to make 
Reassurance, unless the Assurer shall be insolvent, become bankrupt or die...”. 
68 Forsikringsaktieselskabet National (of Copenhagen) v Attorney-General [1925] AC 639, 
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“It is now old law that by a contract of reinsurance the reinsurance party insures 
the original insuring party against the original loss, the original interest of the 
original insuring party being constituted by its policy given to the original 
insured”. 
The point was reiterated with some force in the well known case of Toomey v 
Eagle Star Insurance, where Hobhouse LJ stated that: 
“The argument of Eagle Star both before the judge and before this court sought to 
equate reinsurance with liability insurance.  This is not and never has been 
correct.  Liability insurance is a species of original insurance whereby an assured 
insures the risk of becoming liable to others.  A reinsurance contract is, properly 
defined, something different.”
 69 
More recently, in Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co
70, 
the House of Lords confirmed that a reinsurance contract is a further independent 
contract that provides cover for the “original” subject matter, that is, the subject 
matter of the underlying insurance. 
Whilst well established in law, this point is not without controversy.  The decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Wasa v Lexington clearly favoured the view that 
reinsurance is akin to liability insurance.  In Sedley J’s own words, the “need for 
the fiction that reinsurance covered the primary risk and not the insurer’s own 
potential liability [was] long spent.”
71  Even the House of Lords, when reversing 
the CA decision on this point recognised that “there is much to be said for the 
view that in commercial reality reinsurance is liability insurance which provides 
cover for the reinsured in the event that the reinsured is liable to pay the original 
insured”
72 but it declined to do so because of the regulatory implications this 
would have
73.  Critically, the point would have made no difference to the outcome 
                                           
69 Toomey v Eagle Star Insurance [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 516, 522. 
70 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2009] UKHL 40, [2010] 1 
AC 180.  
71 Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2008] EWCA Civ 
150, [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 1085, para 49. 
72 Wasa v Lexington (n 70) paras 114 and 115 per Lord Collins of Mapesbury. 
73  Currently reinsurers are subject to regulation based on the class of business they 
engage in which is determined by the nature of the original risk (e.g. property, casualty 
etc).  For a more detailed analysis of the regulatory view of reinsurance see  Özlem Gürses     Part I/Chapter 2 
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of the case and the House of Lords therefore felt this was the inappropriate forum 
to reconsider such a well established legal principle.   
A number of renowned commentators take the view that reinsurance ought to be 
treated as liability insurance
74.  Ascertaining the legal nature of reinsurance is 
important for regulatory reasons but also because it has an effect on the ease 
with which a reinsured may recover from its reinsurer.  If reinsurance is a further 
insurance of the underlying risk, the reinsured must prove that the loss fell within 
the terms of both the inward contract and the outward reinsurance.  This is 
cumbersome.  By contrast, if reinsurance is a form of liability insurance, once he 
has established that the loss fell within the terms of the inward contract the 
reinsured enjoys a “more or less automatic link to the reinsurance”
75 because his 
liability under the terms of the inward contract is what is being covered by the 
reinsurance. 
This issue is also significant for this thesis because, in the context of the LMX 
Spiral, the XL reinsurances operated in a way that made them more akin to 
liability insurance.  This is explored in Part III of this thesis. 
 
2.3.2  Insurable Interest in Reinsurance 
A reinsurance contract is subject to the requirement that the reinsured should 
have an insurable interest in the subject matter of the reinsurance.  As explained 
above, the subject matter of a reinsurance contract is legally deemed to be the 
original risk.  This raises the question of the nature of the insurable interest of 
the reinsured. 
Section 9 of the MIA provides that “The insurer under a contract of marine 
insurance has an insurable interest in his risk, and may re-insure in respect of it”. 
                                                                                                                                 
and Rob Merkin, ‘Facultative reinsurance and the full reinsurance clause’ [2008] LMCLQ 
366, 371. 
74 See RL Carter, LD Lucas & N Ralph, Reinsurance (Guy Carpenter, 5th edition, 2013) ch 
1, Introduction (b).  See also Gürses and Merkin ibid; Özlem Gürses, Reinsuring Clauses 
(London:  Informa  2009),  ch  1  para  1.4;  Özlem  Gürses  ‘The  Construction  of  Terms  of 
facultative Reinsurance Contracts: Is Wasa v Lexington the Exception or the Rule?’ MLR 
(2010) 73 (1) 119-130 and Malcolm Clarke, ‘The Contractual Nature of Reinsurance’ CLJ 
2010 69(1) 24-25. 
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The nature of that insurable interest is not necessarily obvious, given that the 
reinsured has no legally recognised proprietary rights or other direct interest in 
the original risk.   In Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan
76, Lord Hoffman 
commented that a contract of reinsurance: 
“…is not an insurance of the primary insurer’s potential liability or disbursement.  
It is an independent contract between reinsured and reinsurer in which the 
subject matter of the insurance is the same as that of the primary insurance, that 
is to say, the risk to the ship or goods or whatever might be insured.  The 
difference lies in the nature of the insurable interest, which in the case of the 
primary insurer, arises from its liability under the original policy.” 
Given that the reinsured has no proprietary rights in the original risk, its interest 
can only arise from its liability under the (re)insurance it has provided to cover 
that risk.  To distinguish this from liability insurance, however, the law treats the 
insurable interest of the reinsured as an interest in the underlying risk.  This may 
work in the context of facultative reinsurance, where the risk being transferred is 
identifiable although doubts have been raised about the adequacy of this 
principle for facultative proportional reinsurance
77.  In any case, this 
argumentation becomes tenuous in the context of XL reinsurance, where 10 or 
more layers may separate the reinsurer sitting on top of the reinsurance tower 
from the underlying risk.   
This disconnection between the ultimate reinsurer and the primary insurance was 
recognised in the well known case of Hill and ors v Mercantile and General 
Reinsurance Company
78.  Here, the House of Lords had to opine on a “follow the 
settlement” clause, a clause designed to compel reinsurers to follow the 
settlement of their reinsured.  The case concerned losses emanating from the 
seizure and destruction of 15 aircraft during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces 
in 1990.  The aircraft had first been insured by Kuwaiti insurance companies 
(Level 1) before being reinsured on the London market (Level 2).  The reinsurers 
under those reinsurance contracts had then entered chains of XL reinsurances.  A 
dispute had arisen concerning the reinsurance of the penultimate XL contracts 
                                           
76 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313, [1996] 5 Re LR 411, 419.  See also 
Skandia International Corp v NRG Victory Reinsurance Limited [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 439. 
77 Gürses, Merkin and Clarke (n 74).   
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(Level 3) by the final layer of outward XL reinsurances (Level 4).  The relevant 
reinsurances contained the following follow the settlement clause:  
“All loss settlements by the reassured including compromise settlements and the 
establishment of funds for the settlement of losses shall be binding on the 
reinsurers, providing such settlements are within the terms and conditions of the 
original policies and/or contracts… and within the terms and conditions of this 
reinsurance.” 
The decision reaffirmed the independence of reinsurance agreements making it 
clear that establishing liability under the underlying insurance was not sufficient 
to impose payment obligations on the reinsurers.  The basic principle is that a 
loss has to fall both within the terms of the underlying insurance and the terms of 
the reinsurance to become payable by the reinsurer.  The follow the settlement 
clause did little more than restate this principle.   
Of particular interest for our current purposes, however, are the comments made 
concerning the relevance of the original loss.  Lord Mustill first noted that when 
considering whether a loss settlement fell within the ambit of the clause, the 
instinct was to consider the relevant settlement to be that of the original insurer 
i.e. Level 1.  However, he went on to say that this was incorrect because the 
follow the settlement clause referred to the loss settlement of the reinsured.  
Thus, one only had to look at the settlement entered into at Level 3 to consider 
whether the reinsurers at Level 4 should be bound to pay.
79 
This decision is clearly based on the actual wording of the follow the settlement 
clause set out above which expressly refers to the “loss settlements by the 
reassured”.  It is perfectly possible for a loss that falls within the terms of the 
original insurance policies to be outside the scope of a reinsurance policy.  In 
fact, in this case there were discrepancies in the period clauses at Level 1 and 
Level 3 which meant that losses that fell squarely within the Level 1 insurance 
may have been outside the scope of the Level 3 reinsurances.   
Lord Mustill’s view made more commercial sense.  Between Levels 2 and 3 the 
risk had been through the LMX Spiral: a complex web of XL reinsurances which 
we are told is now impossible to replicate
80.  By way of illustration, the claimant in 
                                           
79 ibid 1254.  
80  This is according to Mr R Bulmer, an actuarial expert who has created the most 
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Hill v Mercantile had paid over 10,000 claims in respect of the Kuwait loss
81.  In 
practical terms, this meant a risk could not be “tracked down” the LMX Spiral.  
Nevertheless, Lord Mustill’s decision to focus on the settlement at the level of the 
inward reinsurance, Level 3, sits uneasily with the legal view that what is being 
reinsured at Level 4 is the actual loss suffered at Level 1, and that the insurable 
interest of the reinsured links to the original property. 
Lord Mustill’s reasoning on this point was endorsed in the more recent case of 
Equitas v R&Q
82.  The case arose because irrecoverable losses had been 
erroneously paid and other losses wrongly aggregated whilst making their way 
through the LMX Spiral.  This caused serious difficulties not only because the 
overpayments did not fall within the scope of the reinsurances, but also, and 
more critically, because those errors had caused excess points and policy limits 
to have been reached much earlier than they should have been.  The reinsurers 
refused to indemnify without strict proof of liability under each and every 
underlying contract.  Expert evidence established that such proof was impossible 
to provide because the LMX Spiral could not be reconstructed.  The reinsurance 
contracts contained a follow the settlement clause in terms identical to those 
examined by the HL in Hill v Mercantile and set out above.   
Relying on Lord Mustill’s analysis, Gross J concluded that the relevant losses were 
those of the layer sitting just below the reinsurance in dispute so that the 
reinsured, to prove its losses, did not have to prove excess points and policy 
limits had been breached under each and every underlying reinsurance contract.  
Again, this decision can be explained by the specific difficulties presented by the 
LMX Spiral but Gross J clearly took the view that the analysis by Lord Mustill 
applied to all XL reinsurances, regardless of participation in the LMX Spiral.   
It is submitted that the views of Lord Mustill and Gross J reflect market practice.  
A catastrophe reinsurer certainly feels very little connection, if any, with individual 
risk insured as part of its portfolio.  In fact, many underwriters know little about 
the reinsurances that sit below the one they are concerned with.  Considering that 
the insurable interest that is being reinsured somehow links back to the primary 
layer seems at odds with the way in which the XL market works.   
                                                                                                                                 
Equitas (n 1) case.  His model only represents some of the features of the LMX Spiral that 
were identified as key to quantify the losses in dispute. 
81 Hill v Mercantile (n 78) 1245. 
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As with the ‘orthodox view’ that reinsurance is a further insurance of the original 
subject matter, the legal theory that the insurable interest of a reinsured links 
back to the original risk has been criticised by many commentators.  This 
includes Professor Robert Merkin and Ozlem Gürses who wrote “Given that 
reinsurance and insurance contracts are independent of each other and that 
there is no privity of contract between the assured and the reinsurer, so that the 
assured cannot make a direct claim against the reinsurer, it is curious to see an 
explanation of insurable interest on the basis that the reinsurers have in fact 
insured the subject-matter of the original insurance contract.”
83 
One view is that the rule concerning insurable interest fits better the facultative 
reinsurance contract scenario, and the question has been raised by O’Neill and 
Woloniecki whether the “facultative marine reinsurance contract of the kind 
contemplated by s.9 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 should constitute the 
paradigm for all reinsurance contracts.”
84  McGillivray suggests: “It may be that 
the subject-matter and insurable interest are sometimes for practical purposes 
identical, as in the case of reinsurance of a professional indemnity or public 
liability insurer, or that the subject-matter of the reinsurance cannot readily be 
equated with the subject-matter of the original insurance, as in the case of non-
proportional reinsurance.”
85 
 
2.4  Concluding Remarks 
The LMX Spiral comprised contracts of XL reinsurance.  Such contracts are subject 
to the general rules of insurance law which apply indiscriminately to all types of 
reinsurances.  This includes the rule that reinsurance contracts are further 
reinsurances of the risk insured at the primary layer and that the insurable 
interest of the reinsured links to that risk.  It is submitted that the LMX Spiral put 
to the test those legal principles and raises the question whether all reinsurances 
should be subject to the same legal principles. 
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3  Factual Overview of the LMX Spiral 
 
Now that we have set the legal background through our study of insurance law 
and XL reinsurance contracts, in this chapter we aim to provide a factual overview 
of the LMX Spiral.  We first outline its key features before providing a history of 
its development, from its first appearance to its unwinding, the latter 
precipitating the near collapse of the Lloyd’s insurance market. 
 
3.1  The Lloyd’s Insurance Market 
Before we describe in some detail the LMX Spiral and consider how it developed, 
it is important to give a brief overview of the Lloyd’s insurance market (Lloyd’s) 
and explain its unusual structure.  Although the LMX Spiral was a feature of the 
London market as a whole, Lloyd’s was at the heart of it and the demise of the 
LMX Spiral was a major contributor to the serious crisis the market had to face in 
the early 1990s.  The crisis forced some overdue changes within Lloyd’s which 
will be explained in due course.  For the purposes of this chapter however our 
description focuses on the era of the LMX Spiral which is the 1980s. 
 
3.1.1  Origins of Lloyd’s  
The Lloyd’s insurance market in London has an interesting and colourful history.  
Whilst describing it in minute detail would be superfluous to this thesis
86, a brief 
overview will explain some of its most unusual characteristics which are key to 
understand most of the case law that relates to the LMX Spiral, as will be seen 
later in this thesis.   
Lloyd’s origins date back to the late 17
th century
87 at a time when some of the 
business in the City of London was transacted within coffee houses.  One of those 
                                           
86 For the more detailed history see Julian Burling, Lloyd’s: Law and Practice (Informa 
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coffee houses, owned by a certain “Edward Lloyd’s”, developed a reputation for 
insurance business, mainly marine insurance.  Individuals willing to provide 
insurance cover would attend the coffee house and be approached by shipowners 
and merchants seeking insurance protection.  As the insurance business 
developed, “office keepers” started to act as full time brokers on behalf of the 
shipowners.  The brokers would walk around the coffee house with a short 
document providing summary information about the voyage and/or the ship to 
be insured and ask those interested in providing insurance to sign the document.  
The document became known as the slip and those who signed by “writing under” 
the text in the slip became known as the “underwriters”.  The Lloyd’s coffee 
house also started publishing a list of shipping movements, now known as the 
“Lloyd’s List” and which is still being published today.  The Lloyd’s insurance 
market quickly gained prominence in the world of insurance as it continued to 
develop in the 18
th and 19
th centuries, moving premises several times along the 
way.   
In May 1871, Lloyd’s, described as “the Establishment or Society formerly held at 
Lloyd’s Coffee House”
88, was incorporated under the terms of Lloyd’s Act 1871.  
This was followed by more legislation
89 ending with Lloyd’s Act 1982, the statute 
that still governs Lloyd’s today.  Incorporation created what is known as “the 
Society of Lloyd’s” or “the Corporation of Lloyd’s”: an unregistered company
90 with 
a separate legal entity distinct from that of its members.  The Corporation of 
Lloyd’s, however, is not an insurance company since it does no underwriting.  
Instead, it provides and regulates a marketplace where its members carry on 
business individually.  This unusual set up is the direct result of the ways in which 
the market developed.  From a coffee house, it became a sophisticated market 
place recognised by statute.  Nevertheless, by the time of the Lloyd’s Act 1982, 
the basic principles remained unchanged: Lloyd’s was, first and foremost, a 
                                                                                                                                 
earliest surviving reference to Edward Lloyd’s coffee house was also an advertisement in 
the London Gazette dated 1688/9 offering a reward for the recovery of stolen watches 
(Burling (n 86) para 2.2). 
88 Lloyd’s Act 1871 app 1. 
89 This includes Lloyd’s Act 1911, Lloyd’s Act 1951 (each as amended by Lloyd’s Act 1982) 
and Lloyd’s Act 1982 (as amended by the Legislative Reform (Lloyd’s) Order 2008, SI 
2008/3001).  See Burling (n 86) para 3.2. 
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market where individuals could provide insurance for their own account.  The 
procedure to place risk was still exactly the same as in the early days: brokers 
would walk around what became known as “the Room”, where underwriters sitting 
at desks, called “Boxes”, would agree to take some of the risk by “scratching” or 
applying their stamp to slip presented to them by brokers.  Brokers would “do the 
round” around the Room until they had obtained the requisite level of cover.   
 
3.1.2  Lloyd’s Members and their Agents 
Lloyd’s Members: the Names 
We have just seen that whilst the Lloyd’s insurance market evolved from being an 
informal market place in a coffee house to a corporation, its structure remained 
unchanged.  At its heart were the individuals who chose to engage in insurance 
using their own funds.  These individuals were the Lloyd’s members, also known 
as the “Names”.  The underwriting, however, became more complex and 
therefore many of the Names delegated the underwriting to specialist 
underwriters.  The Lloyd’s Act 1982 introduced a distinction between “Working 
Members” and “External Members” of Lloyd’s.  The Working Members were the 
Names who worked within the Lloyd’s market and the External Members were 
those who did not.   
Names who became Lloyd’s members did so as sole trader with unlimited liability.  
It is probably this aspect of Lloyd’s that made it so unique: the way the market 
was funded by a large number of individuals who acted each for their own 
account.  Thus even if several Names had underwritten the same contract of 
insurance, they had to do so with several liability.  Whilst it may seem surprising 
that at the time of Lloyd’s Act 1982 no attempt was made to modernise the 
insurance market, it must be remembered that Lloyd’s unusual set up was 
perceived to be one of its strength.  As we will see later in this chapter, the crisis 
of the early 1990 changed this view and it led to the acceptance of corporate 
capital within Lloyd’s.  In 1994, for the first time in its history, Lloyd’s allowed 
companies to become members and, critically, to do so on the basis that their 
shareholders would only have limited liability.  This was a significant change and 
one that was very successful.  In 2012, corporate members represented 97 per 
cent of the underwriting capacity of the Lloyd’s market
91. 
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The Syndicates 
The early days of the coffee house over, Names started to group together to 
accept insurance business.  The groupings became known as “Syndicates” and 
these have become the life blood of the market.  Names are now prohibited from 
carrying out insurance business at Lloyd’s other than through participation in a 
Syndicate
92.  The Syndicates, whilst recognised in law
93, have no legal personality.  
At the time of the LMX Spiral, each Syndicate was a grouping of individual sole 
traders.  Nowadays, many Syndicates are owned by a single corporate entity.  
Thus whilst the reforms in 1994 allowed corporate capital within Lloyd’s for the 
first time, companies could only join through participation in a Syndicate.   
Syndicates are managed by Managing Agents whose job is to employ 
underwriting and other staff to accept insurance business on behalf of the Names 
(and/or, nowadays, companies) who are members of the relevant Syndicate (the 
Syndicate Members).  The underwriters sit at the Box and use their Syndicate’s 
stamp to accept risk on behalf of the Syndicate’s Members.  Each Syndicate 
Member becomes severally liable under the insurance contract entered into in 
shares determined by the Syndicate’s constitution, also sometimes known as the 
“stamp” for the relevant year of account. 
An important feature of Syndicates is that they are annual ventures.  This means 
that, technically, every calendar year a Syndicate ceases to exist and is replaced 
by a new one even if its members remain exactly the same.  The Syndicate is 
allowed a period of three years to settle its accounts.  After those three years, any 
outstanding liabilities are reinsured under what is called “Reinsurance to Close” 
(RITC) by either the new members of the same Syndicate or by another Syndicate.  
RITC only works if the outstanding liabilities can be accurately quantified.  As we 
will see later in this chapter, the inability of underwriters to properly appraise 
outstanding liabilities for RITC purposes was one of the early signs of the Lloyd’s 
crisis. 
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The Members Agents and Managing Agents 
We have just seen that Managing Agents are those in charge of managing the 
Syndicates.  In the 1980s they were considered to be the agents of the Names 
although in many cases the agency relationship was indirect.  The agents who 
had direct relationship with the Names were the Members Agents whose role 
was to advise the Names and look after their interests in the Lloyd’s market.  For 
External Names, the advice of the Members’ Agent was crucial as it could be the 
only source of information they relied upon to invest in Lloyd’s.  The Members 
Agent would then appoint Managing Agents on behalf of the Names through sub-
agency agreements.  Some agents acted as both Members and Managing Agents 
in which case they were called “Combined Agents” and the Names they acted for 
were called the “Direct Names”.  The relationship between Names and both 
Members and Managing Agents was put under scrutiny in one of the early cases 
of the Lloyd’s crisis
94.  This is explored later in this thesis. 
 
3.1.3  Lloyd’s on the Eve of the LMX Spiral 
One of the trademarks of the Lloyd’s market throughout history and up until the 
Lloyd’s crisis was its independence from regulatory oversight.  The market self-
regulated as it grew and this tradition was continued with Lloyd’s Act 1982.  The 
Act established the Council to “regulate and direct the business of insurance at 
Lloyd’s”
95.  The Council was constituted of 16 Working Members and eight 
External Members, all elected by Lloyd’s Members; plus three nominated 
independent members appointed by the Council.  The introduction of the External 
Members and nominated members aimed to ensure Lloyd’s would not be 
governed purely by those involved in its day-to-day business.   
Nonetheless at the time of the LMX Spiral, it is fair to say that regulatory 
oversight was light.  The Lloyd’s market was still considered to be akin to a 
“gentlemen’s club” where relationships were of paramount importance and the 
fear to lose one’s reputation was deemed to be sufficient to ensure good 
behaviour.  The key players all knew each other, including the Lloyd’s brokers 
who were given exclusive access to the market once they had obtained the 
                                           
94 The Lloyd’s Litigation: the Merrett, Gooda Walker and Feltrim cases [1995] 2 AC 145. 
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requisite authorisation from Lloyd’s itself.  Those who were part of the Lloyd’s 
market believed in its motto “fidentia”, meaning “confidence”.  This particular 
culture of trust within Lloyd’s is evidenced by the fact that some indemnities were 
apparently being paid by Syndicates without too much scrutiny being placed on 
the actual wording of the policies.  Recent case law has also shown how one of 
the largest Lloyd’s broker at the time, Walsham Brothers, funded claims payments 
to assist Syndicate with their cash flow on the expectation that the Syndicates 
would reimburse the broker once they had recovered from their own reinsurers
96.  
Another example is the ways in which Syndicates would sometimes club together 
to pay claims owed by a Syndicate in financial difficulties so as to maintain the 
market’s reputation
97.  No doubt such informal arrangements provided unique 
strength and flexibility to Lloyd’s and the market benefited from a world-wide 
reputation as a place of fair dealing
98. 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, however, Lloyd’s had grown beyond recognition.  
From 6001 Names in 1970, the number of Names had grown to 19,000 in 1980 
and it continued to grow to a peak of 34,218 in 1989.  One of the reasons for the 
sudden growth was a relaxation of the rules concerning membership.  Before the 
1970s, Lloyd’s membership was the reserve of the few since only the wealthiest 
could satisfy the means requirement to become a Lloyd’s Member.  Following a 
decline in membership in the late 1960s, the Lloyd’s Council decided to lower the 
means test required to underwrite at Lloyd’s
99.  Given that bank guarantees 
                                           
96 Equitas Ltd v Walsham Brothers & Company Ltd [2013] EWHC 3264 (Comm), [2014] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 12. 
97 A well know example of this practice is the “Harrison scandal” in the 1920s, named after 
the underwriter Harrison who had caused very large losses to his Syndicate through 
fraudulent activities.  All underwriting members agreed to share the loss in proportion to 
their Syndicate’s income.  See Adam Raphael, Ultimate Risk The Inside Story of the Lloyd’s 
Catastrophe (Four Walls Eight Windows 1995) p 34. 
98 This reputation had much to do with the decision of one of Lloyd’s best known 
underwriter, Cuthbert Eden Heath (who is also credited with inventing XL reinsurance: see 
2.2.3) to pay all claims presented to him as a result of the devastating San Fransisco 
earthquake of 1906.  Cuthbert Heath sent a telegram to his San Francisco agent famously 
saying “Pay all our policy-holders in full irrespective of the terms of their policies”. 
99 This was based on recommendations set out in the report of the Lloyd’s Working Party 
chaired by Lord Cromer (December 1969).     Part I/Chapter 3 
  61     
secured on a prospective Name’s property could be used to pass the means test, 
Lloyd’s membership became accessible to a much wider population
100.   
There was real prestige in being a Lloyd’s member and individuals flocked to the 
market to become Names.  Prestige was not the sole attractive feature of Lloyd’s.  
Membership also offered tax advantages as underwriting losses could be offset 
against taxable income
101 and the market offered a unique opportunity to work 
money twice.  Names indeed were able to make a return not only on their 
underwriting at Lloyd’s but also on funds or share they had deposited in support 
of their underwriting.  Therefore, from a “cosy” gentlemen’s club in 1970 the 
Lloyd’s market grew into a very large commercial enterprise funded by over 
30,000 Names, many of whom were of relatively modest means.   
It is important to note here that Lloyd’s was not the sole market trading in 
reinsurance in the 1980s.  London was also home to the London Underwriting 
Centre (LUC), another insurance and reinsurance market set up by companies in 
1983.  At the time there was a large number of insurance and reinsurance 
companies in London that had no access to Lloyd’s given its rules against 
corporate capital.  Some companies therefore created the LUC as a direct 
competitor.  Whilst the LUC could never match the unique reputation and 
busyness Lloyd’s enjoyed, it was a viable alternative market.   
In addition, there were insurers and reinsurers in London who did not participate 
in either Lloyd’s or the LUC and dealt directly with brokers instead.   
The corporate reinsurers active within the London market, whether within the LUC 
or individually, are significant for the purposes of our thesis.  As we will see 
shortly, companies participated heavily in the LMX Spiral. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
100 The means test was lowered from £75,000 to £50,000 and a new category of “mini 
Names”, requiring a deposit of only £37,500, was created.  As reported in Raphael (n 97) 
p 53. 
101 The tax advantages were particularly attractive in the 1970s when the top rate of tax 
was 98 percent.  See Raphael (n 97) p 44-45. Part I/Chapter 3 
  62 
3.2  Key Features of the LMX Spiral 
Now that we have set the scene by describing Lloyd’s and other reinsurance 
markets within London, we can focus on the LMX Spiral.  The spiral remains 
shrouded in mystery, partly because of its sheer complexity but also because it 
developed within a market that was very specialised and therefore not widely 
understood.  The next few sections of this chapter aim to bring clarity. 
 
3.2.1  The Nature of the LMX Spiral: Intertwining Reinsurances 
The first chapter of this thesis sets out the description of the LMX Spiral by Philips 
J set out in the Gooda Walker case which we will not repeat here.  Put very simply, 
the LMX Spiral was a cluster of overlapping XL reinsurance agreements.  Those 
reinsurances were standard XL reinsurance contracts that provided cover, among 
other things, for catastrophic losses. 
The LMX Spiral developed within the London XL market (the London XL Market) 
because XL reinsurers (First Tier Reinsurers) looked to protect themselves. 
Other XL reinsurers, principally from the London XL Market, provided the 
reinsurance (Second Tier Reinsurers).  Those Second Tier Reinsurers also took 
reinsurance to protect their own liabilities, and the providers of the requisite 
reinsurance were, more often than not, London XL reinsurers (the 
Retrocessionaires).  The Retrocessionaires also took reinsurance, and again, 
most of their reinsurers were to be found within the London XL Market. 
The demand for XL reinsurance grew rapidly in the late 1970s and the 1980s, 
partly due to a significant growth in insured values
102.  Despite the rapid 
expansion of the London XL Market in the mid 1980s
103, the number of XL 
reinsurers remained finite, and they all needed reinsurance for their own rising 
exposure.  Inevitably, some reinsurers ended up reinsuring their own reinsurers.  
Using the terminology used above, the Retrocessionaire’s reinsurers may well 
have been First Tier Reinsurers or Second Tier Reinsurers.  At that point, a risk 
initially insured by a First Tier Reinsurer or Second Tier Reinsurer would have 
come full circle.  XL reinsurers effectively recycled the same risks amongst 
themselves.   
                                           
102 Walker (n 40) para 2.10. 
103 For detail of the sharp increase in Lloyd’s membership see s 3.1.3 of this thesis.     Part I/Chapter 3 
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Underwriters active in the London XL Market did not recognise the individual risks 
they had already taken on because the XL reinsurance contracts they were dealing 
with covered portfolios rather than single risks.  There were two main types of XL 
contracts used within that market: 
 
a)  “specific”  treaties.  Those reinsurances covered accounts that 
contained the same type of risks such as hull, cargo, oil rigs etc. 
b)  “whole account” (aka “general”) treaties.  Those reinsurances 
protected the entire portfolio of business of the reinsured
104. 
 
Within these contracts underwriters were unable to identify risks they had already 
underwritten.  This was made worse by the multiple layering that became one of 
the trademarks of the LMX Spiral.  As risks were being passed on to more and 
more XL reinsurers, sometimes being bundled further with other risks (for 
instance through the use of whole account treaties), they became more and more 
opaque. Opacity has been identified as one of the key features of the LMX Spiral. 
Once a catastrophe happened, the resulting loss would lead to a number of 
claims being made, some of which would reach the First Tier Reinsurers.  
Thereafter the claims would progress through the London XL Market, generating 
claims at each layer of reinsurance.  Ultimately, the loss would come back to, say, 
the First Tier Reinsurer, who would have to pay again before making another 
claim to the relevant Second Tier Reinsurer.  In this way, various claims relating to 
the one loss would circulate, or “spiral” around the same players within the 
London XL Market.  This is the “pass the parcel” aspect of the LMX Spiral referred 
to in Phillips J’s quote from the Gooda Walker judgment.  At each turn of the LMX 
Spiral the total amount of all claims paid by all reinsurers from all layers (Gross 
Claim) would grow although the value of the original loss remained unchanged.    
As it spiralled around the LMX Spiral, the Gross Claim often became so large that 
it bore no resemblance to the original loss.  This “magnifying effect”
105 has come 
to be recognised as one of the major consequences of the LMX Spiral.  Taking the 
Piper Alpha disaster
106 as an example, 43,000 claims were made on 11,500 XL 
policies within the LMX Spiral.  The Gross Claim was estimated to have been as 
                                           
104 Walker (n 40) para 2.4. 
105 This was the term used to describe this feature of the LMX Spiral in the case of Equitas 
(n 1). 
106 Walker (n 40) para 2.14. Part I/Chapter 3 
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high as $15 billion, when the original loss amounted to $1.4 billion.  In other 
words, the Gross Claim was more than 10 times the value of the original claim.  
Piper Alpha is not an extreme example: similar figures have been shown to apply 
to other losses that made their way through the LMX Spiral
107. 
Ultimately, the loss would fall on the first XL reinsurer who ran out of reinsurance 
cover.  How and why this happened will be explained later in this thesis. The 
result was that the risks were concentrated amongst the few rather than being 
dispersed.  This concentration of risks is another major consequence of the LMX 
Spiral. 
 
3.2.2  London: the Hub of the LMX Spiral 
At the centre of the LMX Spiral was the London XL Market.  Phillips J in the Gooda 
Walker case commented: 
“The letters LMX stand for London Market excess of loss.  The letters thus describe 
both the place where the business is transacted and the nature of the business.” 
The London XL Market however was not the only place where the risks that were 
within the LMX Spiral were being traded.  It is therefore important to define at the 
outset the exact parameters of the London connection. 
Firstly, the risks transacted within the London XL Market originated from all over 
the world.  Thus the London connection related to the place of underwriting, not 
the location of the risk.  Secondly, risks underwritten in the London XL Market 
could be reinsured abroad, and still qualify as risks that were within the LMX 
Spiral.  This is because reinsurers based outside London (Foreign XL Reinsurers) 
participated in the LMX Spiral.  As will be explained later, their participation was 
minimal but it cannot be disregarded.  They provided cover to underwriters from 
the London XL Market.  It is well established that the XL reinsurance of an 
underwriter from the London XL Market is called “LMX Business”
108.   
                                           
107 For instance, aviation losses relating to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq amounted 
to $343 million when they entered the LMX Spiral in 1991.  By the year 2000, the Gross 
Claim was as high as $6 billion.  These figures are taken from the judgment in Equitas (n 
1) [33], [34]. 
108 Walker (n 40) ch 2.  “LMX Business” is also the defining term used in the Gooda Walker 
case (n 1) and in the report of the LMX Working Party, ‘Excess of Loss Reinsurance of 
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At Lloyd’s request, a committee chaired by Sir David Walker was set up in 1992 to 
enquire into allegations of misfeasance concerning the LMX Spiral.  The 
committee published its report in 1992 (the Walker Report).  The findings of the 
Walker Report will be described later on in this thesis
109.  For current purposes, it 
is interesting to note that the Walker Report describes LMX Business as follows: 
“LMX Business is a form of reinsurance developed and largely transacted in the 
London market by both corporate reinsurers and Lloyd’s syndicates.  The basis of 
LMX business is essentially the same as that of mainstream excess of loss treaty 
reinsurance.”
110 
The above quote confirms that the basis of LMX Business was standard XL 
reinsurances.  It also makes it clear that both Syndicates and corporate reinsurers 
engaged in LMX Business.  This is an important point, given that the LMX Spiral is 
often associated with Lloyd’s, or Syndicates.  In fact, many companies 
participated in LMX Business.  Expert evidence in the case of Equitas v R&Q 
111 
establishes that there were nearly as many corporate reinsurers as there were 
Syndicates which would underwrite a risk on the London XL Market.  In fact, it is 
possible that in the later part of the 1960s, the London XL Market comprised a 
majority of corporate reinsurers
112.   
As explained above, Foreign XL Reinsurers from places such as Germany, 
Switzerland, France and Scandinavia engaged in LMX Business by taking on 
liabilities from the London XL Market.  There were also large reinsurers which 
supported the London XL Market by providing quota share reinsurance to its 
underwriters
113.  Since those were not XL contracts, such reinsurances do not 
qualify as LMX Business
114.   
                                           
109 See section 4.2 of this thesis. 
110 Walker (n 40) para 2.2. 
111 Equitas (n 1). 
112 Tony Berry, ‘Expert Report of Tony Berry’ (The Society of Lloyd’s v John Stewart 
Clementson [1995] CLC 117) para 2.5. 
113 It is understood that Eagle Star was one of the major providers of such quota share 
reinsurances. 
114 There is a dissenting view.  Richard Outhwaite, a leading marine excess of loss 
underwriter, has expressed the view that proportional reinsurance of XL business should 
be included in his definition of ‘LMX’. Interestingly, he did however recognise that the 
term LMX ‘should mean on the surface excess of loss reinsurance of London market 
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It is slightly inaccurate to refer to the London XL Market as it contained, in fact, 
three distinct sections: the marine market, the aviation market, and the “non-
marine” market.  The latter meant everything that did not fall within either of the 
previous two markets.  Although these markets had different characteristics, for 
the purposes of this thesis the term “London XL Market” encompasses all three 
markets unless otherwise stated.   
A risk entered the London XL Market at the point when it was first reinsured on 
an XL basis.  Whether the same risk had been reinsured previously was irrelevant.  
The key is the nature of the reinsurance: as soon as the risk was covered by XL 
reinsurance, it had crossed the threshold and made it onto the London XL Market 
regardless of how many times it had been reinsured previously. 
It is important to clarify that the LMX Spiral was only a part of the London XL 
Market.  As will be seen later the London XL Market has survived the collapse of 
the LMX Spiral.  The First Tier Reinsurers who provided the first layer of XL cover 
were the “gatekeepers” of the London XL Market.  The LMX Spiral could only be 
originated from the next level, when reinsurances were placed with the Second 
Tier Reinsurers.  This is because the LMX Spiral could only start when the same 
risk was being reinsured a second time by the same reinsurer, which requires at 
least two reinsurances.  From the second-tier level, reinsurances were colloquially 
known as “XL on XL”, because they were an XL reinsurance of an XL account
115.  A 
common misconception is that the London XL Market started only when there was 
“XL on XL” reinsurance in place.  In fact, experts agree that the London XL Market 
also included all those First Tier Reinsurers who provided the first layer of XL 
reinsurance
116.  This thesis uses the defined term “London XL Market” rather than 
the sometimes seen “LMX Market”
117 to make it clear that the London XL Market 
and the LMX Spiral are related but distinct phenomena.  The term “LMX Market” 
could be understood to suggest that (i) the LMX Market and LMX Spiral start at 
the same level of reinsurance (i.e. XL on XL) and that (ii) the LMX Market was the 
sole market where the LMX Spiral operated, both of which are incorrect.   
                                                                                                                                 
Market conference, Insurance and Reinsurance Research Group Limited, 14–15 April 
1988).  
115 In the case of whole account treaties, the coverage may have included different types of 
reinsurances, only some of which were XL contracts. 
116 This has been confirmed by former underwriters Jim Gregory, Tony Berry and John 
Emney during interviews with the author of this thesis.   
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Not all risks that reached the London XL Market entered the LMX Spiral.  Some 
First Tier Reinsurers did not seek XL reinsurances themselves.  They might have 
had other types of reinsurance protections in place, such as quota share 
reinsurances, or facultative obligatory treaties
118, or they retained the risks.  Some 
of the XL risks made their way out of the London XL Market at the first tier level, 
sometimes abroad, and never came back.  As explained above, a risk entered the 
LMX Spiral at the point when it was being reinsured on an XL basis by the same 
reinsurer for a second time. 
A distinction also has to be drawn between the LMX Spiral and LMX Business 
although there is more correlation between the two.  As it is the XL reinsurance of 
an XL underwriter (from London), LMX Business is necessarily XL on XL.  This is 
the point where a risk may enter the LMX Spiral.  However, not all XL on XL risks, 
and therefore not all LMX Business, entered the LMX Spiral.  LMX Business entered 
the LMX Spiral only at the point where it was reinsured a second time by the same 
reinsurer.  It is also important to note that some XL on XL was not LMX Business: 
for instance when a Foreign XL Reinsurer reinsured its liabilities onto the London 
XL Market, technically that specific reinsurance was not LMX Business (it was the 
reinsurance of a foreign underwriter, not of a London underwriter).  This applies 
even though prior to going to the Foreign XL Reinsurer the relevant risk may have 
been LMX Business.  This foreign element of the LMX Spiral prevents us from 
asserting that the LMX Spiral consisted solely of LMX Business
119.  In this thesis, 
LMX Business that entered the LMX Spiral will be referred to as Spiral Business. 
In normal circumstances, sending a risk abroad would have spread liabilities 
further, which is the key purpose of reinsurance.  One of the features of the LMX 
Spiral, however, was that the risk still ended up being concentrated in the hands 
of the few.  There were two principal reasons for this: 
 
1.  Only a small proportion of the XL on XL liabilities made their way outside 
London because the London XL Market was by far the largest market for 
XL reinsurances; and 
 
                                           
118 Berry (n 112) para 2.6. 
119 It is possible that some experts consider the term “LMX Business” to encompass a risk 
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2.  LMX Business that had gone abroad, in any case, tended to make its way 
back to the London XL Market.  This happened because the Foreign XL 
Reinsurers also needed protection for their exposure and, as stated 
above, the largest market for them to find reinsurance was the London 
XL Market. 
 
The liabilities that entered the London XL Market therefore usually remained 
within that market, even if they were sometimes temporarily taken abroad by 
Foreign XL Reinsurers.  This is illustrated by the case of Equitas v R&Q, where the 
expert actuary sought to calculate the extent to which risks found their way out 
of the LMX Spiral, or “leaked”.  His estimates shows that such “leaks” were minute, 
even though he included all forms of leakage and not just reinsurance abroad.  
His actuarial model was based on the assumption that 5% of reinsurance layers 
(of which they were hundreds) were only 90% placed.  This means that 95% of all 
layers of reinsurance were 100% reinsured within the LMX Spiral, and only a small 
fraction (10%) of the remaining 5% had actually leaked.   
We have so far defined many key terms and it is certainly worthwhile providing a 
final overview.  The epicentre of the LMX Spiral was the London XL Market, that is, 
the market where a risk was first reinsured on an XL basis by a London 
underwriter.  Those London underwriters obtained reinsurance, some of which 
could be proportional (at which point the risk would leave the London XL Market) 
and some of which was XL reinsurance.  In the latter case, the XL on XL cover is 
commonly defined as LMX Business, and it was provided by other London 
underwriters or Foreign XL Reinsurers.  The LMX Spiral started when a risk was 
reinsured again by the same reinsurer, be it a Foreign XL Reinsurer or a London 
underwriter, at which point the risk became a Spiral Business.  The LMX Spiral 
developed principally, but not only, within the London XL Market and it was fed 
mainly, but not exclusively, from LMX Business. 
 
3.2.3  The 1980s: an Era of Rapid Expansion 
The LMX Spiral is associated with the 1980s although a spiral had been in 
existence within the London XL Market much earlier.  It is possible that the 
London XL Market already contained a spiral in the 1950s – this remains     Part I/Chapter 3 
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uncertain
120.  In any case, the phenomenon became evident in 1965, when the 
losses caused by the then significant Hurricane Betsy “spiralled” amongst the 
London XL Market participants
121.  After Betsy, there were few major losses that 
had an impact on the London XL Market until Hurricane Alicia in 1983.  The 
significant losses stemming from Alicia spiralled amongst LMX players for years.  
However, at the time, only knowledgeable underwriters were aware of the 
existence of a spiral within the London XL Market.  The LMX Spiral was not 
generally known before 1988/1989
122. 
The LMX Spiral is associated with the 1980s because, towards the end of the 
decade, a series of catastrophes produced large losses that suddenly exposed the 
LMX Spiral to the outside world and led to its collapse.  In addition, during that 
decade the LMX Spiral had grown exponentially.  Whilst Lloyd’s overall premium 
increased by 61% between 1983 and 1988, its XL premium leapt by 201% in the 
same years
123.  The popularity of XL Business in the 1980s is further shown by the 
fact that 52 out of 80 Syndicates that commenced business between 1982 and 
1988 chose to write XL Business.  Inter-syndicate reinsurance premiums more 
than doubled in five years: from £547 million in 1985 to £1275 million in 1990
124.  
The rapid growth of the LMX Spiral during the 1980s was due, amongst other 
things, to a rapid rise in capacity within the London XL Market, caused by the 
increase in membership noted earlier
125.  This led to an oversupply of XL 
reinsurance and a fall in prices.  Faced with increased competition and declining 
rates in direct insurance, many underwriters took on more XL risks in order to 
secure more premiums in what was considered a profitable line of business.  
They did so because they felt safe in the knowledge that, with all this new 
capacity, they would always be able to reinsure their exposure.  The additional 
reinsurance, however, was procured by other underwriters from the London XL 
Market, who themselves needed reinsurance.  Thus the same liabilities were 
being passed around the same reinsurers.   
                                           
120 Tony Berry, ‘The Effects and Lessons of Piper A to the Excess of Loss Market’ (undated).  
Mr Berry also confirmed this view during interviews with the author of this thesis. 
121 LMX Working Party (n 108) para 1.5. 
122 Brown v KMR Services Ltd and ors [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 513, 519. 
123 Walker (n 40) para 2.10. 
124 R Gilkes, ‘Lloyd’s and the changing marketplace’ (5
th International Reinsurance 
Congress, Bermuda, 7–9 November 1991). 
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The fact that the number of reinsurers was much greater only served to accelerate 
the “spiral effect”: risks were being transferred more often, amongst a larger, but 
still finite, number of players who reinsured each other.  A number of good years 
with few catastrophes in the mid 1980s had made LMX Business attractive and 
seemingly safe, fuelling more demand, a more competitive market, and leading to 
a decline of underwriting discipline: retentions and co-insurance reduced, 
resulting in the rapid growth of the LMX Spiral.   
 
3.2.4  LMX Market Participants 
The exact number of reinsurers who engaged in LMX Business at any one time is 
difficult to gauge.  The Walker Report set down some very specific criteria to 
identify those Syndicates that could be considered to be “LMX Syndicates”.  
According to the Walker Report, in 1989 such a syndicate: 
 
1.  either wrote at least £1,000,000 premium income or, if less, 10% of its 
capacity of XL on XL or LMX Business; or 
2.  wrote at least 50% XL “of all types” and had a material involvement in XL on 
XL and/or LMX Business. 
 
87 Syndicates matched those criteria
126.  An important limitation of this analysis is 
that it only includes Syndicates.  As mentioned above, many companies wrote 
LMX Business.  The Walker Report acknowledges this by pointing to estimates 
that corporate reinsurers had carried 69%, 45%, 64% and again 64% of the losses 
that had arisen from, respectively, the 1987 Northern European storms, Piper 
Alpha, Hurricane Hugo and the 1990 Northern European storms
127. 
More recently, in the Equitas v R&Q case, a sophisticated model was produced to 
represent key characteristics of the LMX Spiral (the Equitas Model).  The exact 
number of syndicates who participated in the relevant risks could be established 
through data made available by Lloyd’s.  Experts agreed that “doubling up” that 
number was a satisfactory way to estimate the total number of participants, 
including those from the companies market
128.  Thus as many companies as 
syndicates must have engaged in LMX Business in the 1980s.  If one doubles the 
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figure set out in the Walker Report of 87 “LMX Syndicates”, this produces a total 
of 174. This is significantly less than the 300 and 409 reinsurers who participated 
in the risks in Equitas v R&Q.  However, the large discrepancy between those 
figures can be explained. 
As the London XL Market developed throughout the 1980s, many syndicates and 
companies participated in the London XL Market without truly specialising in that 
business.  Thus, whilst the number of underwriters who wrote LMX Business must 
have been in the hundreds, there remained few underwriters or even companies 
or syndicates who truly specialised in LMX.  In 1989, one of the specialist LMX 
underwriters, Mr John Emney estimated that the non-marine market contained 
half a dozen Syndicates and similar numbers of companies who were considered 
to be LMX leaders, about 20 medium sized LMX players and a “larger number” of 
small players.  He noted that the aviation market was similar, but then 
emphasised that the LMX marine market was much larger, with far more leaders 
and followers.  In fact, he said most, if not all, marine underwriters at Lloyd’s or 
within the companies market wrote at least a small volume of LMX Business
129.  In 
the Gooda Walker case, another expert, Richard Outhwaite, gave specific figures 
for the same year, as follows: 
 
 
  “those which 
made XL the 
major part of 
their books” 
“those which 
wrote XL as an 
adjunct to their 
main book” 
“those which 
wrote no XL 
business” 
Marine syndicates  33  67  19 
Non-marine 
syndicates 
59  71  5 
Insurance 
companies
130  
26  56  11 
TOTAL  118  194  35 
 
                                           
129 John Emney, London Market Reinsurance (SAVA, Holland, June 1989). 
130 This figure includes only companies that are members of the Institute of London 
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The above illustrates the difficulties in identifying who was and who was not a 
writer of XL Business at the time, and the discrepancies between the numbers set 
out in the Walker Report and those provided by Mr Outhwaite are noted in the 
Gooda Walker judgment.  What is clear, however, is that many syndicates and 
companies wrote XL business without being true specialists and it is striking that, 
relying on the numbers provided by Mr Outhwaite, in 1989 nearly every reinsurer 
in the London XL Market (312 out of 347) wrote XL contracts.   
For the purposes of this thesis, an LMX Player, be it a Syndicate, corporate 
reinsurer or a Foreign XL Reinsurer, is a reinsurer that engaged purposefully in 
LMX Business.  The actual proportion of its premium income derived from LMX 
Business is not critical; what matters is that its portfolio contained LMX Business.  
At this point, it is important to specify that an LMX Player is a reinsurer that took 
on LMX Business although such business may or may not be part of the LMX 
Spiral.  In this thesis, an LMX Player who became involved in the LMX Spiral will be 
described as a Spiral Participant. 
 
3.3  The Demise of the LMX Spiral 
3.3.1  A Series of Unprecedented Catastrophes 
Prior to 1987, LMX Business was run on the assumption that the type of 
catastrophic losses that would reach the London XL Market followed a relatively 
regular pattern: about 5 major catastrophes would occur every 25 years
131.  The 
years 1987 to 1990 challenged this notion. During those three years, an 
extraordinary and unprecedented series of catastrophes produced large losses 
that had a significant impact on the London XL Market and, ultimately, lead to the 
collapse of the LMX Spiral.   
Those catastrophes are described below.  When available, the 2012 loss values
132 
are provided and these are extracted from the Sigma report produced by Swiss Re 
(the Sigma Report)
133.  The Sigma Report, published every year, is the benchmark 
relied upon by the reinsurance industry and the judiciary to value insured losses. 
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The 1987 UK windstorms (16/17 October 1987)   
This loss, which came to be known within the London XL Market as “87J”, hit 
Southern England, the north of France, and neighbouring European countries in 
the night of 16/17 October 1987.  It was the worst windstorm the UK had seen 
since the year 1703, causing the death of 18 people, and downing an estimated 
15 million trees in England.  The Sigma Report values the insured loss for this 
catastrophe at US$6,264 million. 
This was the first major catastrophe since Alicia in 1983, and it came after very 
profitable years for the London XL Market.  Alicia, however, was still making its 
way around the spiral in 1987
134.  Because it was a hurricane, Alicia should have 
been, in market parlance, a “short tail” loss.  A hurricane causes the damage 
within a short period of time so most of the losses can be identified and 
quantified quickly after the event.  The fact that the Alicia losses were still being 
settled 4 years after the hurricane had taken place illustrates another “spiral 
effect” which has come to be known as “long short tail”
135.  The LMX Spiral delayed 
the final settlement of losses such that short tail losses were turned into long 
term losses.   
This delaying effect was relied upon by some LMX Players who needed to collect 
monies under their reinsurances before they could pay claims made to them.  
Unfortunately for them, the catastrophes that hit the London XL Market in the late 
1980s made their way through the LMX Spiral increasingly fast.  In fact 87J 
progressed through the LMX Spiral relatively quickly.  A typical payment would 
take two weeks to be made, and market experts noted at the time that this loss 
was “storming through” the LMX Spiral at far greater speed than Alicia
136.  
Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence that in 1988 the London XL Market, 
already a soft market, was becoming weaker
137.  Competition was still fierce and 
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clients were putting pressure on reinsurers to continue reducing their premium 
even though exposure was rising.  Rates went down by as much as 25%. 
 
Piper Alpha (6 July 1988)  
On 6 July 1988 a North Sea oil production platform named Piper Alpha was 
destroyed by an explosion and resulting fire, killing 167 men.  The total insured 
loss amounted to about £1.4 billion, making this at the time the largest insured 
man-made catastrophe.  It was also the worst offshore disaster due to the number 
of lives lost, and the high impact it had on the oil and gas industry (the platform 
carried out about 10% of North Sea oil and gas production).  This loss does not 
feature in the Sigma Report. 
It was a human tragedy but in monetary terms this loss was not huge
138.  
However, it had a significant impact on the London XL Market, and most 
particularly the marine section, as it exposed the inadequacies of its rating.  The 
reaction was extreme, with rates for marine XL contracts increasing by as much 
as 300%
139.  The marine London XL Market became particularly hard in August 
1988
140.  However, other than the sudden rate increases, no attempt was made to 
mitigate the effects of the LMX Spiral.  For instance, there was no change to the 
then extremely low retention levels, which some considered was a lost 
opportunity
141.  Some underwriters even took an optimistic view of the future, as 
they believed the market’s ability to cope with losses of the size of 87J or Piper 
Alpha proved its resilience
142.   
Piper Alpha caused serious difficulties to some LMX Players.  Within 15 months, 
that is by October 1989, the worst-hit syndicates had to make cash calls to their 
Names
143.  This was partly due to the fact that the loss was ballooning as it was 
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making its way around the LMX Spiral.  As mentioned previously, the value of 
gross claims ended up being 10 times the value of the initial loss.   
In addition, new rules within Lloyd’s meant Lloyd’s Syndicates had to settle the 
claims within 7 days at a time when reinsurance recoveries would normally take 
about 28 days to be collected.  The new settlement system pushed the claims 
around the LMX Spiral much faster, creating cash flow issues for the syndicates
144 
which had to fund payment of the claims before they could recover on their own 
reinsurances
145.  Some had to borrow money to pay the claims, and others simply 
ran out of money
146 and had to make cash calls to their members. 
 
Exxon Valdez (24 March 1989)  
1989 was a particularly bad year for LMX Players.  The first major loss happened 
on 24 March 1989, when the Exxon Valdez oil tanker struck a reef in Prince 
William, Alaska, and spilled 260,000 to 750,000 barrels of crude oil into the sea 
and local environment.  The oil covered 2,100 km of coastline, and 28,000 km
2 of 
ocean.   
This loss does not feature in the Sigma Report.  However ExxonMobil states it has 
spent US$2.1 billion in the clean-up effort
147, which provides a rough indication of 
the scale of the costs involved.  At the time Tony Berry
148, a leading underwriter 
within the marine London XL Market, noted that the projection for all insured 
losses exceeded $1 billion, whilst the worldwide premium income for the marine 
                                           
144 Tony Berry, ‘Expert Report on Underwriting Issues by Tony Robert Berry’(No 57) para 
11. 
145 Other syndicates within the LMX Spiral would have had to pay within 7 days but 
syndicates may also have relied on reinsurances from LMX Players outside Lloyd’s, or 
from reinsurances not within the LMX Spiral, such as quota shares for instance. 
146 Tony Berry, ‘TR Berry Marine Syndicate 536 Underwriter’s Report’ (1991). 
147 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, ‘Questions and Answers’ 
<http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/qanda.cfm> accessed 24 May 2011.  The 
following figures are provided in the first instance decision of King v Brandywine 
Reinsurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd, [2004] EWHC 1033 (Comm), [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 670, 677: a 
loss of 258,000 bbls of crude oil and total clean-up costs of US $800 million for Exxon 
Shipping Corporation (which became insolvent as a result) and US $1200 million for 
Exxon Corporation. 
148 Tony Berry’s syndicate No 536 made profits from its first year of trading in 1983 until 
1998. Part I/Chapter 3 
  76 
and energy market was then “only” $6 billion
149.  The loss was bound to have a 
significant impact. 
The grounding of the Exxon Valdez has indeed made history for the London XL 
Market not only because of the number of claims it has produced, but also 
because settlement disputes between reinsurers have given rise to significant 
judgments
150.   
 
Hurricane Hugo (15–22 September 1989) 
The second major catastrophe of 1989 was Hurricane Hugo, which struck 
Guadeloupe, Montserrat, St Croix, Puerto Rico, Antigua and South Carolina 
between 15 and 22 September 1989.  The hurricane caused an estimated 56 
fatalities and was the costliest hurricane in the Atlantic at the time.  The Sigma 
Report values the insured loss for this catastrophe at US$8,467 million.  
Hurricane Hugo is said to have made its way through the LMX Spiral in just over 
12 months, causing serious cash flow problems amongst the LMX Players
151.  A 
few things changed within the London XL Market after Hugo: 10% retentions 
became the norm in the non-marine London XL Market
152.  Retentions were seen 
as one of the ways to limit the effects of the LMX Spiral.  In addition, the practice 
of “payback”, whereby the reinsured would pay back over a number of years any 
claims monies received, diminished substantially
153.  Nevertheless, the London XL 
Market remained a buyer’s market, with some underwriters still reducing their 
rates
154.   
 
Phillips Petroleum (23 October 1989)  
1989 saw another major catastrophe when, on 23 October, a series of explosions 
and a fire caused substantial damage to a chemical complex then owned by 
Phillips Petroleum and situated in Texas, USA.  The catastrophe led to the loss of 
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23 lives, and affected all facilities within the complex, causing $715.5 million 
worth of damage plus an additional business disruption loss estimated at $700 
million.  This loss does not feature in the Sigma Report. 
There is some evidence that claims related to Hurricane Alicia were still spiralling 
amongst Spiral Participants in November 1989
155.  To this has to be added the 
catastrophes listed above, and a myriad of smaller losses that were also part of 
the LMX Spiral.  At the end of 1989, the LMX Spiral was starting to unwind but the 
London XL Market was still operational.  
 
North European Windstorm (25 January 1990) 
On 25 and 26 January 1990, one of the strongest storms on record swept across 
north-western Europe.  As there is no official list of such events in Europe, the 
windstorm bears different names.  It is known as the Burns' Day Storm (because it 
started on the birthday of Scottish poet Robert Burns) but also as Daria, or 90A 
within the London XL Market.  The windstorm caused widespread damage and, 
according to the Met Office, was responsible for 97 deaths in the UK.  Once it left 
the UK the storm tracked rapidly east towards Denmark, causing further damage, 
and 30 deaths in the Netherlands and Belgium.  Sadly, casualties were much 
higher than those of the Great Storm of 1987 because the storm hit during the 
daytime.  The insured loss for this windstorm is set at US$8,205 million in the 
Sigma Report. 
In 1990 the financial weight of all these catastrophes led to a contraction of the 
London XL Market as a whole
156.  As a result, some LMX Players were unable to 
find reinsurance for all the liabilities they intended to protect.  This phenomenon 
had started in 1989 but became worse in 1990
157.  Rates were on the increase
158 
but because London was still a buyer’s market those increases were constrained
159 
and retentions remained low, particularly in the marine London XL Market.  The 
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three-year accounting rule within Lloyd’s meant the true extent of the losses 
listed above was still unclear in early 1990.  Some underwriters, however, clearly 
understood that the London XL Market was then extremely vulnerable
160. 
By 1991 three years had elapsed since 87J and the effect of all the above 
catastrophes was becoming apparent.  The year 1991 was reportedly the most 
difficult underwriting year since 1967 when Hurricane Betsy had resulted in a 
serious crisis within the London XL Market.  In 1991 rates were up 1000% 
compared with 1988, which had been the point when rates had been at their 
lowest in the decade for LMX Business
161.   
 
3.3.2  The Collapse of the LMX Spiral  
The six catastrophes listed in the previous section of this thesis triggered the 
demise of the LMX Spiral.  Other catastrophes occurred between 1987 and 1990 
but the ones described above were the most significant, as evidenced by the fact 
that they are the ones listed in the Gooda Walker case.   
The accounting system within Lloyd’s meant there was a three-year delay before 
the full impact of the catastrophes on LMX Syndicates could be felt.  Since LMX 
Syndicates accounted for nearly half of the LMX Players, this certainly explains 
why no real change occurred within the London XL Market until 1990, when the 
market contracted, and rates started to increase.  This continued in 1991 as 
explained above, and from then on the London XL Market entered a slow decline 
as the LMX Spiral started to unwind.  This decline was made worse by another 
major catastrophe that hit the market in 1992: Hurricane Andrew.   
 
Hurricane Andrew (16–28 August 1992) 
Hurricane Andrew struck the north-western Bahamas, southern Florida and 
southwest Louisiana  between 16 and 28 August 1992.  It was the costliest 
hurricane in US history until Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  The 2012 Sigma Report 
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values the insured loss for this catastrophe at a very significant US$26,180 
million.  In 2012, Hurricane Andrew remained the fourth most expensive 
catastrophe since 1970, ahead of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre 
on 11 September 2001.   
By 1992 the London XL Market had changed: it was much smaller, due to some 
reinsurers having gone out of business and many others having stopped writing 
LMX Business.  The increased competition amongst the few remaining LMX 
Players led to considerable rate rises, and more stringent terms and conditions 
for LMX Business.  To avoid becoming involved in the LMX Spiral, some XL 
Retrocessionaires were using wording that excluded the coverage of LMX 
Business
162.   
The trend continued in 1993, when the London XL Market was described as being 
a “seller’s market” for the first time in years
163.  Some noted that at this point 
there was no more LMX Spiral as such
164.  This meant new business did not reach 
a point where it would spiral but claims already in the LMX Spiral were continuing 
to circle amongst the Spiral Participants.   
In 1994 many reinsurers were still seeking to prevent risks from entering the LMX 
Spiral.  This was confirmed in the Gooda Walker judgment, dated October 1994, 
where Philips J noted that “The London market no longer writes spiral business — 
at least on the scale and in the manner which developed in the last decade”
165. 
Thus, from about 1991 the London XL Market was in crisis and the LMX Spiral 
collapsed.  In practice, this meant some LMX Participants became bankrupt and 
many others fled the market by ceasing to write LMX Business.  Amongst the LMX 
Players that remained, some were purposefully avoiding XL on XL cover to stay 
clear of the LMX Spiral.  The LMX Spiral therefore stopped developing, but it was 
still in existence as far as the “old liabilities” were concerned.  The LMX Spiral in 
fact still exists given that some of those old liabilities are being settled now 
through Equitas, as will be explained below.   
The collapse of the LMX Spiral does not mean that it disappeared altogether.  
Neither did it spell the end of the London XL Market or indeed LMX Business.  The 
London XL Market still exists today.  Insurers and reinsurers alike are still seeking 
protection for the substantial amounts of liability they are taking on and XL 
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reinsurance remains an effective and popular way to offload some of those 
liabilities.   
The collapse of the LMX Spiral did, however, play a major part in a very serious 
financial crisis faced by the Lloyd’s market in the early 1990s which, at the time, 
threatened the existence of Lloyd’s. 
 
3.4  Reconstruction and Renewal 
3.4.1  The Lloyd’s Crisis 
In the early 1990s, the financial position of the Lloyd’s market deteriorated 
rapidly, as shown in the profit/loss figures set out below: 
 
Lloyd’s profit/loss figures (£millions)
166 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
195.6  649.5  509.1  (-549.00)  (-1,863.00)  (-2,319.00)  (-2,047.00)  (-1,193.00) 
 
The cumulative losses faced by Lloyd’s for the years 1988 to 1992 amounted to 
£8 billion.  Those losses originated from two major sources:  
 
a)  the collapse of the LMX Spiral described above; and 
b)  “long tail” liabilities.  Those liabilities arose under insurances or reinsurances 
providing cover for asbestos, pollution and other long term health diseases 
(together known as APH).  The 1980s saw an explosion of asbestos litigation, 
and the passing of legislation in the US
167 that required companies who had 
caused pollution to meet astronomical clean-up costs.  The resulting liabilities 
were mostly reinsured at Lloyd’s.  Lloyd’s had traditionally issued “occurrence 
based” policies for such liabilities, that is, policies that provide cover for the 
liability when it occurs, regardless of the time when a claim is made.  This 
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provided, effectively, timeless cover for those long-term liabilities and 
exposed Syndicates to an explosion of claims of increasingly high value.  
 
Those losses caused difficulties for two reasons.  Firstly, the amounts claimed 
were unprecedented and expanding.  Secondly, and critically, it was near 
impossible to value those claims at the outset or to ascertain how long they 
would take to crystallise.  This led to uncertainty, and made it more and more 
difficult for underwriters to estimate the premium for the RITC.  As explained 
earlier in this thesis syndicates are yearly ventures
168.  Broadly speaking, at the 
end of each year every syndicate ceases and after a further two years all 
outstanding liabilities, including IBNRs
169, are reinsured into the successor 
syndicate (or another one).  It falls to the syndicate’s underwriter to fix a 
premium for the RITC.  The premium is clearly affected by the value of the 
outstanding liabilities and IBNRs.   
The three-year accounting rule was intended to assist the process by providing a 
sufficient amount of time for claims to come to maturity.  This enabled the 
relevant underwriters to obtain tangible figures to fix the premium for the RITC, 
rather than having to estimate the value of future claims.  However, as APH claims 
became more prevalent and unpredictable in their values through the 1980s, and 
the LMX Spiral started to unwind, it became more difficult for underwriters to set 
realistic premiums for the RITC.  The Inland Revenue added to the pressure by 
enquiring annually into the levels of RITC of most syndicates.  RITC premium 
indeed had to be based on a fair and reasonable calculation of the value of the 
liabilities that would ultimately arise, falling which under the rules of the Inland 
Revenue it may not be claimed as a deduction for tax purposes
170.   
The underwriter charged with pricing the RITC was therefore faced with an 
impossible dilemma.  Overvaluation brought tax consequences but the risk of 
undervaluation caused real difficulties.  The premium for RITC was indeed the 
price paid by the Names of one syndicate year to the Names of the subsequent 
syndicate years or of another syndicate (the Reinsuring Names) to take over their 
liabilities.  Should the premium be too small, the Reinsuring Names would make a 
loss as the value of the claims would be greater than the amount they had 
received to provide the reinsurance.    
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In effect, Names on a syndicate took on two types of risks: 
 
a)  the risks written by the syndicate in any given year using the Names’ direct 
investment; and 
b)  all outstanding liabilities of that syndicate, or other syndicates it reinsured, 
rolled over from previous years. Under this second type of exposure, Names 
could find themselves liable to pay for losses they had not, technically, written 
themselves.  This included APH losses that had occurred before they had 
started investing in Lloyd’s, or sometimes even before they were born. 
 
In the 1980s, as the law changed in the US and APH claims exploded, it became 
apparent that APH liabilities had been grossly undervalued.  Inevitably, it came to 
a point where the underwriters on the syndicates most exposed to APH liabilities 
felt unable to estimate the premium for the purposes of the RITC.  If a syndicate 
year could not be reinsured, it was left open, that is, it was put into run-off until 
all liabilities had become extinct.  For APH liabilities, this could take 50 years or 
more.   
Before 1980 few Syndicates had been left unclosed.  This changed when the full 
extent of the APH and LMX liabilities became apparent in the mid to late 1980s.  
By 1988, fifty-seven syndicates had left open ninety-seven years of account 
between them.  When the year 1989 was closed, the point at which spiral losses 
from Piper Alpha and other disasters started to materialise, 103 syndicates had to 
leave 162 years open.  When the 1990 year of account was closed, the number of 
open years had reached 317.  In its 1992 Guide to Syndicate Run-Offs the 
independent Lloyd’s analyst Chatset estimated that the costs of closing all open 
years would be £5 billion
171. 
Hence, by 1992 the Lloyd’s market had suffered losses of £8 billion, which did 
not include potential liabilities of up to £5 billion locked up in open years.  In 
addition, there remained many uncertainties caused by difficulties in evaluating 
both APH liabilities and the ultimate costs of the claims that were ballooning 
within the LMX Spiral. 
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3.4.2  The Risk of Insolvency 
In 1993 Lloyd’s published its first ever business plan
172 (the 1993 Business Plan), 
which stated:  
“Our current results are the worst in Lloyd’s history.  Many members have 
been brought to the brink of financial ruin, many more are fearful of the 
future. Confidence in the Society has been shaken.  It is now time to take 
radical action.” 
 
At the time radical action was indeed needed not only to rescue the Lloyd’s 
market but to put an end to the belligerent relationship that had developed 
between Lloyd’s and the Names.  In 1993 about half the Names were engaged in 
litigation against Lloyd’s agents and underwriters
173.   
The 1993 Business Plan put together by the new chairman David Rowland and a 
new chief executive, Peter Middleton, included a series of measures to return 
Lloyd’s to profitability.  This included two very significant changes: 
 
1.  Allowing corporate capital into Lloyd’s with limited liability
174.  Given Lloyd’s 
history, this was a revolutionary idea. 
2.  Putting an end to the uncertainties of the liabilities from the “Old Years” (Old 
Liabilities), defined as “[b]usiness written in past years of account at least 
three years old for which liabilities are still emerging, whether currently 
closed or open
175”.  The novel idea was to ring-fence the Old Liabilities by 
reinsuring them into a new separately-capitalised reinsurance company
176.   
 
In May 1995, Lloyd’s published a document setting out the Society’s plan for the 
reconstruction and renewal of Lloyd’s (R&R)
177.  It noted a marked improvement 
from the time when the 1993 Business Plan had been published.  Between 1993 
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and 1995 the profitability of the market had been restored (the profit for the year 
1993 was just over £1 billion).  In addition, Lloyd’s had received £1.2 billion of 
corporate capital in investment, with more expected to come.   
However, Lloyd’s was still facing insolvency.  At the time, Lloyd’s had to pass two 
solvency tests:  
 
1.  A “global” test, comparing the aggregate eligible assets of the Lloyd’s members 
taken together (including the Central Fund and other Corporation assets) with 
their aggregate liabilities and including a solvency margin.   
2.  A second, “individual” test, requiring each Name to be declared solvent.  A 
Name’s solvency status was established by comparing that particular Name’s 
declared liabilities against his or her eligible assets.  The rules were stringent: if 
a single name did not pass the solvency test, the Name in question would be 
treated under the Insurance Companies Act 1982 as if he or she were an 
insurance company that had failed to pass its solvency test, triggering 
regulatory powers of intervention and the members of Lloyd’s taken together 
would be similarly treated.  However, Lloyd’s could earmark an amount in the 
Central Fund to enable Names to pass the individual solvency test. 
 
In the R&R document, Lloyd’s reported that the global test would be passed for 
the year 1994: the market then had £27.7 billion worth of assets to meet £21.1 
billion of liabilities
178.  It is the second test that was presenting difficulties.   
Despite the return to profitability, the Old Liabilities were putting mounting 
pressure on Names, some of whom were facing bankruptcy
179.  Names owed 
Lloyd’s £732 million at the end of 1994 in respect of unpaid cash calls, £2.2 
billion remained due in respect of losses that had not yet been called, and it was 
estimated that further cash calls for the year 1995 could be as high as £1.5 
million
180.  As a result, the Central Fund was becoming engulfed in earmarking.   
To assist, Lloyd’s had given each Name a solvency credit for the years 1993, 1994 
and 1995 of, respectively, 5%, 3% and 3% of the relevant Name’s Overall Premium 
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Limit (OPL)
181.  In addition, Lloyd’s had obtained from its then regulatory 
supervisor, the DTI, the authorisation to disapply rules that resulted in double 
counting.  The new rules allowed Lloyd’s not to count a loss already incurred by a 
syndicate when the Name was then claiming for the same loss under a stop loss 
policy provided by another syndicate.   
All this, however, was insufficient to safeguard the Central Fund, which was 
depleting rapidly, as shown below
182: 
 
Net Central Fund Position (£millions) 
1992  1993  1994  1995 
272  800  415  21 
 
Lloyd’s was concerned that the Central Fund would be exhausted by 1996
183.   
 
3.4.3  Equitas 
R&R was the furtherance and, in some cases, implementation of the strategy 
proposed in the 1993 Business Plan.  The two key changes set out in the 1993 
Business Plan – corporate capital and the ring-fencing of the Old Liabilities – were 
taken further forward. 
The R&R document set out specific steps to reinsure the Old Liabilities into a new 
reinsurance company and pushed back the cut-off point to 1992 (as opposed to 
1985 in the 1993 Business Plan).  In practice, this meant that all liabilities relating 
to policies covering all years up to 1992 would be reinsured into the new 
reinsurance company, which was to be called Equitas.  The purpose behind the 
Equitas project was not only to ring-fence the Old Liabilities for the benefit of all 
involved in the “renewed” market, but also to provide finality
184 to the Names. 
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Finality would come at a cost, and the R&R document set out a detailed plan for 
the financing of Equitas, which required significant contributions from all 
involved in the market, including the Names themselves.  Lloyd’s estimated that, 
on a cumulative basis, the total amount due by all Names would be £5.9 billion
185 
(the Finality Bill) to (i) settle all of their losses due to date, and (ii) contribute to 
the costs of setting up Equitas.   
As an incentive, Lloyd’s offered a £2.8 billion settlement offer
186 to the Names.  
This £2.8 billion would not be paid directly to Names, but £2 billion of it would 
be made available as credit against the Finality Bill, and a further £800 million of 
the Finality Bill would be paid by errors and omissions underwriters.  This was in 
exchange for an undertaking on the part of the Names not to pursue any claim 
concerning the Old Liabilities against the Society or against other Lloyd’s 
professionals who had contributed to the settlement (the Equitas Settlement).   
The Equitas Settlement was accepted by a sufficient number of Names for the 
project to be implemented.  Equitas was authorised and commenced reinsurance 
business on 3
rd September 1996.  Some Names however rejected the deal and 
instead continued to seek redress as against their agents and the Lloyd’s market 
through litigation (the Litigating Names).  Their mainly unsuccessful legal battle 
went on until 2007
187.  For the 95 percent of Names that accepted the Equitas 
deal, the establishment of Equitas marked the end of their dispute with Lloyd’s.  
Equitas was owned by trustees appointed by the Council of Lloyd’s and whose 
role was to protect the interest of those Names who had agreed to the Equitas 
Settlement.  Three companies were in fact created for the purposes of running off 
all of Lloyd’s pre-1992 liabilities: Equitas Holdings, Equitas Reinsurance Ltd (the 
reinsuring entity) and Equitas Ltd, the retrocessionaire of Equitas Reinsurance Ltd 
and responsible for the day to day running of the run-off.  Many of the 
administrative tasks, including the run-off of some of the syndicates, were in fact 
subcontracted to various other companies.  For instance if a syndicate was still 
trading, its managing agent might have the management of its pre-1992 liabilities 
sub-contracted to it.  The project was funded through the following sources
188: 
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1.  Sale and leaseback of the Lloyd’s 1986 building, and a remortgaging of the 
Lloyd’s 1958 building; and 
2.  Sale of Lloyd’s of London Press. 
The two above sources raised £270 million. 
3.  A contribution of £1 billion from the Central Fund, which included a £700 
million write-off on earmarked funds; 
4.  Contributions from auditors of £116 million; 
5.  Contributions from E&O insurers of £800 million; 
6.  Contribution from Lloyd’s brokers, over 6 years, of £100 million; 
7.  Contribution from members and managing agents of £200 million; 
8.  A 1.5% levy on OPL
189 from ongoing members raising a further £400 million; 
and 
9.  A syndicated loan of up to £300 million. 
 
The above adds up to £3.2 billion.  This amount was credited against the total 
amount of premium owed to Equitas by the Names who were reinsuring their Old 
Liabilities.  The situation of each Name was analysed individually and a bill was 
produced for each Name of the final amount he or she had to pay Equitas to 
reinsure.  This was the cost of Finality (although some Names received money).   
From then on, Equitas managed and paid the Old Liabilities of the Names who 
had accepted the Equitas Settlement.  From a legal perspective, however, the 
Names were still liable to their policyholders to pay amounts due under the 
(re)insurances.  Under the Equitas Settlement, there was no novation or 
assignment of the (re)insurance agreements: the contractual relationship between 
the Names who had underwritten the risk (through the Syndicates) and the 
policyholder remained unchanged.  However, the Names now had an agreement 
with Equitas whereby Equitas had agreed to pay amounts due by the Names to 
policyholders under (re)insurances covering pre-1992 liabilities. 
Equitas had to have large reserves to meet all those liabilities.  When it was 
created, Equitas took over all pre-1992 syndicates’ reserves and reinsurances.  
This, in addition to the sources listed above, gave Equitas a total fund of £14.7 
billion.  Given its role as the run-off provider of potentially very extensive 
liabilities, it was imperative for Equitas to establish its reserves at the appropriate 
level.  As part of the preparation for the Equitas Settlement proposal, a reserving 
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group had been set up to determine whether there were enough funds in each 
syndicate’s reserves to meet potential losses.  This required a review of all 
relevant reinsurance policies and assessment of the strength of the relevant 
reinsurers.  In order to do so, Equitas had to create and populate a database of 
over 5,000 reinsurers, 54,000 reinsurance policies and 664,000 lines of 
reinsurance
190.   
The reserving exercise was particularly difficult given the elusive nature of the 
two main types of liabilities covered by Equitas: APH and LMX losses.  For APH 
liabilities, unconventional methods of reserve estimation had to be used.  This 
included having to estimate the total number of potential victims of asbestos-
related diseases worldwide, the number and value of resulting claims, and Lloyd’s 
share of those claims.  LMX losses also presented difficulties as it was impossible 
to ascertain for each loss at the outset how many times it would spiral, bearing in 
mind that with each “turn” of the spiral the Gross Claim would increase.  The 
reserving group instead took a view as to the exposure of the entire London XL 
Market to specific losses, and applied a share for each syndicate.   
The aim of the reserving exercise was to discharge all of Equitas’ liabilities over a 
period of 40 years.  It seems the reserving was adequate as, in 2007, Equitas Ltd 
retroceded all its business to National Indemnity Company, one of the Berkshire 
Hathaway Group of companies, a sign that that business in run-off was perceived 
as a sound investment for a major conglomerate.   
Equitas only provided a solution to LMX Syndicates.  As explained above, the LMX 
Spiral comprised as many corporate reinsurers as it did syndicates.  Corporate 
reinsurers had to finance the claims themselves and did not benefit from a 
mutual pooling of resources.  Many LMX Companies suffered from the collapse of 
the LMX Spiral including Royal Re, Mercantile and General, Victory, Chancellor, 
and Charter Re
191. 
 
3.4.4  The LMX Spiral in Lockdown 
Equitas was impaired in its efforts to unwind the LMX Spiral when judicial 
decisions cast doubt upon the ways in which some of the LMX Spiral losses had 
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been aggregated.  This led to a lockdown of the LMX Spiral that lasted for nearly 
10 years. 
The losses in question emanated from two catastrophes: the grounding of the 
Exxon Valdez on 24 March 1989
192 (the Exxon Losses); and the seizure of Kuwait 
International Airport and its fleet on 2 August 1990 by the Iraqi army and 
subsequent destruction of a BA aircraft around 27 February 1991 (the KAC/BA 
Losses, together with the Exxon Losses, the Losses).  Difficulties arose because, 
years after the relevant events, it transpired that some of the Losses had been 
wrongly aggregated or were irrecoverable.  In Scott v Copenhagen Re UK Ltd
193, 
the Court of Appeal held that the losses of the Kuwaiti aircrafts should not have 
been aggregated with the loss of the BA aircraft as they did not arise out of the 
same event.  Then, in King v Brandywine Reinsurance Co
194, the Court of Appeal 
decided that some of the Exxon Losses were irrecoverable and ought not to have 
been included in the losses that entered the LMX Spiral.  The Losses had become 
so entangled as they were making their way up the LMX Spiral that it was 
impossible to identify the wrongly aggregated, or non recoverable, losses.  Thus 
all claims relating to the Losses had ground to a halt for nearly a decade pending 
a decision on how Equitas could establish the liabilities of the relevant reinsurers. 
Equitas’ solution as previously explained
195 was to develop the Equitas Model, 
which was based on voluminous amounts of actual data taken from the London 
XL Market.  The Equitas Model produced estimates of the recoverable amounts 
due under the relevant reinsurances, including substantial discounts for the 
wrongly aggregated or irrecoverable losses.  The Equitas Models is the closest 
models ever produced of the LMX Spiral. 
In November 2009, in the landmark case of Equitas v R&Q,
196 Equitas won the 
right to use the Equitas Model to verify LMX Spiral losses.  The case was a test 
case brought by Equitas to end the lockdown of the LMX Spiral, so that it could 
continue unwinding the LMX Spiral, at least as regards the Exxon and KAC/BA 
losses.   
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3.5  Concluding Remarks 
It took roughly a decade for the LMX Spiral to develop an incidental market 
occurrence to a very significant market failure that had a major impact on both 
the Lloyd’s and the wider reinsurance market in London.  By the end of the 
1980s, the LMX Spiral encompassed hundreds of reinsurers who all played what 
has been described as a giant and allegedly careless “pass the parcel” game.  
Equitas’ successor is still going through the unwinding process, some 25 years 
after the LMX Spiral showed its first signs of trouble. 
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4  Analysis of the LMX Spiral and its Effects 
 
This chapter provides a critical appraisal of the LMX Spiral and its effects on the 
London XL Market.  As noted in the previous chapter, the immediate trigger for 
the collapse of the LMX Spiral was a series of catastrophes.  However, this chapter 
will show that the LMX Spiral was unsustainable and therefore bound to fail 
because of the ways in which it distorted the London XL Market. 
 
4.1  The Paucity of Reports on the LMX Spiral 
Around the time of the Lloyd’s crisis the Lloyd’s insurance market was the subject 
of three reports and one Parliamentary investigation
197.  Even though Lloyd’s was 
an independent institution that enjoyed little interference from the government, 
the crisis of the early 1990s impacted on individuals, the Names, many of whom 
became bankrupt.  This inevitably lead to a certain level of public interest and 
prompted the government to investigate.  Those reports and investigations into 
Lloyd’s were concerned with the market as a whole and self-regulation, a 
singularity at the time when other financial markets were becoming subject to 
more regulatory scrutiny.   
BY contrast, only one enquiry into the LMX Spiral was ever commissioned.  The 
LMX Spiral was a significant factor in the crisis but it concerned only a specialised 
portion of the market of seemingly little interest to outsiders.  The sole “official” 
report concerning the LMX Spiral commissioned by Lloyd’s was the Walker Report, 
written by a committee chaired by Sir David Walker (the Walker Committee) set 
up at the end of February 1992 to inquire into allegations of misfeasance 
concerning the LMX Spiral within the Lloyd’s market.  The “Report of an inquiry 
into Lloyd’s syndicate participations and the LMX Spiral” was published in June 
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1992
198.  Its findings are set out in more detail below but in short, the Walker 
Committee found no evidence of impropriety, conspiracy of misfeasance. 
Lloyd’s also set up a number of loss review committees to enquire into individual 
LMX syndicates’ losses, but all documentation relating to those reviews is being 
kept confidential by Lloyd’s.  There exist other analyses of the LMX Spiral which 
have not been commissioned by Lloyd’s or the government or any authority with 
a view to understanding the spiral and improving the market in which it operated.  
These other analyses mainly come from actuaries.  This is unsurprising, given the 
nature and complexity of the LMX Spiral; it is most probably an interesting 
phenomenon to study from a mathematical perspective.  This chapter reviews 
some of the most significant of these actuarial investigations.
199 
Other sources of information about the LMX Spiral and its effects include cases, 
speeches, expert reports relied upon in litigation, underwriting reports and 
articles from underwriters active in the LMX market at the relevant time.  In 
addition, over the years the Chartered Insurance Institute has commissioned 
study groups to report on the London XL Market.  Those study groups have 
published lengthy reports in the years 1976, 1988 and 2000.  The reports clearly 
show the impact of the LMX Spiral during the relevant years.  All these other 
resources are referred to in the relevant parts of this thesis.   
 
4.2  The Walker Report  
4.2.1  The Walker Report: Parameters 
The Walker Committee
200 was set up shortly after the collapse of the LMX Spiral 
and tasked with the duty to “inquire into allegations that syndicate participations 
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at Lloyd’s were arranged to the benefit of working names and to the 
disadvantage of external names; and into the operation of the LMX Spiral, where 
it has been suggested that the business was primarily for the benefit of brokers 
and underwriters at the expense of members of syndicates.
201”  The Walker 
Committee carried out a thorough review of the LMX Spiral and the ways in which 
it developed.  This must have been a difficult task given that the information 
provided by Lloyd’s was incomplete.  For instance, because of the three-year 
accounting rule
202, syndicate results were only available up to the 1990 
underwriting year for the most part of the review.  Moreover, Lloyd’s had no 
historic data on the performance of individual syndicates, available records did 
not identify which syndicates could be categorised as LMX Syndicates and neither 
did the data identify which of the Names could qualify as “working names” or 
“external names”
203.  The Walker Committee had to set out its own criteria and 
apply those as best it could to the information available. 
The findings of the Walker Report are valuable given the paucity of 
contemporaneous information concerning the LMX Spiral.  A significant amount 
of information relied upon in this thesis originates from the Walker Report.  
However, it is important to underline the restricted parameters of the review.  The 
Walker Committee had to focus on allegations of churning mentioned above, 
limiting its appraisal to the impact of the LMX Spiral within the narrow confines of 
the Lloyd’s market.  As noted in the previous chapter, the LMX Spiral affected the 
whole of the London XL Market, which included as many companies as it did 
Syndicates.   
 
4.2.2  The Walker Report: Key Findings 
The Walker Committee found no evidence of impropriety but found much to 
criticise in the way LMX Business had been conducted.  It concluded that the 
disastrous results of some LMX Syndicates were due to flawed underwriting, 
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which had been allowed to flourish through lack of proper supervision.  The 
Walker Report therefore made a number of recommendations for improvements.   
 
No impropriety 
One of the report’s key findings is that the development of the LMX Spiral in the 
mid-1980s could be explained through commercial factors.  It was not improper 
trading and the market had not been purposefully distorted by conspiracy or 
misfeasance.  Likewise, the Walker Committee found no evidence of fraud or 
conspiracy to disadvantage external Names or advantage others.  Market insiders 
fared better than outsiders but this was on a small scale and was understandable 
given the insiders’ superior knowledge.  The Walker Report points out that some 
Members’ Agents suffered losses to the same extent as their external Names. 
 
Low standards and inadequate monitoring 
The Walker Committee, however, was unimpressed by the low standards of 
professionalism, care and diligence displayed by some of the underwriters, 
Managing and Members’ Agents involved in LMX Business, finding that in some 
cases these fell “materially below best practice”
204.  Some of the agents had a lax 
approach to their fiduciary duties, sometimes giving prominence to their 
relationship with brokers and other agents rather than focusing on the duties 
they owed to the Names they were representing. 
The Walker Committee also felt that the regulatory oversight from Lloyd’s over 
the syndicates was inefficient.  The method then used to assess a syndicate’s 
performance was premium income monitoring.  This was a crude measure of how 
much business a syndicate was taking on which gave no indication as to the 
syndicate’s exposure.  In fact, since premiums declined rapidly as the LMX Spiral 
developed, less premium income could mean much higher levels of exposure.   
 
Recommendations 
The Walker Committee’s recommendations broadly asked for (i) higher standards 
to be imposed on Managing and Members’ Agents, (ii) tighter regulation and (iii) 
more proactive monitoring of the syndicates with vigorous enforcement and 
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disciplinary action.  The Walker Report noted that underwriters ought to be 
subjected to more supervision too, commenting that this should “warn against 
the unrealism of the apparently continuing sense in some parts of the market 
that underwriters cannot operate efficiently unless their discretion is largely 
unfettered.
205”  It also recommended that in future Lloyd’s should keep better data 
on syndicates.  Interestingly, the Walker Report recommended that Managing 
Agents should set underwriting plans and monitor compliance with those plans.  
This is something that has been echoed in case law
206.   
 
The Future 
Despite making for stark reading in parts, the Walker Report ended with a 
positive message.  Many Names had lost confidence in the Lloyd’s market but the 
same could not be said of insurers and reinsurers who still used the market.  In 
addition, the damage to the Lloyd’s capital base was not irreparable and its 
weaknesses were not attributable to its constitution.  In other words, damage had 
been done but it was not irremediable and improvements could be implemented 
without the need for new legislation. 
 
4.2.3  The LMX Spiral according to the Walker Report 
The Walker Report made some important factual findings about the LMX Spiral 
which are set out below. 
  The rates charged by LMX Spiral Participants diminished in successive layers
207.  
This was in accordance with the ways in which XL reinsurance had been priced 
over the years: the higher the layer, the less chances of a claim being made
208.   
  In the mid 1980s the marine reinsurance market had been particularly 
competitive, making it more and more difficult for marine underwriters to 
make a profit.  As a result, they were drawn to LMX Business which at the 
time was plentiful and seemingly profitable.  However, marine underwriters 
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lacked the necessary experience and LMX Business did require specialist 
skills
209. 
  Because of the very large number of XL reinsurance contracts, LMX reinsurers 
frequently reinsured risks that they had substantially transferred outwards in 
an earlier layer.  As a result, the Walker Report notes that “A consequence of 
the spiraling of LMX Business was that the claims turnover associated with an 
individual catastrophe greatly exceeded the amount of the actual loss”
210.  
This is the magnifying effect mentioned previously.  The Walker Report does 
however emphasise that the higher claim turnover did not actually increase 
the net loss borne by reinsurers.   
  The combined effect of the high claims turnover and low retention was that a 
very large part of the losses reached the higher layers.  The report suggests 
that the underwriters writing those layers may well have been less anxious to 
obtain full reinsurance for their exposure on the assumption that the risk of a 
claim reaching those layers was remote.  Thus many syndicates were carrying 
a large unprotected exposure above the upper limit of their reinsurance 
protections and these exposures were concentrated on those syndicates 
writing at top end of the spiral
211.   
  Claims would spiral until an LMX Spiral Participant had run out of reinsurance 
cover.  According to the Walker Report, a loss rapidly made its way through 
the lower layers and crystallised on the higher layers where reinsurers had 
not necessarily obtained  full reinsurance (see above).  This is the 
“concentrating” effect of the LMX Spiral noted previously.  It is interesting that 
in this context the Walker Report again points to marine underwriters and 
their lack of experience of LMX Business, which tends to cover losses of low 
frequency but high magnitude.  The marine underwriters were more familiar 
with smaller losses of high frequency.  This may explain why they wrote more 
LMX Business with unprotected exposures
212 at the top of their reinsurance 
programmes. 
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  LMX Business was seriously underpriced for two reasons.  Firstly, the risk 
premium had been substantially eroded by price competition, due to the 
arrival into this sector of marine underwriters but also due to the dramatic 
increase in the Lloyd’s Market capacity at the relevant time.  Secondly the 
brokerage, which amounted to a 10% commission on all transactions, reduced 
profit margins.  The inadequate pricing was made worse by the fact that, as 
noted above, most underwriters priced LMX Business in the same way as any 
other XL reinsurance by reducing rates on the higher layers (believing they 
were mostly out of reach) and keeping prices unrealistically low.  Another 
important factor was the widespread practice of payback, which is explained 
earlier in this thesis
213. 
  Syndicates did not accumulate sufficient reserves in the good years of the mid 
1980s to meet the losses of the later years
214.  Syndicates were however 
impaired in doing this because of their structure as yearly venture
215.  The 
good years also had led to less discipline within the market.  Many 
underwriters failed to aggregate their exposure and to adequately assess 
their risk/reward balance.  They failed to have adequate protection because 
they did not realise how quickly a single event loss would make its way 
through the layers of the spiral all the way to the top
216.   
  In the context of sluggish direct insurance and proportional reinsurance 
markets, LMX Business was seemingly attractive due not only to the low levels 
of catastrophes suffered during the good years but also because of the way 
those involved in the Lloyd’s market were remunerated, as follows: 
a.  For Managing Agents and underwriters, LMX Business gave an 
opportunity to increase premium income.  It was relatively cheap to 
administer and produced an attractive initial cash flow, notably because 
past experience showed that claims reached the XL layers long after the 
event and then made their way slowly through the spiral.   
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b.  For Members’ Agents, whose remuneration depends on the capacity 
they place on syndicate, LMX Business presented a unique opportunity 
to absorb all the additional capacity brought to the Lloyd’s market in 
the 1980s. 
c.  Finally, as noted above brokers received a 10% commission on all LMX 
Business and therefore they had an interest in expanding the volume of 
business being transacted in the market
217. 
  The Walker report states that “the search for additional premium income 
appears to have distracted the attention of some underwriters from the 
seriousness of the exposures that they were assuming”.  For instance, on a 
premium rate of 2%, which was not uncommon on the higher layers, a 
premium of £1 million would involve a whole account exposure of £50 
million.  This may be sensible if the layer is highly unlikely to be reached but 
as we know, the higher layers in the context of the LMX Spiral were the most 
exposed.  The report notes this lack of appreciation of the risk was partly due 
to a process of “anaesthetisation to risk from the heady years of the earlier 
1980s”
218.   
  To conclude, the Walker Report describes the LMX Spiral as follows: it would 
have looked like an inverted pyramid at the lower levels of reinsurance, with 
the risk being spread in the classical reinsurance pattern, but with the higher 
levels being akin to the top half of a diamond because this is where risk was 
being concentrated.”
219   
 
4.3  The LMX Working Party Report  
4.3.1  The LMX Working Party 
In October 1988, a report was published in the context of the General Insurance 
Convention, which appears to be a yearly convention organised by actuaries to 
discuss topical insurance issues.  Working parties are set up to study specific 
topics and report on them.  In 1988, the “LMX Working Party” was tasked with 
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looking into “Excess of loss reinsurance of Lloyd's syndicates and London market 
companies”
220.  In this thesis, the resulting report is referred to as the “LMX 
Working Party Report”.  However, because the chairman of the LMX Working Party 
was Graham Lyons, the report is also known as the “Lyons Report”
221. 
The LMX Working Party Report was published in 1988, at a time when the 
existence of the LMX Spiral was only starting to become generally known
222.  The 
report is not about the LMX Spiral, even though it touches upon it, but about the 
London XL Market.  In the words of Philips J in the Gooda Walker judgment, the 
“aim of the working party was to set down the nature of the London market and 
the special considerations which apply to LMX business”
223.  The LMX Working 
Party Report gives real insight into the London XL Market as it provides 
contemporaneous and candid views on LMX Business, including a section on the 
then recent Piper Alpha disaster.  It also includes an actuarial model of a real LMX 
property account that provides a much simplified but nonetheless revealing 
illustration of the effects of the LMX Spiral.  In addition, the report contains useful 
market information, including an LMX Slip Policy and a copy of the questionnaire 
used by underwriters to assess and price LMX Business.  The findings of the LMX 
Working Party Report are referred to in various parts of this thesis but below are 
some of its salient points.   
 
4.3.2  The LMX Working Party Report: Key Findings 
Co-reinsurance
224 
According to the report, one of the peculiarities of the London XL Market was the 
fact that “traditionally”, market participants did not co-insure.  In other words, 
risks within the London XL market were 100% reinsured, mostly within that 
market.  The report, however, notes that “because of the spiral effect there has 
been a move to ensure some co-reinsurance and the current figure is normally 
5%”.  This lack of co-insurance and the low retentions prevalent within the London 
XL Market is one of the factors that fuelled the development of the LMX Spiral. 
                                           
220 LMX Working Party (n 108). 
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222 See section 3.2.3 of this thesis. 
223 Gooda Walker (n 1) 1248. 
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The move towards more co-insurance as the LMX Spiral started to unwind was 
unfortunately “too little too late”, as explained earlier in this thesis
225. 
 
Long-short-tail losses
226 
Through the use of an example concerning Hurricane Alicia, which hit the East 
Coast of the US between 17 and 20 August 1983, the LMX Working Party Report 
demonstrates how the LMX Spiral turned what ought to have been short-tail 
losses into long-tail ones.  The report explains that a hurricane is usually a short-
tail loss given its brief lifespan and the immediacy of the damage it causes
227.  
However, the report notes that “when a loss is large enough the effect of the 
operations of the [London XL Market] is to introduce a “spiral effect” and make it 
much longer tailed”.  The report then contrasts the claim experience of two 
reinsurers as regards hurricane Alicia: one with no retrocession business and 
therefore no involvement in the LMX Spiral (Reinsurer a) and a leading reinsurer 
in the London XL Market (Reinsurer b).  Taking as the base figure the loss at 31 
December 1983, which is four months after the event, the results are 
illuminating: 
  Reinsurer a  Reinsurer b 
December 1983  82% total loss known  Loss = X 
June 1983  Loss increased by 20%  [No results given] 
December 1984  Thereafter loss fluctuates 
by 2 or 3% only. 
Loss = 10X 
December 1985  Loss = 24X 
December 1986  Loss = 37X 
December 1987  Loss = 40X 
 
                                           
225 See section 3.3.1. 
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227 This is particularly true of physical damage.  Loss of profit covered by business 
interruption insurances may take slightly longer to identify and quantify but nevertheless 
this can be done within a matter of months.  This contrasts with the typical long-tail 
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The report points out that from Reinsurer b it may take up to 10 years for the 
loss to come to maturity.  Thus in the context of the LMX Spiral, a three-day 
hurricane turns into an unpredictable 10-year loss.  It is on that basis that the 
writers of the LMX Working Party report coined the phrase “long-short-tail” to 
describe losses that made their way through the LMX Spiral.  This example also 
illustrates the magnifying effect. 
In the report, the leading LMX underwriter John Emney had put forward a 
potential solution to this issue.  He suggested requiring LMX Participants to 
estimate at the outset their aggregated exposure to a specific loss once it had hit 
the second layer of any relevant XL on XL reinsurance, then adding a pre-
determined percentage to that amount to establish the loss reserve for that loss.  
On that basis, loss advices could be submitted to all reinsurers on all layers 
affected.  If it then became obvious that the estimate was too high or too low, 
adjustments could be made.  The purpose of this exercise would not be to 
provide a precise forecast of the total loss but at least to give an indication at an 
early stage of the likely impact of a loss across the market.  With the benefit of 
hindsight, it seems unfortunate that this suggestion, made as early as 1988, was 
never taken up within the London XL Market. 
 
Rating issues
228 
The LMX Working Party Report also clearly highlights another fundamental issue 
with the London XL Market at the time: rating.  As the report points out, because 
of its nature, catastrophe business is more difficult to rate than more traditional 
insurance and reinsurance business.  Catastrophes are few and far between and 
each tends to have unique features.  Thus actuaries may not be able to project 
with much accuracy the likely losses future catastrophes may bring.  Underwriters 
faced the same problems.  The specialist underwriters ought to have had the 
requisite knowledge and experience to set appropriate prices but they needed 
accurate information about the level of exposure they were taking on from their 
reinsureds to price risk accurately. 
The main source of information LMX Underwriters were relying on seems to have 
been standard form questionnaires.  The example set out in the LMX Working 
Party Report is titled the “General Questionnaire” (the LMX Questionnaire) and it 
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was used for non marine XL contracts.  It is set out at Appendix A to this thesis.  
When reading through the LMX Questionnaire, it is evident that the focus is on 
the reinsured’s premium income issued from different types of business and 
geographical areas.  Yet premium income is not a good measure of exposure 
since the level of exposure may well increase if premium reduces due to market 
pressure.  In fact, this is what happened within the London XL Market in the mid-
1980s when overcapacity led to sharp declines in LMX Business rates. 
The report also notes that the practice of payback, which was widespread at the 
time, made the rating more obscure.  Since the payback element was passed on 
to the higher layers, at the retrocessional levels it was practically impossible to 
identify what portion of the premium was due to “payback” and what portion 
covered actual exposure.  The addition of payback to the premium also narrowed 
profit margins: a major issue in a market driven by intense competition.   
To encapsulate all of the above, the report states that “the major drawbacks to 
rating on catastrophe premium income are firstly that this is not a good measure 
of exposure and secondly that the constituent parts of the premium income are 
unclear (some reflect exposure, some may be “payback”, some reinstatement 
premium).” 
Finally, the LMX Working Party Report correctly points out that, once they enter 
the LMX Spiral, claims go “right through” the layers.  Thus reinsurers at the higher 
layers of a reinsurance programme were as likely to have to pay claims as those 
situated lower down the chain of reinsurances.  This meant that rates ought to 
have remained relatively flat as they were going up the reinsurance towers.  Yet 
as pointed out by the Walker Report, within the London XL Market at the time 
rates quoted by underwriters did not reflect this: they diminished with each 
retrocession instead.   
 
4.3.3  The Actuarial Model 
The LMX Working Party Report includes a simplified actuarial model of a real 
reinsurance property account containing LMX Business
229.  Whilst the aim of the 
model was not to analyse the LMX Spiral, the results clearly show some of the 
“spiral effects” which will be discussed later on in this chapter.  A number of 
different scenarios, each with varying parameters, were put through the model to 
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analyse the effect of each of those parameters on the account and, by analogy, 
the London XL Market at the time.  The varying parameters included claim sizes, 
retention levels and leakage.  Below are the model’s key findings for our 
purposes: 
  The model shows that reducing the claim size by more than half did not 
significantly reduce the size of the LMX Spiral.  In practice, this means a loss 
would take as long to be paid in full.  Thus, once it had entered the LMX 
Spiral, the size of a claim did not determine how many “turns” of the LMX 
Spiral it would take for the loss to come to extinction.  Bearing in mind that 
with each turn the gross amount being claimed increased, one can see how 
the magnifying effect was significant for claims of all sizes, and how the 
higher layers of reinsurance could be impacted by even relatively small losses. 
  The LMX Spiral became apparent even for claims not much higher than the 
deductible.  This finding corroborates the one above in that it shows that the 
LMX Spiral had an impact on even the smallest of claims.   
  According to the model, the LMX Spiral reduced mainly through reinsurance 
programmes becoming exhausted.  This means that losses stopped 
circulating only when a reinsurer had ran out of reinsurance cover.  As will be 
seen later, that reinsurer then had to meet all claims that fell upon it, leading 
to a concentration of the losses upon the least protected reinsurers within the 
London XL Market. 
  The LMX Working Party report also notes that the size of the deductible had a 
much greater impact on the length of the spiral than the overall size of the 
reinsurance programme and its upper limit. 
  The model shows that the length of the LMX Spiral increased as the following 
two parameters were increased: (i) the percentage of a reinsurance 
programme placed in the London XL Market and (ii) the percentage of this 
placement that was retained within the London XL Market.  The actual size of 
the reinsurance programme made little difference.  This shows that 
reinsurance spirals are potential features of any “closed” reinsurance market, 
regardless of the size of exposures being reinsured in those markets. 
  The model also shows that the magnifying effect of the LMX Spiral increased if 
all of the following three parameters were increased: (i) the percentage of a 
reinsurance programme placed within the London XL Market, (ii) the 
percentage of this placement retained within the London XL Market and (iii) 
the size of the reinsurance programme (as a percentage of the upper limit of Part I/Chapter 4 
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the programme).  Thus the gross claim amounts would increase more for the 
larger reinsurance programmes that were placed within the London XL Market.  
This is the classic compounding effect: a higher figure (the original loss value) 
multiplied (claims turnover) produces higher amounts. 
  Also, the size of claim which would cause a reinsurance programme to be 
exhausted would reduce proportionally as the above three parameters were 
increased.  This meant that small claims could burn through the entire 
reinsurance programmes causing the relevant reinsurers to run out of cover. 
The report concludes that reinsurance programmes would be exhausted by 
claims that are “not immense”.  In this context, those with the best chances of 
survival were the LMX Spiral Participants with the highest levels of reinsurance 
protection.  Whilst this seems obvious, it is important to note that this does not 
relate to the actual levels of exposure.  Hence reinsurers heavily exposed to the 
catastrophes listed in the previous chapter could still perform well if they had 
sufficient reinsurance in place.  This demonstrates why an accurate assessment of 
a reinsurer’s exposure, which would have dictated the level of reinsurance 
required, was of paramount importance. 
 
4.4  Professor Andrew Bain 
In an article published in 1999
230 Professor Andrew Bain, an economist, sought to 
produce a model of a reinsurance spiral and to apply it to “the situation that 
existed in the Lloyd’s and the London reinsurance markets in the second half of 
the 1980s”.  His analysis is more detailed than the model produced by the LMX 
Working Party because Professor Bain had access to additional information, 
including the reports of the Walker Committee and the LMX Working Party 
mentioned above, as well as that of the Gooda Walker Loss Review Committee
231.  
Professor Bain also had the benefit of hindsight: by 1999 the Spiral had collapsed, 
and he had been able to read some of the judgments concerning the LMX Spiral 
and referred to in the next chapter. 
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4.4.1  Some Key Features of Reinsurance  
Professor Bain’s article first explains some of key aspects of reinsurance from his 
perspective.  He points out that the value of the PML
232 will depend on the nature 
of the risks being undertaken.  The PML of a well diversified portfolio, where the 
degree of correlation between the individual risks has been controlled, can be 
much lower in value than the aggregate of the insured risks.  However, he notes 
that in XL reinsurance the loss may be higher than the upper limit of a reinsurer’s 
own reinsurance protection.  In such case the reinsurer has to bear the losses that 
“come out of the top” of its outward reinsurances.  Since the level of reinsurance 
cover would have been set according to the PML calculation, the author describes 
this situation as PML failure.  When PML failure occurs for some reinsurers before 
others in the market, the distribution of loss will not reflect the reinsurers’ 
intended exposure.   
Professor Bain then goes on to explain that the magnifying effect referred to 
previously
233 is a normal consequence of reinsurance.  Indeed, once a loss is large 
enough to trigger a reinsurance claim, then two overlapping claims are made for 
the same loss (one by the insured and one by the primary insurer to its reinsurer) 
such that the total value of both claims – described as the gross claim value – is 
higher than the original loss.  Professor Bain explains this in the following way: 
“Suppose that a risk is placed by the subscription method amongst a number of 
insurers, that each primary insurer retains 50% of the cover granted as a 
deductible and reinsures the other 50% on an excess of loss basis, that each 
reinsurer does likewise, and that retrocessionaires retain 100% of the risk that 
they accept. A loss event resulting in insured losses of up to 50% of the cover 
granted will be retained entirely by the primary insurers: gross claims equal total 
insured losses. In the case of a loss event resulting in insured losses equal to 
between 50% and 75% of the cover granted, the excess over 50% will result in 
claims on the reinsurers. Thus the loss event gives rise to gross claims that 
exceed the insured losses by the amount of these reinsurance claims. For losses 
between 75% and 100% of the cover granted, reinsurers will seek to recover 
losses in excess of 75% from the retrocessionaires, adding a further round of 
claims. The result is that an insured loss amounting to 100% of the available 
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cover would give rise to gross claims equal to 175% of the losses
234. In general, 
even in the absence of a spiral, the relationship between the total gross claims 
generated by a loss event and the level of insured losses depends on the structure 
of the primary, reinsurance and retrocession contracts involved.” 
 
4.4.2  Professor Bain’s Actuarial Models 
In his article, Professor Bain explores the effects of reinsurance spirals through 
the use of two actuarial models, the second one of which is developed into three 
scenarios.  His key findings are as follows: 
Model 1.   
His first model, which he calls a “general” model, provides a simplistic but 
nonetheless informative scenario.  It includes a number of inside reinsurers who 
reinsure each other within a market and outside reinsurers who do not reinsure 
back into the market.  As we know this was not the case within the LMX Spiral as 
the Foreign XL Reinsurers did reinsure back into the London XL Market.  However, 
this model serves to show the importance of leakage.  In the model, provided the 
insiders obtain sufficient reinsurance cover, the losses in excess of the insiders’ 
deductible are borne by the outside reinsurers.  However, because of the 
magnifying effect of the spiral, this only works if the outside reinsurers are willing 
to provide very high levels of reinsurances. 
Model 2.   
The second model is described as a “simplified model” but it is more complex.  It 
includes two groups of insiders: a first group (Insiders 1) that reinsures up to a 
certain level (R 1) but underwrite beyond that level (R 2) and a second group 
(Insiders 2) that will only write risks and reinsure up to the same level (R 2).  It is 
important to note that “R 1” is a lower level than “R 2” such that Insiders 1 have 
no reinsurance cover between levels “R 1” and “R 2”.  The model also includes 
outsiders who do not reinsure inside the market and who provide cover up to a 
level (R 0) that is lower than “R 1”.   
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The market is therefore as follows: R 0 (cover provided by outside reinsurers to 
all insiders) < R 1 (cover provided by Insiders 1 and 2 to all insiders) < R2 (cover 
provided by Insiders 1 and 2 to Insiders 2 only) 
From this the following scenarios are devised: 
  Scenario 1.  This supposes that the amount of cover provided by outside 
reinsurers exceeds the size of the original loss (X).  In mathematical terms: X < 
R 0.  In this scenario, the spiral of claims continues “indefinitely” but it does 
become smaller on each round and, ultimately, the loss falls entirely on the 
outside reinsurers. 
  Scenario 2.  In this scenario the original loss is greater than the cover provided 
by the outsiders.  In mathematical terms: X > R 0.  This means that at one 
point the reinsurance provided by outsiders becomes exhausted.  Subsequent 
claims fall on the insiders until Insiders 1 exhaust their reinsurance cover.  
Those insiders must thereafter retain any further claims made to them.  
Insiders 2, however, can continue to pass on claims to Insiders 1 until the 
limit of their own reinsurance cover, namely R 2, is attained.   
This second scenario clearly demonstrates how a reinsurance spiral 
“concentrates” the loss, in this case on Insiders 1, rather than spreading it.   
 
An “illustrative example” 
The above findings are illustrated through the use of a fictitious example based 
on the accidental destruction of an oil rig presenting a total loss of $1,200 
million.  The market is then presumed to comprise the following: 
  200 inside reinsurers who provide $6 million of cover each but retain the 
first $1 million of loss.  Thus those 200 reinsurers each obtain XL 
reinsurance cover of $5 million (a total of $ 1 billion) 
  100 outside reinsurers. 
 
In addition: 
  The first three layers of reinsurance of $0.5 million each are spread equally 
amongst the 200 insiders and 100 outsiders.  Thereafter outsiders do not 
participate in the market.  Hence the cap on each of the outsiders’ 
exposure is $1.5 million (R 0). 
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  Of the 200 insiders: 
o  50 “Insiders 1” reinsurers have reinsurance cover up to $5 million (R 
1) but they carry exposures of up to $ 10 million (R 2).   
o  the remaining 150 “Insiders 2” reinsurers benefit from the same 
levels of reinsurance cover and exposure i.e. $10 million (R 2) 
 
Below are the results found by Professor Bain when putting the original claim of 
$1200 million through the above model.  Losses were distributed as follows: 
 
Loss 
($ millions) 
Loss 
bearers 
Comments 
200  Insiders  These losses are covered by the $1 million 
deductibles retained by each insider.   
100  Outsiders  Insiders recover claims above their 
deductible from the outsiders. 
300 - 550  Insiders 1  These losses, which are above the Insiders 
1s’ $5 million reinsurance cover, are 
involuntary. 
550 -1200  Insiders 1 
and 2 
At this points Insiders 2 have also 
exhausted their $10 million reinsurance 
cover and they also suffer involuntary 
losses. 
 
 
The model also provides evidence of the magnifying effect, as follows: 
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Loss 
($ millions) 
Claims level 
($ millions) 
Comments 
200  200  The losses fall within the deductible so no 
reinsurance claims are made. 
200 to 300  Up to 500  In this range only one third of claims are 
retained by outsiders with the balance 
leading to further claims. 
300 - 550  Up to 2300  This is the range where the magnifying 
effect is the most significant as claims 
spiral amongst the insiders until Insiders 
1 run out of reinsurance cover. 
550 - 1200  Up to 3000  Whilst there is still a magnifying effect, 
the number of claims rises more in line 
with the level of loss as Insiders 2 also 
exhaust their reinsurance cover; thus 
limiting further the number of claims 
being made. 
 
 
4.4.3  Features of Reinsurance Spirals 
Based on the above findings, Professor Bain describes the characteristics of 
reinsurance spirals.  He explains, as we already know, that reinsurance spirals are 
triggered when a reinsurer receives additional claims in relation to a loss it has 
already indemnified under a previous XL contract.  He points out that once 
reinsurers have paid claims in excess of their deductibles, any additional claim 
will trigger further claims to their outward reinsurers.  This continues until PML 
failure occurs
235.  Based on his analysis, Professor Bain’s conclusions concerning 
reinsurance spirals are as follows: 
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  Reinsurance spirals are characterised by PML failure, which adds to the 
concentration of risk because those reinsurers whose reinsurance cover 
runs out first involuntarily end up retaining all losses that reach them, 
usually until they become insolvent.   
  In addition, in a spiral the connection between the level of insured losses 
and the triggering of claims on the higher reinsurance layers is lost.  This 
is because claims above the deductibles are passed on to the higher 
layers so that even a small claim can reach the catastrophe layers of XL 
reinsurance towers.   
  As a result, the correlation between a layer of reinsurance cover and the 
probability of a claim being made is subverted.  He concludes from this 
that premium should not reduce with each XL reinsurance layer but 
remain constant. 
  Another aspect of this effect is that underwriters are unable to make an 
objective estimate of the probability of a claim reaching their layer. The 
only way they could make such an estimate would be to obtain detailed 
knowledge of the structure of all intervening reinsurance contracts.  As 
we know, such transparency did not exist in the London XL Market of the 
1980s. 
 
The article points out that the capacity of a reinsurance market is the sum of all 
deductibles within the market, plus layers willingly retained by reinsurers.  
Beyond this the risks are transferred amongst reinsurers.  If a loss occurs that is 
greater than the sum of all deductibles and voluntary retentions, some reinsurers 
will run out of cover.  Reinsurers calculate the level of reinsurance they require 
beyond their retentions and deductible through the use of PMLs, which are 
necessarily estimates.  Accurate PMLs are therefore paramount and yet Professor 
Bain argues that “in the absence of the information necessary to calculate the PML 
with any precision in these conditions, it will hardly be surprising if some insurers 
get it wrong.” 
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4.5  Spiral Effects 
4.5.1  The Spiral Effects 
This chapter would be incomplete without a final outline of the many ways in 
which the LMX Spiral distorted the London XL Market (the Spiral Effects), taken 
from the reviews described above plus all other relevant publications analysed by 
the author of this thesis.   
 
The Magnifying Effect:  
This is mentioned in all of the above reviews and it is now a well known effect of 
the LMX Spiral.  To reiterate, once a loss had made its way through the LMX 
Spiral, the gross claim amount had become significantly larger than the initial 
loss.  As noted in Professor Bain’s article, a magnifying effect is a normal feature 
of any reinsurance market and the Walker Report specifies that it does not 
increase the net loss borne by reinsurers within that market.   
Nevertheless, within the LMX Spiral the claims turnover was so high that the total 
value of claims sometimes bore no resemblance to the original loss.  The sheer 
volume of claims must have added significantly to administrative costs.  
Moreover, claims impact on deductibles and reinsurance protections.  Thus the 
more claims were being made, the quicker reinsurers would exhaust their 
deductible.  This had the effect of increasing further the claim turnover as once a 
deductible had been breached, claims would go straight back into the market in 
the form of further claims.  This is clearly demonstrated in Professor Bain’s 
model.  Likewise, the increased number of claims would have caused reinsurers 
to exhaust their reinsurance cover, which leads Professor Bain to conclude that 
reinsurance spirals are characterised by PML failure.  The issues raised by this are 
well illustrated by the Equitas
236 case, where claims had been made on layers that 
may not have been reached but for the LMX Spiral.   
 
Concentration 
The concentration of losses upon the few is another well known effect of the LMX 
Spiral and again, all the above reviews refer to it.  The Walker Report for instance 
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notes that the vast majority of the very significant losses suffered within the 
Lloyd’s section of the London XL Market in 1988 and 1989 were borne by only 14 
of all 87 “LMX Syndicates”
237.  The actuarial models from both the LMX Working 
Party and Professor Bain provide cogent evidence that explains why and how this 
happened.   
The concentration of losses upon the few was unintended.  Those who ran out of 
cover first were the ones who had either failed to calculate their aggregates or 
those who believed a level of exposure at the “top end” of their reinsurance 
programs carried little risk of being reached.  This was in itself a failure of the 
market.  Moreover, the concentration of losses upon the few is diametrically 
opposed to the purpose of reinsurance.  Reinsurance markets exist to spread 
exposure further so that the financial burden of a large loss can be borne by the 
many.  A reinsurance market which concentrates losses is at best inefficient or, in 
the case of the LMX Spiral, seriously flawed.   
 
Opacity  
Opacity is a generally well known feature of the LMX Spiral and again it is noted in 
all the above reviews.  In XL reinsurance the relationship between reinsurer and 
the primary insurer is more remote than in proportional reinsurance and this 
feature increases as layer upon layer of XL reinsurances is placed.  In addition, 
given the ways in which risks were bundled together within the London XL market 
at the time
238, it was difficult for any XL reinsurer to identify individual risks within 
the accounts it was reinsuring.  Thus with or without the LMX Spiral, there would 
necessarily have been a level of opacity within the London XL Market. 
The LMX Spiral however created such a complex web of interconnected 
reinsurance contracts that, according to the Walker Report, “transparency 
virtually disappeared”. As a result the report goes on to say that there was no 
practicable means to establish at what size an original insurance loss would 
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trigger a claim
239.  The LMX Questionnaire would not have been of great 
assistance as it provided little information on the risks begin underwritten.  This 
lack of transparency was made worse by the practice of marine underwriters to 
include increasingly large “incidental non marine” exposures into their LMX 
Business accounts.  As those reinsurances were bundled and reinsured under 
“whole account” treaties, significant levels of non marine risks insidiously entered 
the marine section of the London XL Market. 
According to the Walker Report, the only features of XL reinsurances an 
underwriter could be certain of in the market were the deductible; the limit of 
exposure to that particular contract and the premium.  This is barely enough 
information to assess a risk accurately.  In addition, in the context of the LMX 
Spiral two of these items were unreliable.  We have just seen how the claim 
turnover caused PML failure and how it also caused deductibles to be exhausted 
much more quickly than could have been anticipated.  We have also seen how the 
rating was inadequate and obscure so premium could be misleading.  The LMX 
Spiral therefore rendered the London XL Market so opaque that underwriters 
wrote business without the basic information one needs to assess risk, as noted 
by Professor Bain. 
 
Long short tail 
This effect is explained in some detail above in the context of the LMX Working 
Party Report.  Even though the larger claims made their way through the London 
XL Market much more quickly as the LMX Spiral started to unwind
 240, the sheer 
volume of claims meant that a loss would take years to be fully paid.  To a certain 
extent this effect was a welcome feature of the London XL Market in that it gave 
reinsurers more time to gather resources to pay.  Given that XL premium is often 
paid at the outset, the long short tail effect created a positive cash flow for 
reinsurers, with premium being received prior to claims having to be met.   
This however works when reinsurers can expect and quantify claims coming their 
way.  The combined effect of all the features described above made this unlikely.  
Within the LMX Spiral, claims were magnified to unpredictable levels, exhausting 
deductible and causing unexpected PML failure along the way before falling 
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seemingly randomly on the less well protected reinsurers.  Until that point was 
reached, claims would circulate endlessly, increasing the long tail effect.  The 
example set out in the LMX Working Party Report illustrates this perfectly: after 
four years the LMX Spiral Participant (reinsurer b) has to face potential claims of 
an unpredictable level for an unpredictable amount of time.  By contrast, the 
reinsurer who was not involved in the LMX Spiral (reinsurer a) knows its exact 
exposure within about 18 months of the event. 
 
Sum insured and layering rendered meaningless 
In an XL reinsurance, the “Sum Insured” is the upper cap on the reinsurer’s 
liability (Sum Insured) and it is the point above which there is no more 
reinsurance protection for the reinsured.  In normal circumstances, the Sum 
Insured is unlikely to be reached by small claims and higher layers of reinsurance 
are much less likely to be triggered than the lower working layers.   
In a closed spiral, that is, one with no leakage and reinsurers who do not become 
insolvent, claims circulate to infinity.  In this context, the sum insured and the 
layering become irrelevant.  Even though the LMX Spiral was not a closed spiral, it 
had features that made it akin to a closed spiral in some respects: the small 
deductibles were rapidly exhausted and the minimal amount of leakage meant 
that claims would circulate until a reinsurer had run out of cover.  As a result, 
claims were being made on the higher layers for even the smaller losses.  By the 
same token, Sum Insured were reached even though the initial loss may not have 
been that substantial.  The actuarial models of both the LMX Working Party 
Report and Professor Bain demonstrate this. 
 
Irrational rating structure 
This Spiral Effect is also mentioned in all of the above reviews.  Many 
underwriters priced LMX Business in the same way as any other XL reinsurance 
business, by reducing premium as the risk went up the layers.  In addition, 
intense competition within the London XL Market in the 1980s had driven prices 
down.  In the context of the LMX Spiral, claims were as likely to reach the higher 
layers as the lower ones.  Thus a flat rating structure would have been more 
appropriate and yet it would probably have seemed absurd to many underwriters 
who wrote LMX Business at the time.     Part I/Chapter 4 
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Unpredictability 
Although it links in with many of the Spiral Effects mentioned above, the issue of 
unpredictability is not specifically mentioned in any of the above reviews.  The 
point, however, was made cogently in case law
241 and it is worth setting out here.  
Fundamentally, within the LMX Spiral, an underwriter was unable to predict who 
would bear a loss as this depended on at least two parameters that were 
unknown to him, which are as follows:  
  The level of protective reinsurance cover relative to exposure available to 
each LMX Spiral Participant; and 
  the extent to which there was leakage (which also depended on the extent 
to which other LMX Spiral Participants had ran out of cover). 
Viewed in a simplistic way, reinsurers did not know who would be the “weakest 
link” in the market yet this information was fundamental as it could impact on 
their own reinsurance protection.  Indeed, a reinsurer may suddenly find that its 
reinsurers had become insolvent, leaving it without reinsurance cover and 
therefore with losses more likely to “come out at the top”.  All LMX Spiral 
Participants depended upon each other but they knew hardly anything about their 
respective strength and exposures. 
 
4.5.2  Simply a Market Phenomenon? 
This chapter sets out in some detail three reviews of the LMX Spiral carried out by 
a varied cross section of experts and professionals.  They wrote at various points 
in time within a period of 11 years and based their analysis on different sources 
of information.  In this context, the facts that their conclusions have much in 
common provides tangible evidence that the LMX Spiral did impact the market in 
the ways they suggest.   
 
                                           
241 See for instance Wynniatt-Hussey v RJ Bromley (Underwriting Agencies) plc and ors 
[1996] Re LR 310, 319–2; Arbuthnott v Feltrim Underwriting Agencies Ltd & ors [1995] 
CLC 437, 487; Berriman and ors v Rose Thompson Young (Underwriting) Ltd [1996] 5 Re 
LR 117, 127; Nederlandse  (n 57) 686. Part I/Chapter 4 
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The case law, which is analysed in the next chapter, acknowledges some of those 
Spiral Effects.  However, English courts have confined their findings on the LMX 
Spiral to issues of facts to be used as a backdrop for their assessment of the 
underwriters’ and agents’ negligence.  Courts are of course restricted by the 
choice of arguments made by parties to litigation.  It is maybe unfortunate that 
the Walker Report had the effect of deterring parties from raising issues as 
regards the LMX Spiral in Court.  Instead, the parties focused on underwriters’ 
negligence claims and the legal position is now that the LMX Spiral was not, per 
se, unreasonable business. 
On the one hand the LMX Spiral may be seen was as a relatively innocuous market 
phenomenon.  The above reviews, however, particularly the actuarial models, 
provide solid evidence that the LMX Spiral had a distorting effect on the London 
XL Market.  Regrettably, actuarial evidence was never used in case law to critically 
appraise the LMX Spiral.  Actuarial evidence was heavily relied upon in the recent 
case of Equitas v R&Q
242 but the models served only to establish quantum rather 
than to appraise the LMX Spiral itself.  It may be worth pointing out here that 
Professor Bain’s models were created for the purposes of litigation but his 
evidence was inadmissible in court because some of the data he had relied upon 
was confidential.     
The better view is that the LMX Spiral was not reasonable business because of the 
impact it had on the London XL Market.  All that was required to trigger a market 
failure was for a few losses, not necessarily huge ones, to start making their way 
through the LMX Spiral.  The magnifying effect would have led to PML failures 
thus concentrating the losses upon the few.  This would necessarily have 
happened because some reinsurers were bound to have miscalculated their 
exposure and mis-priced their portfolios due to the opacity of the market, its 
irrational rating structure and its inherent unpredictability.  Even the best 
underwriters would have found that some of the usual criteria they rely on to 
assess their exposure, for instance the Sum Insured or layering, had become 
meaningless.  The long short tail effect also meant that reinsurers were unable to 
quantify the full extent of their exposure to a particular loss until years after the 
event.  The LMX Spiral was a destructive force and many of the underwriters who 
engaged in the London XL Market at the time precipitated its collapse by fuelling 
it development.  
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4.6  Concluding Remarks 
Some of the underwriters and other professionals embroiled in the LMX Spiral 
debacle argued that the catastrophes of the late 1980s/early 1990s had caused 
its collapse.  The catastrophes were the proximate cause of the very significant 
losses suffered by the relevant reinsurers.  However, the LMX Spiral also played a 
part in the difficulties faced by the London XL Market because of its inherent 
flaws.  The Spiral Effects listed above would have led to a crisis sooner or later.  
All that was required was for a few losses to start making their way through the 
LMX Spiral for its distorting effects to impact on the weakest reinsurers.   
     Part II/Chapter 5 
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PART II: LEGAL APPRAISAL OF REINSURANCE 
SPIRALS 
 
 
5  The Case Law 
 
Given the many pitfalls of the LMX Spiral and the very extensive losses suffered 
by many Spiral Participants, it is unsurprising that its unwinding fuelled a wave of 
litigation in the English courts.  This chapter reviews all of the cases that relate to 
the LMX Spiral and analyses their findings.   
 
5.1  The Lloyd’s Litigation 
5.1.1  A Wave of Litigation  
The vast number of losses and the near collapse of Lloyd’s led to a wave of 
litigation in early 1993 that threatened to overwhelm the Commercial Court
243.  
Most cases were brought by Names, often organised into “action groups”
244, 
seeking to recover some of the sums they were liable to pay
245 under the various 
contracts of insurance or reinsurance subscribed on their behalf.  Because they 
had unlimited liability, many Names were being required to pay for losses much 
higher than their initial investment into Lloyd’s
246 and some faced serious 
financial hardship.   
                                           
243 Barrow v Bankside Members Agency Ltd and ors [1996] 5 Re LR 1, 5. 
244 For instance the Gooda Walker action group comprised Names who had joined the 
Gooda Walker syndicates. 3000 Names were claimants in the Gooda Walker case (n 1).  
This information is set out in the case of Berriman (n 241), which itself involved 1092 
claimant Names. 
245 The payments were due under cash calls made by the relevant Syndicates to replenish 
the Syndicate premiums trust funds for the purposes of paying claims. 
246 For instance, losses to those Names who were members of the Rose Thompson Young 
(Underwriting) Ltd’s marine syndicate would have amounted to between 315.9% and Part II/Chapter 5 
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If a Name was unable to pay a Syndicate cash call, the payment would be made 
from the Central Fund.  In anticipation, the Central Fund might also be earmarked 
to match his or her outstanding liabilities taken into account in the annual 
solvency test.  However, as explained earlier in this thesis, demands on the 
Central Fund were so high in the early 1990s that Lloyd’s had to face the 
prospect of the Central Fund becoming exhausted by 1996
247.   
As cash calls continued to be made for increasing sums of money, there grew 
more and more resentment amongst Names who felt they had been deceived.  
Some alleged fraud; others just felt they had been misinformed by their Members’ 
Agent, notably about the riskiness of LMX Business.  The growing sense of 
mistrust led to some Names refusing to pay their cash calls until their grievances 
were heard.   
The initial response by agents and by Lloyd’s was to seek to force payment of 
cash calls, or reimbursement of Lloyd’s where the Central Fund had been used to 
pay cash calls, by issuing court claims
248 against the Names who were unable 
and/or unwilling to pay.  In 1992, Lloyd’s issued nearly 200 such claims and 
wrote a further 3,000 letters threatening to issue claims should the requisite 
liabilities remain unpaid
249.  Lloyd’s also offered assistance to Names through its 
hardship committee which, under certain conditions, would provide an annual 
income to the Names most in need.  In addition, upon taking his post in the 
autumn of 1992, Lloyd’s new chief executive, Peter Middleton, put in place a 6-
month moratorium on all legal action.  Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1993, 
6,100 Names had been threatened with legal action by Lloyd’s
250.  In March 1993 
it was reported that half of Lloyd’s Names were engaged in litigation against 
Lloyd’s agents and underwriters
251.  A settlement offer sent to approximately 
                                                                                                                                 
410.76% of the syndicate’s stamp capacity in the year 1988 and between 434.9% and 
704.92% of the same in the year 1989.  Thus a Name who had committed a line of 
£40,000 to the syndicate would have lost between £126,000 and £164,000 in 1988 and 
between £174,000 and £282,000 in 1989.  See Berriman (n 241) 122–23. 
247 See section 3.4.2. 
248 At the time these were called ‘writs’ so the contemporary literature refers to the 
‘Lloyd’s writs’. 
249 Raphael (n 97) 201–02. 
250 ibid.  
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22,000 Names by Lloyd’s in 1993 was rejected by the Names early in 1994
252.  
The Commercial Court was flooded with cases brought by the Names or related to 
the Lloyd’s crisis which became known as the “Lloyd’s Litigation”.  The vast 
majority of the cases ended with the implementation of R&R on 3
rd September 
1996
253. 
 
5.1.2  The Cresswell Order 
It is not possible to know exactly how many claims were issued initially and how 
many Names were involved in the Lloyd’s Litigation
254.  However, information can 
be found in some of the judgments.  Thus, in the first instance decision of Jaffray 
v Society of Lloyd’s
255, Cresswell J noted that by the year 2000 the courts had 
considered 102 cases as part of the Lloyd’s Litigation
256.  He also said that this 
was “the largest and most complex piece of civil litigation the Commercial Court 
has ever seen.”
257  Such extraordinary circumstances called for extraordinary 
measures.  In the case of Barrow v Bankside
258, Saville J, who was initially in 
charge of the Lloyd’s Litigation, explained how in the summer of 1993 he 
produced a “management plan” to deal with all those cases, covering the period 
up to 1995.  This plan was embedded in an order made on 29 September 1994 
by Cresswell J (the Cresswell Order), who had by then inherited the duties of 
managing the Lloyd’s Litigation.  The aim of the management plan was to identify 
preliminary issues and “lead cases” to be heard first so as to provide guidance for 
other parties and establish principles relating to both quantum and liability.  The 
                                           
252 Frederick Thomas Poole and ors v Her Majesty’s Treasury [2006] EWHC 2731 app 1 
‘Statement of facts for First Trial’. 
253 For more detail on R&R, see section 3.4. 
254 This is because court files concerning those actions have now been destroyed.  HMRC 
services informed the author of this thesis by telephone on 29 November 2011 that court 
orders and files relating to cases are systematically destroyed 5 years after the judgment 
is delivered. 
255 Society of Lloyd’s v Jaffray [2000] EWHC 51 (Comm).   
256 ibid app 1. 
257 ibid ch 5. 
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Gooda Walker dispute was thus specifically chosen as one of the lead cases and it 
has indeed set the benchmark for all disputes concerning the LMX Spiral
259.   
The Cresswell order identified the following six broad categories into which cases 
could be sorted
260: 
a)  LMX cases; 
b)  long tail cases; 
a.  run-off contract cases; 
b.  reinsurance to close cases; 
c)  personal stop loss cases; 
d)  portfolio selection cases; 
e)  Central Fund litigation cases; and 
f)  other cases. 
 
The relevant category for this thesis is obviously the first one, although the LMX 
Spiral is discussed in some of the other categories.  For instance, in the portfolio 
selection cases it was often alleged that Members’ Agents had fallen short of the 
standards of care they owed to clients by recommending LMX Syndicates to 
Names who wanted a safe investment and had no wish to engage in high 
risk/high reward business.   
 
5.1.3  Litigating Names 
At this point it is important to note that the Lloyd’s Litigation cases certainly 
represent only the “tip of the iceberg”.  Many of them would have been the cases 
pre-selected by the court to provide guidance, and it is possible that some 
allegations or even entire cases were withdrawn once it became clear how courts 
would assess standards of care owed by the Lloyd’s professionals.  More 
significantly, Names who agreed to the R&R deal had to forego any legal action 
they had initiated or intended to issue against Lloyd’s and Lloyd’s professionals.  
R&R was accepted by about ninety five per cent of all Names and the settlement 
took effect on 3
rd September 1996.  Prior to that, Names seeking redress in the 
courts had organised themselves into 90 action groups.  Many of these action 
                                           
259 See chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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groups would have ceased activity once R&R was implemented although 1,752 
names rejected the deal and some chose to continue the legal battle
261.   
The Litigating Names refused to pay the Equitas premium and questioned Lloyd’s 
powers to impose R&R upon them making various allegations against Lloyd’s in 
the process, including fraud, misfeasance in public office, conspiracy and 
misrepresentation
262.  The implementation of R&R thus initially triggered more 
litigation.  Because this new wave of cases focussed on the Society of Lloyd’s 
itself and its duties to the Names, or on issues concerning R&R, LMX Business did 
not feature prominently. 
Proceedings were issued against Lloyd’s in the United States, Canada, Australia, 
Belgium and even before the European Commission.  In some of these 
proceedings allegations of fraud were made against Lloyd’s as regards the LMX 
Spiral but it seems that most of these cases were stayed through Lloyd’s taking 
action to enforce the English exclusive jurisdiction clause agreed to as part of the 
so-called “General Undertaking”’ given by all Names when they join Lloyd’s
263.   
 
5.2  LMX Judgments 
5.2.1  Overview 
Only a small number of cases within the Lloyd’s Litigation mention the LMX Spiral 
and amongst these, a handful provide a legal verdict on the spiral itself.  
Appendix B to this thesis provides a list of all cases that comprised the Lloyd’s 
Litigation, and a few others that are relevant
264.  Amongst these, the 42 cases that 
relate the LMX Spiral
265 are indicated in bold.   
                                           
261 Jaffray (n 255) ch 5. 
262 See for instance the  Jaffray first instance decision (n 255) and on appeal (Jaffray v 
Society of Lloyd’s [2002] EWCA Civ 1101), or the cases of Poole (n 252) and Stockwell & 
ors v Society of Lloyd’s [2007] EWCA Civ 930, [2008] 1 WLR 2255. 
263 Jaffray (n 255) ch 6. 
264 The appendix is based on the list of cases included in the Jaffray first instance decision 
(n 255) and other cases of relevance, for instance judgments delivered after Jaffray that 
relate to the Lloyd’s Litigation, the LMX Spiral, the PA Spiral or R&R. 
265 It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of cases that relate to the LMX Spiral 
directly or indirectly because there are a number of unreported judgments (some of which 
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Many decisions that relate to the LMX Spiral are not particularly relevant to the 
analysis set out in this thesis because the judgment focuses on issues unrelated 
to Spiral Business.  The Clementson
266 dispute is a good illustration of the point.  
Mr Clementson, a Lloyd’s Name since 1976, alleged that the Central Fund at 
Lloyd’s operated to distort competition and encourage moral hazard.  These 
allegations, explored in no less than three full judgments, required a detailed 
review of the ways in which the Lloyd’s market operated in the 1980s and early 
1990s, which necessarily involved an analysis of the LMX Spiral.  The findings, 
however, focus on anti-competition law.   
Amongst the 42 cases that relate to the LMX Spiral, the author of this thesis has 
identified a list of 15 judgments that are particularly important for the purposes 
of this thesis (the LMX Judgments).  The LMX Spiral does not necessarily feature 
prominently in all LMX Judgments but these have been selected on the basis that 
they contain interesting findings or comments about Spiral Business.  The LMX 
Judgments are listed and described briefly in the next few sections (a more detail 
analysis of the relevant findings is set out later in this chapter).  They have been 
split into categories and are presented in chronological order.  
 
5.2.2  Core LMX Cases 
In the first instance decision of Jaffray, Cresswell J listed the following as the 
cases that fell under the first category of the Creswell Order titled “LMX Cases”.  
For ease of reference, these will be referred to as the “Core LMX Cases”: 
1.  Deeny & ors v Gooda Walker Ltd (in voluntary liquidation) & ors [1994] CLC 
1224 
This is the first and still the leading case on the LMX Spiral heard by 
Phillips J.  3095 Names, organised into an “action group” successfully sued 
their Members’ Agents and the Managing Agents who ran the Gooda 
                                           
266 The Society of Lloyd’s v John Stewart Clementson [1994] CLC 71.  This was the first 
instance decision of Saville J, followed by the Court of Appeal decision ([1995] CLC 117) 
where  it  was  decided  that  the  issue  of  whether  Lloyd’s  had  infringed  competition  law 
could not be determined as a preliminary point (as Lloyd’s had sought to establish) and 
therefore should proceed to trial.  This led to the subsequent decision of Cresswell J in 
The Society of Lloyd’s v John Stewart Clementson [1997] LRLR 175 where it was held that 
the Lloyd’s Central Fund was not in breach of competition rules.     Part II/Chapter 5 
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Walker syndicates, alleging that the vast losses they had suffered had been 
caused by the agents’ negligence.  The Gooda Walker syndicates 
specialised in LMX Business and they were heavily involved in the LMX 
Spiral.   
2.  Arbuthnott v Feltrim Underwriting Agencies Ltd & ors [1995] CLC 437 
This was another action brought by 1,594 Names against their Members’ 
Agents and the Managing Agents of the Feltrim syndicates for negligent 
underwriting.  It was also heard by Phillips J who followed the principles 
laid down in his recent Gooda Walker judgment.   
3.  Berriman and ors v Rose Thompson Young (Underwriting) Ltd [1996] 5 Re 
LR 117 
In this case Names sued their Members’ Agents and Managing Agents for 
the negligent underwriting of Mr Bullen on the Rose Thompson Young 
syndicates.   
4.  Wynniatt-Hussey v RJ Bromley (Underwriting Agencies) plc and ors [1996] 
Re LR 310 
This was another case raised by Names, focusing on the underwriting of Mr 
Bromley.  The judge, Langley J, noted that by then, there was little dispute 
about the characteristics of LMX Business.   
 
The following judgment is not listed in Jaffray because it is a more recent case 
that was not part of the Lloyd’s Litigation.  Nevertheless, it clearly qualifies as a 
Core LMX Case since it relates to the LMX Spiral and its effects on the market. 
5.  Equitas v R&Q Reinsurance Company (UK) Limited [2009] EWHC 2787 
(Comm) 
As set out previously in this thesis
267, this case was issued by Equitas seeking 
recovery from reinsurers under XL contracts that were part of the LMX Spiral.  
The key issue was how Equitas could prove its loss fell within the outward 
reinsurances.  It is an issue of fact but the judgment establishes that an 
actuarial model seeking to reproduce the effect of the LMX Spiral, even if 
imperfect, is acceptable evidence to verify Spiral losses.  Expert evidence from 
the case also shows that it is now impossible to replicate the LMX Spiral in its 
entirety.   
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5.2.3  Portfolio Selection Cases 
6.  Sword-Daniels v Pitel and ors, Brown v KMR Services Ltd [1994] 3 Re LR 10 
This judgment at first instance comprised two of the lead cases selected by 
the court at the time of the Cresswell Order.  The claimants were two very 
different types of Names.  The first one, Mr Sword-Daniels, was an 
inexperienced investor of limited means who, in the words of Gatehouse J, 
“should have been discouraged from joining Lloyd’s” because his only asset 
consisted of a half share in the property of his house which had to be 
charged to enable him to join
268.  The second investor, Mr Brown, was a 
businessman who became a proactive and sophisticated Name, choosing his 
own syndicates and allocations.  Both Names had instructed their Members’ 
Agents to provide conservative investments but instead were advised to join 
LMX Syndicates.  In both cases the court found that recommending LMX 
Syndicates to such investors was a breach of the Members’ Agents’ duties 
although in the latter case, Mr Brown was found contributory negligent, to 
the tune of 30%, reduced to 22% on appeal
269, for choosing to remain on the 
LMX Syndicates. 
 
These decisions are of relevance to this thesis because they illustrate how, even 
before the Gooda Walker judgment in the case of the first instance decision, 
courts identified LMX Business as a type of investment that was more risky.  The 
cases also show how the nature of LMX Business has an impact on the duties of 
the relevant Members’ Agents.  This is explained later in this thesis. 
 
5.2.4  LMX Spiral as a Fraudulent Device 
Given the level of distrust between the Names and Lloyd’s at the beginning of the 
nineties, it should come as no surprise that allegations of fraud were made 
concerning the LMX Spiral.  As noted previously, however, the Walker Report, 
found no evidence of conspiracy or misfeasance as regards the development of 
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the LMX Spiral
270.  It seems allegations of fraud were withdrawn from pleadings as 
a direct result of the Walker Report and thus the issue was kept away from the 
courts after it had made a short appearance in the following early decisions 
within the Lloyd’s Litigation: 
 
7.  Boobyer v David Holman & co and the Society of Lloyd’s (No 2) [1993] 
Lloyd’s Rep 96 
Names applied to court for injunctions preventing their Members’ Agents 
from taking steps to pay cash calls from funds and assets Names had 
provided on trust to secure their liabilities at Lloyd’s.  Their application 
failed.  However, in passing, Saville J commented that “there are 
undoubtedly features of the LMX Spiral which call for careful 
investigation”
271 before noting that the LMX Spiral was being investigated 
by Sir David Walker.   
The Names were arguing that contracts covering Spiral Business had been 
entered into by the Managing Agents in breach of their fiduciary duties 
because the business was fraudulent, or because the contracts in question 
did not qualify as insurance or reinsurance contracts but as gambling.  
They alleged that the Spiral Participants were involved in the business of 
“churning” in that the purpose of the relevant transactions was not to 
create underwriting profit for the Names but to generate brokers’ and 
profit commissions.  Saville J concluded that the evidence before him did 
not substantiate allegations of deliberate churning.  He also rejected a 
further argument put forward by the Names that the reinsurance contracts 
were void because underwriters engaging in the LMX Spiral were unable to 
assess the risk properly and set the premium.  This has to be right.  As he 
points out, an underwriter not assessing risk and premium correctly may 
be negligent but the contract is not rendered void through lack of due care 
and skill on the part of its writer.   
Saville J however did not reject the Names’ contentions as groundless; he 
simply pointed to a lack of evidence to substantiate allegations of fraud.  
He also suggested to the Names that they may be better off arguing that 
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“the sort of business done by their agents in the LMX was so extraordinary 
that it fell outside the scope of the sort of underwriting business which the 
names had authorized the agents to conduct on their behalf and that 
accordingly the names were not bound by that business, that is to say, that 
it was not authorized by them at all, so that payments made in respect of 
that business did not go to discharge any obligation of the Names.”
272 
This judgment is dated 16 April 1992.  In June 1992, the Walker Report was 
published.  It clearly ruled out the possibility of fraud, explaining instead that 
the LMX Spiral was a market phenomenon the development of which could be 
linked back to commercial factors
273.   
 
8.  R v Lloyd’s of London ex parte Briggs and ors [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 176 
This judgment dates from 17 July 1992.  Lloyd’s had applied to court to 
set aside a leave obtained by Names to subject Lloyd’s cash calls to judicial 
review.  The leave for judicial review was set aside for a number of reasons 
that are outside the scope of this thesis.  The interesting point, however, is 
that the judgment notes that Names dropped allegations of fraud as 
regards the LMX Spiral, probably as a direct result of the findings set out in 
the Walker Report
274. 
 
9.  Deeny v Walker and ors and same v Littlejohn & Co and ors [1996] Re LR 
In the main Gooda Walker decision in 1994
275 the Names succeeded in 
establishing liability on the part of their Managing and Members’ Agents for 
the negligent underwriting of the Gooda Walker syndicates.  However, out of 
losses totalling £295 million, the Names could only recover £75 from the 
relevant Errors & Omissions (E&O) insurers.  This judgment represents an 
attempt by the Names to recover from other potential culprits.  In this case 
they targeted brokers and auditors, arguing that Times and Distance 
reinsurance policies (the T&D Policies) entered into as early as 1983 and 
1984 were fraudulent devices used to misrepresent the true profitability of 
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273 See section 4.2. of this thesis. 
274 R v Lloyd’s of London ex parte Briggs and ors [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 176, 179. 
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the Gooda Walker syndicates thus enticing Names to join them.  Maybe not 
surprisingly, this far-fetched argument failed.  The obvious obstacle was 
causation: the court found that the losses suffered by the Names in 1989 
and 1990 had been caused by poor underwriting, not the T&D policies.   
This case illustrates how Names sought to raise arguments of fraud and 
conspiracy against other professionals in what was clearly an attempt to cast 
as wide a net as possible to recover their substantial losses. 
 
10.  Sphere Drake Insurance v Euro International Underwriting [2003] EWHC 
1636 (Comm) 
This is the seminal judgment concerning the so called “PA Spiral” that led 
to findings of dishonest breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent 
misrepresentation against Euro International Underwriting and dishonesty 
against the broker SCB.  The judgment explores XL spirals at length and its 
influence can be seen in the next couple of cases.  It is described in some 
detail in the next chapter. 
 
11.  Society of Lloyd’s v Henderson and ors [2005] EWHC 850 (Comm) 
This judgment is dated 2005, nearly ten years after the implementation of 
R&R but only shortly after the decision in Sphere Drake.  Some of the 
Litigating Names made an application to amend their pleadings against 
Lloyd’s to raise the issue of misfeasance in public office.  Andrew Smith J 
disallowed the amendments on the ground that they introduced new issues 
which should have been raised in the preceding Jaffray
276 case.   
More critically for our purposes, the judge also rejected a new argument 
raised by the Names that Lloyd’s misfeasance extended to its failure to 
regulate LMX Business, notably by failing to prevent the development of 
another spiral, the PA Spiral.  Andrew Smith J pointed out that “the LMX 
spiral was entirely different from the PA spirals: the latter cannot properly 
be presented as a recurrence of the former.  The LMX spiral was not 
caused deliberately or dishonestly.  The losses were caused when the 
results of major catastrophes had to be borne by underwriters who had 
failed to recognise their aggregate exposure and to protect themselves by 
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reinsurance.   I cannot accept that there is any real prospect of the 
applicants establishing a complaint on the basis that their losses were the 
result of a recurrence of the problems experienced in the LMX spirals.  
That suggestion is properly to be regarded as fanciful.”
277 
Smith J’s comments concerning the LMX and the PA Spirals set out above 
were upheld by the Court of Appeal in Stockwell & ors v Society of Lloyd’s
278.   
 
5.2.5  LMX Business as a More Risky Type of Business 
In the next series of judgments the LMX Spiral serves only as a background but 
the cases show the inherent risks of Spiral Business and the reasons why it had to 
be given ‘special consideration’ by underwriters.   
 
12.  Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow Ernst & 
Young [1997] LRLR 678 
This is a long judgment concerning the acquisition of Victory Reinsurance 
Company (Victory) by Dutch reinsurance group Nederlandse Reassurantie 
Groep (NRG).  Victory was a London based company heavily involved in LMX 
Business.  It is one of the few cases in this selection that relates to a 
company rather than a Syndicate.  The judgment itself is as between NRG 
and some of its advisers tasked with the duty of assessing Victory’s financial 
standing: the actuary Bacon & Woodrow and accountants Ernst & Young.  
Their review took place between May and July 1990, a point in time when 
there was some awareness of the risks associated with LMX Business 
although the full extent of liabilities entwined in the LMX Spiral did not 
become apparent until 1991
279.  After Bacon & Woodrow and Ernst & Young 
had reported back to NRG, notably on the issue of Victory’s reserves in light 
of its exposure to the LMX Spiral, NRG agreed to buy Victory for £140 
million.  This turned out to be a disastrous deal for NRG.  At the time of 
purchase Victory’s reserves amounted to about £24 million but losses from 
its marine, aviation and transport account which comprised Spiral Business, 
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totalled £360 million.  By March 1993, Victory’s non-life business had to be 
put into run-off. 
This case serves as a useful illustration not only of the scale of financial 
exposure one entity could have to the LMX Spiral, but also the difficulties 
even the best accountants and actuaries faced in quantifying that exposure.  
Indeed, having assessed the state of market knowledge at the time, the 
court came to the conclusion that Bacon & Woodrow and Ernst & Young had 
not fallen below contemporary standards of care and skill in assessing the 
adequacy of Victory’s capital reserves
280.  At the time, there was an 
“imperfect understanding of the effect and potential impact” of the LMX 
Spiral
281.   
 
13.  Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgins Ltd [1998] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 565 
This was a dispute between Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd and the 
brokers who placed Aneco’s participation in a facultative/obligatory 
(fac/oblig) treaty covering the marine XL accounts of a number of 
Syndicates for the year 1988, all underwritten by Mr Bullen.  Aneco alleged 
the brokers had misrepresented the nature of the so-called “Bullen treaty” 
by describing it as a quota share treaty rather than a fac/oblig treaty
282.  
The court found in favour of Aneco.   
More interesting for our purposes is an argument presented by the 
defendant brokers, seeking to turn some of the negative effects of the LMX 
Spiral to their advantage.  They contended that the nature of the treaty was 
immaterial because “XL on XL writing involves making essentially arbitrary 
judgments on the likelihood of a catastrophe occurring (…) The opacity of 
risk prevents the underwriter from making any informed assessment of it 
(see chapter 2 of the Walker Report).  Writing catastrophe business is a 
huge gamble. (…) the spiral works in a manner which is capricious and 
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entirely unpredictable”
283.  This argument was unsuccessful.  As will be 
seen below, in the courts’ eyes the risky nature of LMX Business meant that 
the duty on underwriters who chose to write this type of business was, on 
the contrary, to ensure that they had a clear understanding of their 
syndicate’s exposure. 
The case went all the way to the House of Lords but the issues raised on 
appeal are not relevant for our purposes. 
 
14.  Norwich Union Life Insurance v Qureshi and Qureshi [1999] Re LR 263 
In this case Mr Qureshi sought to recover from Norwich Union (NU) his very 
substantial losses as one of the Names, most notably from the Gooda 
Walker syndicate.  The link between NU and the losses was tenuous.  In 
November 1989 NU had provided My Qureshi with a “Property Backed 
Guarantee Plan” (the Plan) which provided a guarantee of his liability to 
Lloyd’s, a mortgage over his home and a life policy.  When Mr Qureshi 
started to receive cash calls, under the terms of the Plan NU paid up to the 
limit of the guarantee and then took action to repossess Mr Qureshi’s 
home.  Amongst other things Mr Qureshi argued that because some 
companies within the NU group participated in insurance and reinsurance 
business on the London market, NU had knowledge of, and should have 
disclosed to him, the fact that the Syndicate involved in the LMX Spiral 
might incur large losses.  Mr Qureshi failed in establishing such a duty on 
the part of NU
284. 
 
15.  Avon Insurance Plc and ors v Swire Fraser Ltd and another [2000] Re LR 
535 
This was a dispute between stop loss insurers and their coverholder 
brokers about alleged misrepresentation by the latter concerning the ways 
in which each Name would be assessed by the lead broker personally.  The 
court found there was no misrepresentation, even though the sharp 
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increase in the number of applications for stop loss insurance meant the 
lead broker had to delegate some of his tasks.  The relevant aspect of the 
case for our purposes is the fact that the broker had identified a number of 
syndicates engaging in XL business as potentially more risky.  The court 
was convinced by the broker’s argument that the list he produced of these 
syndicates aimed to assist with the overall assessment of a Name’s 
portfolio but it was not a list of syndicates to avoid at all costs. 
 
5.3  Legal Principles Pertaining to the LMX Spiral 
Having established a definitive list of all cases that relate to the LMX Spiral, the 
next step is to analyse their findings.  This section focuses on the Gooda Walker 
decision because it was the very first one on the subject, but the analysis 
incorporates findings from all relevant cases.  
The legal principles identified by English courts pertaining to the LMX Spiral fall 
into three broad categories: (i) duties owed by the Lloyd’s professionals (ii) 
findings on the LMX Spiral itself and (iii) the standard of care of underwriters who 
wrote Spiral Business.  We will explore each of these in turn.   
 
5.3.1  Duties Owed 
As explained above, the LMX Spiral was the accidental side-effect of what can be 
described as excessive trading within the market.  It had not been set up 
fraudulently as a scheme.  Thus the court had no choice but to drill down to the 
minutiae of the individual reinsurance contracts and agency relationships that 
surrounded those contracts to establish liability for the vast losses that stemmed 
from Spiral Business.   
With the exception of the Nederlandse
285 case mentioned above, there is no 
judgment in the English courts where a corporate reinsurer sought to find 
another co-contracting party, or agent, responsible for its LMX Spiral losses.  
What happened however is that once the initial loss was paid, reinsurers rejected 
some of the claims for a number of technical reasons.  In those cases the 
disputes then focused on the reinsurance wording rather than the LMX Spiral 
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itself.  Of course, it is also possible that some disputes concerning the LMX Spiral 
and involving corporate reinsurers were referred to arbitration, or settled before 
they reached court.   
The Names at Lloyd’s were in a very different situation in that their reinsurances 
had been entered into on their behalf by their Members’ and Managing Agents.  
The Names turned to those agents to seek compensation.  The situation, 
however, was not straightforward given the unusual structure of the Lloyd’s 
Market.  The Members’ Agents were the ones who had a direct relationship with 
the Names and advised them on their portfolio choices but it was the Managing 
Agents who did the underwriting on behalf of the Names
286.   
Duties owed by Members’ Agents seemed uncontroversial.  In Sword-Daniels
287 it 
was common ground that the duties owed included the following:   
1.  to advise the Name which syndicates to join and in what amounts;   
2.  to keep the Name informed at all times of material factors which might 
affect his underwriting;   
3.  to provide the Name with a balanced portfolio and appropriate spread of 
risk;  
4.  to monitor the syndicates on which the Name was placed and make 
recommendations as to whether to increase or reduce his share on a 
syndicate, join a new syndicate, or withdraw;   
5.  to keep regularly in touch with the syndicates to which the Name 
belonged; and   
6.  to advise and discuss with the Name the prospects and past results of 
syndicates.    
 
The LMX Spiral losses, however, flowed from poor underwriting and this was the 
responsibility of the Managing Agents.  Until 1990 Names had no contractual 
relationship with Managing Agents, unless the agent was a Combined Agent who 
performed the role of both the Members’ and Managing Agent, in which case the 
Name was a Direct Name.  When the agents were not combined, the Members’ 
Agent would appoint the Managing Agent through the use of a sub-agency 
agreement.  There was thus a chain of contractual agreements: an agency 
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agreement between the Indirect Name and his Members’ Agent, a sub-agency 
agreement between the Member’s Agent and the Managing Agent, and finally a 
reinsurance contract entered into with a reinsured by the Managing Agent on 
behalf of the Name. 
Prior to 1985, there was no prescribed form for the sub-agency agreement 
between the Members’ Agent and the Managing Agent although standard wording 
was often used.  This standard wording gave the Managing Agent unfettered 
discretion to underwrite on behalf of the Name and it contained no express duty 
of care and skill in the exercise of this function.  However, in one of the first key 
preliminary issues to be considered by the courts in the context of the Lloyd’s 
Litigation, the House of Lords in 1995 found that Managing Agents owed a 
tortious duty of care to both Direct and Indirect Names
288.  In addition, the HL also 
found that both the Managing Agents’ contract with Direct Names and sub-
agency agreement with Members’ Agents of Indirect Names contained an implied 
term requiring the Managing Agents to exercise reasonable skill and care when 
underwriting.  The tortious and contractual duty co-existed.  As of 1
st January 
1987 a standard sub-agency agreement was introduced under a Lloyd’s byelaw 
dated 1985 but the HL found the situation under this new regime remained 
unchanged; that is, there were tortious and implied contractual duties that co-
existed.  From 1990, Names entered into standard form contracts directly with 
their Managing Agents.  These were not part of the decision as the HL was 
concerned with agreements entered into prior to 1990.  The key findings of the 
HL decision can be summarised as follows: 
 
Members’ 
Agents 
  owed contractual duties of care to Direct and Indirect 
Names. 
  contractually liable for the performance of the 
Managing Agents’ duties set out below until Names 
entered into contracts directly with the Managing 
Agents from 1990 onwards. 
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Managing 
Agents 
  owed tortious duties of care to Direct and Indirect 
Names.  
  owed implied contractual duties of care to Direct 
Names. 
  owed implied contractual duties of care to Indirect 
Names: (i) before 1987: under the standard wording 
used in the sub-agency agreement, (ii) between 1987 
and 1990: under the Lloyd’s standard form sub-agency 
agreement.   
Cause of action    the tortious and contractual duties were concurrent.  
Names were therefore free to pursue the Managing 
Agents in tort, in contract or both, depending on their 
circumstances. 
 
Once the above principles were established, Names were free to pursue Managing 
Agents directly, which gave rise to the Core LMX Spiral cases listed above.  
Unfortunately for the Names, whilst they managed to establish negligence on the 
part of the Managing Agents, the sums awarded were much larger than funds 
available to the agents themselves and their E&O insurers.  In the case of Cox v 
Bankside Members Agency Ltd
289, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the principle 
of chronological priority, also known as “fist past the post” would apply as far as 
recoveries from the E&O insurers were concerned.  Thus E&O monies would go to 
Names whose case had been heard first
290. 
Attempts to find others liable or in breach of duties failed on account of a lack of 
causative link or because the defendants owed no duties to the Names.  As noted 
in the previous section, such defendants included accountants, auditors
291 and 
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even life insurers
292.  The Litigating Names also failed to establish any liability for 
the LMX Spiral on the part of the Society of Lloyd’s
293. 
 
5.3.2  The LMX Spiral 
We set out the description of the LMX Spiral from the Gooda Walker
294 case earlier 
in this thesis
295.  Feltrim
296, which came shortly after the Gooda Walker judgment 
and which was also decided by Phillips J, does not contain a detailed description 
of the LMX Spiral and its effects.  Phillips J instead specifies that the Feltrim
297 
decision ought to be read in conjunction with his Gooda Walker judgment.  The 
findings of Phillips J in Gooda Walker and Feltrim have largely been relied upon in 
subsequent cases on the LMX Spiral, even the most recent judgments
298.   
The views of Phillips J on the LMX Spiral are neatly summarised in the following 
passage from Feltrim:  
“Spiral business was an aberration. Many, if not most, of those who engaged in it 
did so in the belief that the reinsurance that they were buying from their 
colleagues was providing a protection from exposure when this was largely 
illusory.  The capacity that was provided by the market was involuntary.  Had all 
members of the LMX Market correctly applied the agreed principles of competent 
excess of loss underwriting, the form and capacity of the market would have been 
radically different.  The conduct of the individual excess of loss underwriter falls 
to be considered, however, having regard to the market that existed, even if this, 
(sic) was an aberration. Some underwriters succeeded in conducting business in 
this market that did not result in heavy losses.  Neither in Gooda Walker nor in 
these actions have the plaintiffs alleged that it was negligent per se to write spiral 
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business.  The allegations of negligence are freestanding charges of failure to 
follow fundamental principles of excess of loss reinsurance.”
 299 
Phillips J’s strong comments seem to suggest that the development of the LMX 
Spiral in itself is evidence of poor underwriting.  Yet in both Feltrim and Gooda 
Walker, no allegations were made that writing Spiral Business was negligent per 
se
300.  The difficulty with such an argument was that, as Phillips J recognises 
himself, some Spiral Participants had written Spiral Business successfully.  This 
led him in Gooda Walker to conclude that a competent underwriter could write “a 
book which included spiral business”.  In reaching this conclusion, Phillips J seems 
to have been greatly influenced by the good results of Mr Tony Berry’s syndicate 
536 whose underwriting reports had been exhibited by Mr Von Eicken, one of the 
expert witnesses during trial.  Mr Von Eicken, the judge and counsel for the 
defendant conjectured that Mr Berry had made use of arbitrage.  In Phillips J’s 
view, such good results “could only be achieved by someone who fully understood 
the spiral and who deliberately took advantage of the disparity of rate for low 
level and high level layers of business”
301.  Interestingly, My Berry, who had no 
involvement in the trial, has told the author of this thesis that he never engaged 
in arbitrage and his profits were achieved purely through the application of good 
underwriting discipline.  Nevertheless, Phillips J’s finding that participation in the 
LMX Spiral was not negligent per se was never challenged.  From then on, the 
courts’ focus was on establishing what a competent underwriter would have done 
in the context of the LMX Spiral. 
By the time of the Gooda Walker judgment, courts had already recognised that 
LMX Business was high risk
302.  Traditionally the reason for this had been the fact 
that LMX Business comprised the underwriting of catastrophes, a more volatile 
type of risk.  In the 1980s, this was compounded by the way in which the LMX 
Spiral distorted the market.  In Gooda Walker, the following were identified as 
undesirable effects of the LMX Spiral: 
a)   the concentration of the risk in the hands of the few rather than dispersal; 
b)   what has become known as the “magnifying effect” on claims; 
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c)  the fact that higher layers were at a much higher risk of being impacted 
than would usually be the case in XL underwriting;  
d)  the transfer of a substantial proportion of premium to brokers; 
e)  opacity;  
f)  irrational rating because higher layers received a much lower rate even 
though they were, in fact, fairly likely to be impacted; and  
g)   unpredictability.  In Gooda Walker Phillips J explained this was due to the 
fact that it was impossible to work out what level of catastrophe would “burn 
through” the layers.  This was further developed in subsequent cases.  
Courts noted that Spiral Participants could not predict when a loss would 
impact on their layers because this depended partly on the extent to which 
other reinsurers would first exhaust their reinsurance cover
303.   
 
The above list identifies the Spiral Effects but none of the judgments include legal 
findings specifically on these effects. 
In the judgments that followed Gooda Walker, the description of the LMX Spiral, 
its effects on the market and the duties of the Reasonable LMX Underwriter were 
explored further and often amalgamated.  This is illustrated by the following 
passage from Bromley: 
1.  “LMX business was reinsurance on an excess of loss basis underwritten in 
the London market.  It could be the XL reinsurance of a direct underwriter 
(primary or first tier reinsurance) or of an XL reinsurer of the direct 
underwriter (second tier) or of such a second tier reinsurer (third tier). 
2.  At the second and third tiers the insurance could be written either as XL of 
XL or as a whole account cover.  While the former would protect only the 
XL writings of the cedant, the latter (whole account cover) would protect 
the whole account of the cedant including but not limited to his own XL 
writings... 
3.  The purpose of acquiring such reinsurance was to protect the cedant from 
aggregate accumulations in his account in the event of a catastrophe loss 
whether from the loss of a high value risk such as an oil rig or an 
accumulation of losses from a single event such as a hurricane.  It would 
take the form of a series of layers of protection up to the vertical limit 
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which the underwriter considered it prudent to acquire.  While the lower or 
working layers could be expected to be impacted with some frequency the 
higher layers could be expected to be impacted only by major catastrophe 
losses.  It was this perception that led to the higher layers (where there 
would be no or limited claims experience to rely on) being rated by way of 
a percentage of the exposure (rate on line) and to that rate itself being a 
percentage of the rate for the layer which underlay it.  Thus the higher the 
layer in general the lower it would be rated. 
4.  There were a limited number of Lloyd’s and company reinsurers which 
underwrote LMX business.  In consequence, and as the market grew in the 
1980s, many reinsurers were reinsured by those they were themselves 
reinsuring.  Underlying retention tended to be small and, at least in the 
marine market, co-insurance was uncommon. 
5.  The further away the reinsurer was from the original business the less he 
knew or could know about the nature of or risk of accumulations on his 
cedant’s business.  It was not the custom for cedants or brokers to provide 
aggregate information or the level of their own protection on their 
accounts when placing their reinsurance. 
6.  The features in (4) and (5) in particular gave rise to what was called ‘the 
spiral’ or ‘the spiral effect’ which became greatly exacerbated by the late 
1980s and had the effect of concentrating a catastrophe loss on the few 
and not spreading it among the many albeit the latter was the major 
rationale of reinsurance. 
7.  For the purposes of these proceedings, two feature of the spiral should be 
stated.  First the consequence of claims arising from a particular 
catastrophe accumulating in the accounts of those who wrote LMX business 
and being repeatedly passed on as claims to their reinsurers was that the 
amount of the original insured loss was magnified as it passed within those 
accounts albeit of course actual payments to the original assureds could 
never exceed the total insured loss... The effect was not only that the 
higher layers of protection were impacted in the case of a catastrophe far 
more easily but also that the protection they were thought to provide was 
to a great extent rendered illusory as once a loss was in the spiral it would 
progress through the layers almost automatically subject only to the 
second feature of the spiral described in (8) below.  It was also a     Part II/Chapter 5 
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consequence that the practice of rating the higher layer as a percentage of 
the underlying layer did not reflect the real risk undertaken. 
8.  The second relevant feature of the spiral was that the only significant way 
in which catastrophe losses would cease to spiral was as one or more LMX 
reinsurer exhausted the vertical level of their protections and so ceased to 
contribute to the spiral.  Moreover ... there was no way an individual 
underwriter could tell whether he would exhaust his protections before 
others did and so assess whether a substantial part of the loss would fall 
on them rather than on his syndicate ... the fact is (as is now apparent) 
that many who thought they were running no or no substantial exposure 
were wrong and sadly disillusioned by events.  No other underwriter could, 
as it seems to me, have known as much let alone more about other 
underwriters’ accounts than those underwriters thought they knew about 
them nor could an underwriter properly have conducted his own account 
on the basis that others would exhaust their covers before he did and so 
cease to contribute to the spiral causing it to slow or stop.  To have done so 
would be to rely on luck not judgment. 
9.  It follows, and on the evidence was or should have been understood at the 
relevant time by those writing LMX business such as Mr Bromley, that it 
was essential for a underwriter to protect and the only way in which he 
could protect the syndicate against serious losses arising from 
accumulations on his account was to take a number of steps.  First he had 
to know the aggregate exposures which he had written (or was proposing 
to write) on his XL account and to keep them under review as might be 
necessary. ... 
10.  The second step required of the LMX underwriter was to assess the 
probable maximum loss (PML) to the syndicate in the event that the worst 
practical catastrophe occurred to which his account might be exposed. ... 
11.  The third and final step required of the LMX underwriter was to acquire 
reinsurance protection to a vertical level sufficient to protect the syndicate 
against the PML (...). 
12.  I would add that, while established at the time, the practice of presenting 
the accounts of LMX syndicates or information about them in terms of the 
level of premium income to be derived or in fact derived from the various 
parts of its business and of writing business against expected or hoped for 
levels of premium income could lead to misunderstanding.  The key feature Part II/Chapter 5 
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of LMX business which the underwriter had to consider was the exposures 
he wrote and the level of protection he acquired to limit that exposure.  
While premium income levels may be an indication of exposure they are 
not necessarily so let alone a substitute for the procedures described 
above.
304” 
 
The above passage can be found under the heading “LMX underwriting” in the 
judgment, which shows that by then the focus was on the quality of the 
underwriting rather than on the LMX Spiral itself.  This brings us neatly to the 
following topic: the Reasonable LMX Underwriter. 
 
5.3.3  Reasonable LMX Underwriter 
In Gooda Walker Phillips J first considered whether the underwriters, who held 
themselves out as LMX Business specialists, ought to have appreciated the 
“nature and effects” of the LMX Spiral
305.  Given that other underwriters were 
aware, and spoke of, the risks associated with the LMX Spiral
306, he found no 
reason why the Gooda Walker underwriters should not have understood those 
risks.  The underwriters in question were very experienced writers of XL business, 
but catastrophe business and the LMX Spiral required “special consideration”.  For 
instance, reliance on past experience when estimating risk was inappropriate in 
the context of the LMX Spiral: catastrophes do not conform to a pattern and in 
any case their impact on Spiral Participants was unpredictable.  Having gathered 
evidence from expert underwriters, Phillips J identified a number of key 
prudential steps which seemed to be fundamental in the writing of a successful 
reinsurance portfolio comprising Spiral Business.  His findings have been refined 
in the subsequent Core LMX Cases, including Bromley as set out above.  
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Therefore, according to all these findings, a Reasonable LMX Underwriter would 
do the following: 
1.  actively manage its portfolio’s exposure and balance: a balanced 
reinsurance portfolio is one where exposure is spread over different types 
of business and different geographical areas
307.  In the case of Aneco, the 
expert Tony Berry also gave evidence showing that XL accounts could be 
balanced across layers, for instance by including a mix of working, middle 
and higher catastrophe layers
308;  
2.  follow an underwriting plan: a competent underwriter would have a plan 
setting out the amount of exposure his syndicate would run and beyond 
which reinsurance cover was to be required.  This did not have to be in 
writing, but it had to exist; 
3.  monitor its aggregates and PML: keeping an eye on aggregates and 
calculating PML is good practice for any XL reinsurance underwriter but it 
was fundamental for those participating in the LMX Spiral; 
4.  purchase the appropriate amount of reinsurance: once an underwriter had 
calculated his syndicate’s PML, he had to purchase reinsurance in 
accordance with his underwriting plan to limit the syndicate’s exposure; 
5.  match reinstatement: the underwriter had to ensure there were no gaps in 
the reinsurance coverage by matching the number of reinstatements 
between the syndicate’s inward and outward reinsurances.  If this was not 
feasible, the Reasonable LMX Underwriter had a choice either to take the 
risk without reinstatement on the basis that his syndicate would be 
exposed to a second catastrophe, or decline to write the inward 
business
309; and 
6.  charge suitable rates: although not listed within the same section of the 
Gooda Walker judgment, it is clear that rating formed a major part of 
Phillips J’s assessment of the Gooda Walker underwriters.   
 
It is interesting to note that the above findings address some of the issues 
identified in the various reports concerning reinsurance spirals described in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis.  This is unsurprising given that the Walker Report and 
the LMX Working Party Report were both available to the courts at the time. 
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The reasonable steps described above are elements considered in respect of all 
underwriters whose decisions were being scrutinised in the Core LMX Cases.  In 
addition, in Gooda Walker Phillips J made the following findings of relevance to 
the issue of competent underwriting: 
7.  Balancing profit over a number of years: it is acceptable for an underwriter 
to write LMX Business on the basis that losses made in some years could 
be balanced by generous profits made in other years
310.  However, Names 
had to be made aware of the risk that they were potentially exposed to loss 
on some of their underwriting years.  In Bromley, expert evidence showed 
that in good years' returns could be as high as 20% but in bad years losses 
could amount to 100% of a Name’s stamp capacity
311.  In Gooda Walker no 
time limit was specified for a balance to be achieved.  In subsequent cases, 
courts suggested that seeking to balance an account over a period of 5 or 
even 10 years would be reasonable
312. 
8.  Inter-syndicate and reciprocal reinsurance: Phillips J saw nothing wrong in 
principle with Syndicates mutually reinsuring each other.  He recognised 
that, to the extent there were Names on both the syndicates, the risk 
would not be effectively transferred.  However, he did not consider that 
inter-syndicate reinsurance in itself would establish a breach of the 
underwriter’s duty.  Likewise, he found that reciprocal reinsurance between 
two reinsurers, whether from Lloyd’s or the company market, was not 
negligent per se even though this practice added to the incestuous effect 
of the LMX Spiral. 
 
Whilst establishing that the Reasonable LMX Underwriter would do all of the 
above, courts emphasised that they were not looking for a paradigm
313.  The 
standard was one of reasonableness, not perfection, and therefore courts were 
                                           
310 Mr Philipps said: “There is no reason in principle why an underwriter should not write 
business on the basis that net losses will be made in some years that are balanced by 
generous profit levels in the other years. If, however, an  underwriter is deliberately to 
expose  his  names  to  suffering  losses  from  time  to  time,  he  must  make  sure  that  the 
names are aware of this and of the scale of loss to which they will from time to time be 
exposed.”   See Gooda Walker (n 1) 1241. 
311 Bromley (n 241) 334. 
312 See Feltrim (n 59) 49 and Berriman (n 241) 120.  
313 See Bromley (n 241) 313 and Berriman (n 241) 129.     Part II/Chapter 5 
  145     
only seeking to identify what a reasonably well informed and competent 
underwriter would have done.  However, underwriters who chose to take on Spiral 
Business had to show they had the requisite specialist skills and they were 
deemed to have an understanding of the dangers of the LMX Spiral.
314  XL on XL 
business was considered to be “particularly difficult and dangerous” business: 
many in the market looked up to those who held themselves out as market 
leaders and followed them
315.  In the later case of Sphere Drake, the court 
commented that “spiral underwriting required special skills, knowledge and 
nerve”
316.   
In all Core LMX Cases listed above the Managing Agents and their underwriters 
lacked the special skills and they were found negligent.  All were seemingly 
unaware of the pitfalls of the LMX Spiral, most did not have a plan and few 
calculated aggregates or PMLs.  This meant pretty much all of them were unable 
to ascertain whether they had sufficient reinsurance in place.  Those findings of 
negligence met the immediate needs of the Names seeking compensation.  
However, there remains the question whether the Reasonable LMX Underwriter 
would, in fact, have been an effective cure to the many ills caused by the LMX 
Spiral. 
 
5.4  Concluding Remarks 
The case law tells us that underwriters could choose to take on LMX Spiral 
business without necessarily being in breach of the duties of care and skill they 
owed to the Names.  However, that decision carried with it the duty to ensure 
they had the requisite skills and specialist knowledge to navigate what was a 
treacherous market.  These findings enabled the Names to obtain compensation 
but they do not address the Spiral Effects described earlier in this thesis.  It is 
also noticeable that judges have expressed doubt as to whether Spiral Business 
was at all manageable, given that it was so unpredictable.  
                                           
314 See for instance Bromley (n 241) 313. 
315 Aneco (n 283) 577. 
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6   Legal Appraisal of Reinsurance Spirals 
 
Many cases are issued from the unwinding of the LMX Spiral and resulting Lloyd’s 
crisis.  Yet there is a scarcity of legal principles concerning the LMX Spiral.  As 
shown in the previous chapter, what we have is a series of cases that make it 
clear the English judiciary disapproved of the LMX Spiral but where the legal focus 
is on the underwriting and the duties of the Lloyd’s agents and their 
underwriters.  This chapter aims to provide, for the first time, a detailed legal 
appraisal of reinsurance spirals. 
 
6.1  XL Reinsurance and Spirals  
6.1.1  Reasonable Risk Taking? 
In the case of Feltrim, Phillips J conjectured that the London XL market would 
have been very different had all underwriters exercised reasonable care and 
skill
317.  It is certainly correct that the LMX Spiral would not have expanded as it 
did.  None of the underwriters whose decisions were analysed in the Core LMX 
Cases
318 intended to have such high exposure.  Had they understood more about 
Spiral Business, there is no doubt that they would have made different decisions 
so as to limit their exposure to more manageable levels.  This would have 
curtailed the development of the LMX Spiral. 
This raises an important question: if the effect of underwriters complying with 
their legal duty of care would mean a much diminished LMX Spiral, was it 
appropriate to consider the LMX Spiral as an acceptable form of business from a 
legal perspective?  This was, after all, excessive trading that developed mainly 
through negligent behaviour.  The question is even more acute when one 
considers that the Spiral Effects
319 made it more likely that Spiral Participants 
would suffer a loss.  There was, therefore, a vicious circle: negligent underwriters 
fuelled the development of the spiral and as it grew, the spiral itself rendered the 
                                           
317 Feltrim (n 59) 443.  See also Gooda Walker (n 1) 1287. 
318 The Core LMX Cases are set out in section 5.2.2 of this thesis. 
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underwriting more precarious.  The actuarial models discussed in previous 
chapters
320 demonstrate that the development of the LMX Spiral magnified the 
Spiral Effects to a point where the LMX Spiral became unsustainable.  Individual 
underwriters, no matter how cautious, had no control over the underwriting of 
others and the development of the LMX Spiral.  Bearing this in mind, could it still 
be said that engaging in Spiral Business was reasonable risk taking?  This is an 
issue of importance because it is probable that further reinsurance spirals will 
develop in XL markets in the years to come.  This is demonstrated below. 
 
6.1.2  Reinsurance Spirals as a Side Effect of XL Reinsurance 
One would hope that the LMX Spiral remains a unique occurrence in the history of 
reinsurance.  However, reinsurance spirals seem to be a likely feature of XL 
reinsurance markets
321.  XL reinsurance is a relatively new form of reinsurance
322 
which only attracts specialist firms.  Yet it requires a high number of reinsurance 
contracts to cover a single risk because the original risk is split into tranches to 
be spread across a number of reinsurers and this happens indefinitely.  In a 
market that only includes a limited number of specialists, one can see how 
overlap can occur.  By the same token, reinsurance spirals can develop in the 
smaller, more specialist reinsurance markets covering, for instance, satellite 
reinsurance.  In fact, in such small markets a spiral may be inevitable as it could 
provide the only way to reinsure the risk a sufficient number of times. Moreover, 
after a few layers of reinsurance, the market can become opaque, making overlap 
more likely as market participants may not recognise the risk they have already 
taken on.   
There is evidence concerning the existence of three spirals that have developed in 
XL reinsurance markets since the early twentieth century.  The first is the spiral 
                                           
320 See ch 4 of this thesis. 
321 In Sphere Drake (n 1) at para 166 Thomas J said as follows: “Spirals can occur quite 
unintentionally  in  markets  where  companies  write  XL  on  XL  of  each  other’s  business; 
indeed there is often likely to be some spiralling in a retrocessional (retro) market where 
insurers reinsured the  same companies  and then reinsure those risks  within the same 
market. The existence of spirals is therefore an inevitable feature of such markets…”. 
322 XL reinsurance dates from the early 20
th century and only became widely used after the 
1950s.  See section 2.2.3 of this thesis for more detail on the history of XL reinsurance.     Part II/Chapter 6 
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that developed in 1965 following Hurricane Betsy
323; the second is the LMX Spiral 
and the third is the spiral that developed in the early nineties.  The latter became 
known as the “PA Spiral” because it was built upon the reinsurance of Personal 
Accident (PA) insurance policies emanating from the US.  As previously noted
324, it 
has given rise to the seminal case, Sphere Drake
325, which will be explored later in 
this chapter.  It is possible, and even very probable, that reinsurance spirals other 
than the three mentioned above have developed in the global XL reinsurance 
markets.  The London XL Market may have contained a spiral in the 1950s
326 and 
hurricane Alicia arguably triggered a separate spiral in the early 1980s although it 
can be considered as being part of the LMX Spiral.  The author of this thesis has 
also been told
327 that losses concerning asbestosis did spiral amongst a number 
of reinsurers as well as, more recently, the losses concerning the terrorist attack 
on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001
328.   
If reinsurance spirals are a likely feature of XL reinsurance markets, it is 
important to critically assess their legal status, most notably because use of XL 
reinsurance is likely to expand with the continued developments of international 
trade and commerce.   
 
                                           
323 See section 3.2.3 of this thesis.  
324 See section 5.2.4 of this thesis. 
325 Sphere Drake (n 1). 
326 See ch 3.2.3 of this thesis. 
327 This information was provided during a discussion between the author of this thesis 
and a number of reinsurance specialists in a meeting of the Reinsurance Working Party of 
the “Association Internationale de Droit des Assurances” (AIDA) in Istanbul on 3rd May 
2012. 
328 The 9/11 spiral is described by Mr Patrick J. Shannon during the 2003 Washington 
Spring Meeting of the Society of Actuary (Patrick J Shannon, ‘Managing Risk Concentration 
in the Post-9/11 Environment’ (Washington D.C,. Spring Meeting, Washington, 29-30 May 
2003).  His description of the development of the catastrophe market prior to 9/11 bears 
striking resemblance to the lead up to the LMX Spiral described earlier in this thesis.  For 
instance, he explains that over capacity in the market had led to premium being 
underpriced and “irrational”; retentions were small, allowing for lax underwriting 
discipline with the result that some policies contained unlimited reinstatements and few 
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6.1.3  The Need for Legal Principles 
Our analysis of the LMX Spiral has identified a number of Spiral Effects
329 that 
distorted the London XL Market and led to its demise.  For ease of reference, the 
Spiral Effects are reiterated below: 
1.  the magnifying effect, whereby the gross claim amount by far exceeded 
the initial loss; 
2.  concentration of the losses upon the few; 
3.  greater opacity of the reinsurance market; 
4.  the long short tail effect that turned short tail losses into long term losses; 
5.  the sum insured and layering became meaningless because small claims 
“spiralled their way up” the chain of reinsurances to reach the higher 
layers; 
6.  the rating structure was irrational as the usual correlation between the 
layering and level of risk was broken down; and  
7.  there was unpredictability due to the inability of reinsurers to work out 
who would run out of cover first. 
It is submitted that those Spiral Effects would, to a smaller or greater extent, 
apply to all XL reinsurance spirals.  This view is based on the fact that the data 
relied upon by actuaries to create the models of reinsurance spirals described 
earlier in this thesis
330 did not originate from the LMX Spiral itself.  Instead, the 
data was based on illustrative XL accounts.  Thus, those actuarial models 
demonstrate what might happen in any XL reinsurance market that develops a 
spiral. 
In this thesis, the phrase “Spiral Effects” means the effects any reinsurance spiral 
has on the contracts that are at its core (Spiral Contracts).  It seems clear that 
the Spiral Effects increase the element of risk taken on by underwriters.  Again, in 
this thesis this additional element of risk (Spiral Risk) is deemed to apply to any 
reinsurance spiral once it reaches a critical mass.  If a reinsurance spiral 
continues to grow, the actuarial models show that it becomes unsustainable.  Not 
                                           
329 See ch 4.5.1 of this thesis. 
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all reinsurance spirals may reach that point.  In any case, at the very minimum the 
Spiral Effects make the work of the underwriter more hazardous, which is 
incongruous, given that the whole point of reinsurance is to reduce risk.   
Since they carry more risk, the Spiral Contracts are more likely to fail, leading to 
more disputes.  There have been relatively few cases concerning reinsurance 
spirals generally, the most recent being the Equitas case
331, which relates to the 
now “old” LMX Spiral.  This could be explained by the fact that the spiral element 
may not come to light in a dispute as between two XL reinsurers who may choose 
to focus on other issues where there is more legal guidance.  Indeed, whilst 
courts have acknowledged the fact that reinsurance spirals are a perilous form of 
business, no legal principles have been developed to address this issue 
specifically.  This may be because XL is a relatively new form of reinsurance and 
the law has yet to catch up with some of its idiosyncrasies – the development of 
spirals being one of them.  If reinsurance spirals are given consistent legal 
treatment by the English judiciary, this will provide more legal certainty.  In 
addition, reinsurers may start to take notice and either (i) seek to identify spirals 
when they make a claim so the law develops further in this area; or (ii) avoid 
becoming involved in a reinsurance spiral in the first place.  Indeed, the law ought 
to provide safeguards to ensure the spirals do not develop to the point where 
they become unsustainable.   
The regulatory regime is another tool that can be used to ensure reinsurance 
spirals do not develop to the point where the Spiral Effects take hold.  For 
instance the solvency requirements imposed on insurers and reinsurers in 
Europe
332 have no doubt resulted in reinsurer having to keep a closer look on the 
level of exposure they take on.  Nevertheless, it seems that some reinsurance 
spirals have developed relatively recently
333 when much tighter regulatory controls 
were already in place.   
                                           
331 Equitas (n 1). 
332 This includes the Solvency I Directive (2002/13/EC) and the Reinsurance Directive 
(2005/68/EC).  Although it has yet to be implemented, the Solvency II Directive 
(2009/138/EC) is probably having an impact on European insurers and reinsurers given 
the preparatory work that is already underway under the guidance of the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. 
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The power of regulatory control is limited because regulations do not necessarily 
have global reach whilst reinsurance markets work on a worldwide basis.  Efforts 
are being made to develop global standards for insurers and reinsurers through 
the activities of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.  Moreover, 
regulation may well prove effective if regulators chose to focus on reinsurance 
spirals.  For instance they could require reinsurers to keep track of the source of 
the risk they undertake so as to be in a position to recognise a risk they have 
already underwritten.  In practice this may be difficult to achieve given the 
tendency of the market to use XL reinsurance to bundle risks.  In any case it is 
outside the scope of this work to consider potential regulatory solutions in detail 
as the thesis is on the private law of reinsurance contracts.  Nonetheless it is 
important to note the potential relevance of regulation as a tool to curb the 
development of reinsurance spirals.  
XL reinsurance was created in the London market and English courts have been at 
the forefront of all legal developments concerning reinsurance generally.  
Therefore legal findings about reinsurance spirals ought to be made under 
English law.  London contains a thriving reinsurance market and many 
reinsurance contracts in the world are governed by English law.  If they are 
governed by another law, English judgments on reinsurance issues may still be 
relevant given that they are often used as guidance in other jurisdictions.  The 
reinsurers who chose to do business under English law ought to benefit from 
legal certainty.  They may be unaware of the bigger picture as they focus on the 
individual XL contracts they enter into.  However, if those individual contracts are 
the building blocks of a structure frowned upon by the English judiciary; those 
reinsurers may find themselves in court bearing the consequences of legal 
disapproval.   
Some may argue that reinsurers have learnt their lessons and that the regulatory 
framework has raised greater awareness of the need to keep a close eye on 
exposures.  This may however not be sufficient to curb the development of 
reinsurance spirals in future.  The reinsurers who had received appropriate 
training in the 1980s knew how to keep aggregated exposures under control and 
some clearly did this very carefully.  Nevertheless the LMX Spiral developed.  Also, 
despite the lessons learnt from the LMX and the PA Spirals a new reinsurance 
spiral did clearly develop prior to 9/11.      Part II/Chapter 6 
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The need for positive action to be taken was highlighted by the Walker committee 
when, having analysed the Lloyd’s market and considered the development of the 
LMX Spiral in great detail, it concluded: 
“Although there have been frequent assertions that misjudgements of the kind 
that led to LMX losses will not recur, and that the market can be relied upon to 
take corrective action (...), experience from other financial institutions and 
markets suggests that memories are short.  The committee do not have 
confidence that problems of the kind experienced with LMX business could not 
recur and believe that protections need to be put in place to reduce the risk that 
such business will be undertaken so incautiously in future.”
334 
For all these reasons, it is desirable to develop more specific legal principles 
under English law to deal with reinsurance spirals and reduce the Spiral Risk. 
 
6.2  The Legality of Reinsurance Spirals 
6.2.1  Illegality 
The most radical tool courts have at their disposal to eradicate unwanted 
developments is to declare those to be illegal.  Illegality, however, is a blunt 
instrument.  The question of the legality of reinsurance spirals has not been 
explored in the English courts.  It was not raised, as such, in any of the case law 
concerning the LMX Spiral although it came close in the context of the PA Spiral.  
In the Sphere Drake case, the claimant told the Court they would not raise issues 
of illegality concerning the relevant contracts because the other party to those 
contracts was not present at Court
335.  Thomas J endorsed this decision agreeing 
that “any issue of illegality should only be determined when both parties to a 
contract alleged to be illegal [are] present.” 
Could issues of illegality be raised as regards the Spiral Contracts?  Under English 
law, contracts may be found to be illegal because they were entered into to 
commit a crime or civil wrong or they may be contrary to public policy.  The latter 
is the more likely argument in the context of a reinsurance spiral.  It is unlikely 
that reinsurance spirals or some of the contracts within may be found to have 
been set up to commit a crime.  If fraud is involved, there is an argument that the 
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relevant contracts lead to a civil wrong.  Given the Spiral Effects noted earlier
336, 
however, the more likely argument is that reinsurance spirals are contrary to 
public policy because, once they develop beyond a certain point, they can lead to 
market collapse.  This is a far-fetched argument based on the premise that 
English Courts are empowered to create new heads of public policy
337, which 
remains a point of contention.  Alternatively, it may be that one of the current 
grounds of public policy
338 could be relied upon.  Nevertheless, for the sake of 
argument, we may assume that this is a possibility.   
A reinsurance market crisis is against the public interest because of the impact it 
would have not only on the world of insurance and reinsurance but also 
potentially on the public at large.  To a certain extent, this was shown by the 
demise of the LMX Spiral: the resulting collapse of the London XL Market led to a 
serious crisis within the Lloyd’s market and it caused a number of personal 
bankruptcies as well as insolvencies.  Lloyd’s may be a special case but there is a 
clear argument that allowing any portion of a market to experience a crisis is 
detrimental as it will have an impact on the economy at large.  The recent sub-
prime debacle has shown how damaging the knock on effects of a crisis can be.  
Reinsurance markets may not have the same function as financial markets in the 
world economy but their demise could still have a significant impact.  For 
instance, the contraction of reinsurance markets can lead to increased premium 
being imposed on insurers and, ultimately, the primary policyholders.  
Reinsurance companies are also major investors worldwide because they hold a 
                                           
336 See section 4.5.1 of this thesis for further details of the Spiral Effects. 
337 This is an unsettled area of English Law.  There are currently two conflicting positions 
set out in case law whereby either (i) the courts cannot create new heads of public policy 
(Egerton v Earl Brownlow (1853) 4 H.L.C. 1 and Janson v Driefontein Consolidated Mines 
Ltd [1902] A.C. 484 ); or (ii) they can (Egerton v Earl Brownlow (1853) 4 H.L.C. 1; Wilson v 
Carnley [1908] 1 K.B.729; Initial Services Ltd v Putteril [1968] 1 Q.B. 396 and McLoughlin 
v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410).  The latter view is the most recent view and it seems to be 
generally accepted that courts may extend existing public policy to new situations 
(Montefiore v Menday Motor Components Co [1918] 2 KB 241).  All of this however is 
subject to the public policy that supports contractual freedom.  See Chitty on Contracts, 
Volume II para 16-004 (31
st Edition). 
338 One of the existing grounds of public policy is “objects economically against the public 
interest” which may apply in this particular case.  See Chitty on Contracts (n 337) para 16-
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large amount of capital.  If several of them were to become insolvent this could 
have a knock on effect on investment markets too. 
However, illegality is a very serious allegation and it would be unrealistic to argue 
that all reinsurance spirals are to be considered illegal.  Such sweeping 
generalisation would go against the English courts’ tradition to take into account 
commercial realities.  More importantly, reinsurance spirals are not all alike, 
particularly when one considers the way they come into being.  A reinsurance 
spiral that is purposefully and dishonestly set up could be subject to a finding of 
illegality but many reinsurance spirals develop within XL markets simply as a side 
effect of normal market trading.  Courts ought to be slow to find illegality when 
only market forces are at play.  This point is perfectly illustrated by contrasting 
the LMX Spiral and the PA Spiral. 
As seen earlier in this thesis
339, allegations of fraud concerning the LMX Spiral 
were raised in early court cases but they were not pursued once the findings of 
the Walker enquiry
340 became public.  Some brokers did extremely well out of 
Spiral Business
341 and there are still those in the market who believe there was 
some fraudulent intend behind the rapid expansion of Spiral Business.  Even if 
there were some elements of fraud, it seems clear that the LMX Spiral was not 
purposefully set up to swindle XL reinsurers.  There was no “master plan”.  
Rather, the LMX Spiral was a cluster of overlapping standard XL reinsurance 
agreements that grew organically and randomly as individual contracts were 
being entered into by the Spiral Participants.  Those participants had no overview 
and no purpose other than to reinsure their liabilities on an ad hoc basis.  They 
often contributed to the LMX Spiral unwittingly.  At worst some Spiral Participants 
or brokers fuelled the development of the LMX Spiral by seeking to take 
advantage of the more naive reinsurers.  However this was at the level of the 
individual XL contract.  Overall, the LMX Spiral was a market phenomenon that 
developed without any oversight from any of its participants.   
                                           
339 See section 5.2.4 of this thesis. 
340 Walker (n 40). 
341 Bill Brown of Walsham Brothers reputedly earned a salary of £7.3 million in 1992.  He 
was one of only a handful of brokers who derived all their revenues from LMX Business.  
See  Nick  Ryan,  ‘The  Bashful  Broker’  The  Independent  Magazine  (London  26  February 
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By contrast, the PA Spiral was set up by the insurer Euro International 
Underwriting (EIU) and a firm of brokers, Stirling Cooke Brown (SCB) to transfer 
the near totality of loss-making PA business to reinsurers at a premium that 
procured a profit to EIU and a commission to SCB.  Only those who engaged in 
what is known as “arbitrage” or “net underwriting” could benefit from the 
business.  Arbitrage is the practice of trading a risk and making a profit on the 
differential in rates and it is discussed at length below.  The court found that 
arbitrage was acceptable provided that full disclosure had been made to the 
reinsurer
342.  In the context of the PA Spiral there had not been full disclosure and 
this was one of the key factors that led to the findings of dishonest breach of 
fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation.  The findings were made against 
EIU but a finding of dishonesty was also made against the brokers SCB.  
Comparing the LMX Spiral and the PA Spiral shows that the purpose behind the 
reinsurance spiral and the way it develops can vary from one spiral to the next.  
This could make all the difference as regards the legal status of the spiral.  On 
that basis, establishing a ground rule that all XL reinsurance spirals are illegal 
would be erroneous.   
Such a finding would also have undesirable consequences.  Not only would the 
illegal Spiral Contracts be rendered unenforceable but their premium would also 
be irrecoverable
343.  This is not a good position to be in for reinsureds who would 
lose both their cover and the premium they paid for it.  Moreover the illegality 
would taint entire chains of reinsurance contracts.  Indeed, any contract up the 
chain of XL reinsurances that contains the spiral element would be illegal too.  In 
addition, the illegality would affect any reinsurance providing cover to the illegal 
contract because indemnities paid under the illegal contract would necessarily be 
“ex gratia”.  Some reinsurances may expressly cover “ex gratia” payment but it is 
doubtful whether such wording is effective
344.  Given that the Spiral Contracts may 
be covered under countless other reinsurances outside the spiral, a finding of 
illegality would have a ripple effect on the market that would be far-reaching and 
                                           
342 Sphere Drake (n 1) para 146. 
343 This is because the spiral element would be part of the contract from the outset and 
therefore the illegality would attach from the point in time when the contract is entered 
into.  See The Law of Insurance Contracts (n 4) para 24.9.A (R March 2014). 
344 See for instance John Robert Charman v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Plc and 
Another [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 607.  In that case it was held that the words “liable or not 
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very disruptive.  The finding of illegality could also be made years after the event, 
once reinsurance payments have been processed.  One can only imagine the 
chaos that would ensue if all involved reinsurers had to re-open their books to 
make adjustments for erroneous payments.   
To conclude, it is submitted that participation in an XL reinsurance spiral should 
not, on its own, provide sufficient ground for a finding of illegality.  This is partly 
because a finding of illegality would be extremely disruptive to reinsurance 
markets and also because some spirals may develop without any wilful 
wrongdoing on the part of its participants.  This is also a far-fetched and not a 
particularly compelling argument but one which had to be explored in this thesis 
for completeness’ sake.  Parties will always be free to raise illegality when suing 
on the basis of individual XL contracts.   
 
6.2.2  Pyramid Schemes 
Whilst discussing illegality in the context of reinsurance spirals, it is important to 
consider whether analogies can be drawn between spirals and pyramid schemes.  
There are, at first sight, similarities between the two, and case law makes it clear 
that pyramid schemes are illegal.   
A pyramid scheme is an unsustainable business model that produces no profit 
and instead relies on the investment of newcomers for its continued existence.  
Such schemes are usually set up dishonestly to enable those who join first to 
recoup the costs of joining and to make a profit by recruiting others to the 
scheme.  In Re Senator Hanseatische
345, the Court of Appeal held that such a 
scheme was illegal.  In Sphere Drake, the point was made that the PA Spiral was 
                                           
345 Re Senator Hanseatische Verwaltungs Gesellschatf mbH [1996] EWCA Civ 1344, [1997] 
1 WLR 515.  At pp 524-525 Millett LJ commented “It is, however, another feature of the 
scheme which is far more pernicious and which gives much greater cause for concern.  
This is the certainty that the scheme will cause loss to a large number of people, and that 
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much larger number of those who are recruited later.” Part II/Chapter 6 
  158 
akin to a pyramid scheme.  Thomas J acknowledged that the latter bore the 
following resemblances to a pyramid scheme
346:  
 
i)  “It was a mathematical certainty that the liabilities incurred by those 
participating in a reinsurance scheme in this market would far 
exceed the income that could be earned, as the gross losses would 
far exceed the premiums, particularly after commissions and 
brokerages had been taken by intermediaries who bore none of the 
risks. As the losses were passed on at each stage, there was less 
premium to pay for them. 
ii)  It was inevitable that enormous losses would have had to be paid; in 
a pyramid scheme, these would fall upon the many new recruits. In 
this market, the losses would be concentrated; that did not make it 
any less pernicious. 
iii)  As in a pyramid scheme, new recruits had to be found; to induce a 
participant to write gross loss making business, a person had to be 
found to take those losses. In such a way a chain was created, but it 
would never in practice be infinite and the losses would ultimately 
have to be paid by the person or persons in the chain left with the 
losses. Just as in a pyramid scheme, it did not matter that those 
persons could not be identified precisely. 
iv)  The Court is, in pyramid schemes, astute to protect the interests of 
consumers against exploitation; there was a public interest in 
protecting the insurance and reinsurance market from abuse.” 
 
However, this point was not fundamental.  Thomas J agreed there were analogies 
that could be drawn between the PA Spiral and pyramid schemes but then 
decided that he did not need to draw on those analogies to find that the brokers 
and relevant underwriters had acted dishonestly.   
The issue whether the LMX Spiral may have amounted to a pyramid scheme was 
not explored in Court.  The above quote from Thomas J in the Sphere Drake case, 
however, illustrates why, unlike the PA Spiral, the LMX Spiral could not really be 
compared with a pyramid scheme.  Taking the above points one by one, it is true 
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that, in the context of the LMX Spiral, a catastrophic loss would generate gross 
liabilities that would by far exceed gross premium paid, particularly at the higher 
levels of reinsurance (point i)).  It is also true that such loss did concentrate upon 
the few (point ii)) although, as will be seen later, this was caused by negligent 
underwriting rather than a “scheme”.   Also, there was no “mathematical certainty” 
of a loss being suffered at the time of writing the business because there was 
always a chance that reinsurers could make a profit if no catastrophe were to 
occur.  Moreover, within the context of the LMX Spiral, there was no need to 
recruit new participants to induce the primary insurers to write business (point 
iii)).  Arguably the plentiful and cheap supply of reinsurance created by the LMX 
Spiral may have encouraged reckless underwriting at the primary level but this 
was an accidental side effect.  The purpose of the LMX Spiral was not to generate 
loss making business artificially at the primary level.  This point, certainly, is a 
key differentiating factor.  The business that made its way to the LMX Spiral was 
genuine: all that happened is that the risks were being recycled rather than 
dispersed.  Pyramid schemes usually contain no “real” business: they have no 
purpose other than to allow those who set them up to make money by recruiting 
other members to the scheme.   
Thus, it is the opinion of the author of this thesis that had the issue been debated 
in court
347, the LMX Spiral would not have been found to be contrary to public 
interest and therefore unlawful by analogy with a pyramid scheme.  The same can 
probably be said of all reinsurance spirals that develop through market trading.  
Such spirals, no matter how unsustainable, contain genuine business.  They are 
not purposefully set up as an artificial device to enable a few to make a profit to 
the detriment of others. 
 
6.3  Legal Issues with Reinsurance Spirals 
6.3.1  The Problem with Negligence 
If reinsurance spirals are not illegal, is it then possible to argue that those who 
engage in this type of business are automatically negligent? Such a finding would 
be made on the basis that entering into a Spiral Contract must be in breach of the 
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duty of care the law imposes on underwriters.  Considering the Spiral Effects and 
how they make it more likely that the contract will fail, this seems an attractive 
argument.   
The LMX Spiral was seen very unfavourably by the judiciary.  However, because of 
the way the cases were pleaded, courts were unable to make findings on the 
adequacy of spirals, often regrettably so.  The court’s dissatisfaction in not being 
able to condemn the LMX Spiral in itself is evident in some of the quotes set out 
earlier in this thesis
348 but also in the following passage from Berriman: 
“there is no allegation in this case that Mr Bullen should not have engaged in the 
LMX market at all.  There is much to be said in favour of such a contention, had it 
been made.  It became quite apparent to me in the course of the evidence that the 
very nature of the way the market operated made it difficult for any underwriter 
to make soundly based judgments about the risk he was writing.  It is a market 
which has, I believe, ceased to exist since 1991 because it was recognised to be an 
aberration.  However, such a case would have had to take account of the fact that 
there were many syndicates and companies who participated in that market, 
some of whom appeared to do so quite successfully.”
349 
The above quote identifies the major flaw in the proposed argument that 
participating in reinsurance spirals is negligent per se.  Business from reinsurance 
spirals may be profitable.  Negligence belongs to the law of tort, where a cause of 
action is only established if the claimant has suffered some form of damage.  In 
the context of a commercial contract, the damage is usually a financial loss.  
Some reinsurers suffered disastrous losses under the XL reinsurance contracts 
that formed the LMX Spiral but not all did.   
This issue was foreseen by Phillips J in the Gooda Walker
350 case.  The judgment 
contains a whole section devoted to answering the question: ‘could a competent 
underwriter write spiral business?  The court responded in the affirmative, 
pointing out that some underwriters involved in the LMX Spiral managed to make 
a profit
351.  This thesis raises issues with Phillips J’s reliance on the results of 
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Syndicate 536 to make this finding
352.  Nevertheless, the reasoning is difficult to 
challenge.  Syndicate 536 was indeed not the sole Syndicate that benefited from 
Spiral Business.  If some reinsurers managed to make a profit from Spiral 
Business, courts could not declare that anyone who became involved in the LMX 
Spiral did so negligently.  The same must apply to all reinsurance spirals.  No 
matter how flawed, if they contain genuine business reinsurance spirals may still 
bring profits to some participants. 
 
6.3.2  The Case Law Conundrum  
As noted in the previous chapter of this thesis, Courts seized of the legal disputes 
that concerned the LMX Spiral shifted their focus from the LMX Spiral to the 
duties of the Lloyd’s agents and their underwriters who engaged in Spiral 
Business.  The judges therefore established a specific set of skills applicable to 
LMX Business that enabled them to assess whether the relevant individuals had 
been negligent.  It is useful at this point to remind ourselves of those skills.  
Using the case law terminology, the Reasonable LMX Underwriter was expected 
to: 
1.  actively manage his portfolio’s exposure and balance;  
2.  follow an underwriting plan;  
3.  monitor aggregates and PML;  
4.  purchase the appropriate amount of reinsurance;  
5.  match reinstatements and 
6.  charge suitable rates
353. 
The above findings enabled courts to make appropriate findings as regards the 
cases they had to deal with.  However, following those guidelines may not have 
been sufficient to protect against the Spiral Effects.  In fact, it may have made 
little difference to the end result of the syndicate.  This is explained below. 
We now know that the LMX Spiral reached a point where it was not possible for an 
underwriter to predict what level of catastrophe would impact on its account 
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because small claims would burn through the various reinsurance layers, 
rendering the layering and Sum Insured almost redundant.  The magnifying effect 
contributed to this by turning small claims into large ones.  Moreover the 
underwriter could not know whether other reinsurers would exhaust their 
protection first.  This is the Spiral Effect named “Unpredictability” noted earlier in 
this thesis.  These difficulties were made worse by the opacity prevalent within 
the London XL Market at the time. Finally, the irrational pricing may have added 
to the difficulties faced by the Reasonable LMX Underwriter by giving the 
misleading impression that the market functioned as a normal XL market with 
smaller rates at the higher layer being a true reflection of the reduced chances of 
claims reaching those layers
354.   
Therefore a Reasonable LMX Underwriter may have followed the steps required by 
case law to have a sound underwriting plan in place (point 2); a good grasp of its 
aggregate and PMLs (point 3), a decent level of reinsurance (point 4) with 
matching reinstatements (point 5) and he may have charged what seemed to be 
suitable rates (point 6).  Yet all this could not protect against the risk that the 
layering and Sum Insured may have become redundant and that some of his 
reinsurance protections might in fact prove to be illusory.  As a result, all the 
steps described above would have provided little-if any- protection: the contracts 
may not fit within his underwriting plan any more (point 2); his aggregate and 
PML calculations would be incorrect (point 3); and finally some of his reinsurance 
protection (point 4), including reinstatements (point 5), would be non-existent.   
An underwriter’s best protection against some of those risks, most particularly 
Unpredictability, may have been to spread his portfolio (point 1 above) so as to 
limit exposure to a market or reinsurer that might appear weak.  However, this 
may not have worked if the risk in question could only be reinsured by a limited 
number of specialist reinsurers.  Sometimes the weakest market also happens to 
be the main reinsurance market – as was the London XL Market at the time of the 
LMX Spiral.  It is interesting to note that in the late 1980s, some saw the role of 
the underwriter in the London XL Market as being “entrepreneurial” because of 
the way the market operated
355.  Moreover, the point of Unpredictability is that the 
effect comes as a surprise and cannot be accounted for.  Of course, all 
transactions contain an element of unpredictability and markets cannot be 
                                           
354 See section 4.5.1 of this thesis for the full list of the Spiral Effects described here. 
355 LMX Working Party (n 108) 51.     Part II/Chapter 6 
  163     
expected to perform without some element of risk.  The point about the Spiral 
Effects, however, is that they add an element of risk that would not exist but for 
the spiral.  The Unpredictability within the LMX Spiral was much greater than the 
usual amount of uncertainty a reinsurer could have expected in a healthy 
reinsurance market. 
The case law therefore leaves us with a conundrum in that the reasonable 
underwriting prescribed by the Courts is not an effective solution to reduce the 
additional Spiral Risk caused by the Spiral Effects.   
 
6.3.3  The Use and Abuse of Arbitrage  
We have noted earlier in this chapter that arbitrage was part of the PA Spiral.  We 
also know that arbitrage was a feature of the LMX Spiral.  In the LMX Working 
Party Report
356, an anonymous underwriter is quoted as stating: 
“There is a gearing element: it is worth writing if the premium rates are 
higher than the cost of outwards reinsurance. (...) If an underwriter can 
obtain an ‘edge’ (i.e. if his net position is such that he is expected to make 
a profit) he will exploit it.  However, the margins for profitability are very 
small particularly when the brokerage of ten per cent each time is 
considered. Hence in general there can only be a very few winners in the 
market — most players will be losers.”  
This suggests that one of the ways to be a winner when engaging in LMX Business 
was to obtain “an edge” or, in other words, to arbitrage.  This is echoed in the 
Gooda Walker case, where Phillips J seemed to believe that the only realistic way a 
competent underwriter could have made profits from Spiral Business was through 
the use of arbitrage
357.  Therefore, taking a narrow view of the judgment, it 
suggests that the Reasonable LMX Underwriter would have suffered losses unless 
he had engaged in arbitrage.  This is troubling because the ability to arbitrage 
features nowhere on the list of requisite skills of the Reasonable LMX Underwriter.  
As noted earlier, Phillips J’s decision seems to have been based on the wrong 
assumption that the success of syndicate 536 was due to arbitrage.  
Nevertheless, this raises the issue: is arbitrage an appropriate way to seek to 
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make a profit in the context of a reinsurance spiral?  More generally, should its 
use be condoned by courts?   
Some underwriters and reinsurance specialists
358 take a strong view that arbitrage 
should not be used in reinsurance markets.  They see arbitrage as a distortion of 
good underwriting discipline.  If reinsurance is the insurance of an underlying 
risk, then premium ought to be based on an assessment of the underlying risk in 
the context of the XL contract
359.  There is an argument that relying on arbitrage 
turns reinsurance into a pure financial product and reinsurers into bankers.  
However, the practice described by Phillips J or the anonymous underwriter above 
is not quite the sort of arbitrage used in financial markets.  A trader will arbitrage 
by buying a commodity at a discount in one market and selling it immediately for 
a higher price in another market.  The trader makes an instant profit and the 
commodity in question is off his balance sheet.  The same cannot be said of 
reinsurance.  A reinsurer, even if he reinsures 100% of the risk at a profit, remains 
liable to indemnify his own reinsured.  There is, therefore, a residual risk for the 
reinsurer.  Moreover, the reinsurer in question may be out of pocket if its 100% 
reinsurer goes bankrupt.  The risk of bankruptcy is small in a normal reinsurance 
market but it increases in the context of reinsurance spirals.  Even if there is a 
residual risk, however, the reinsurer can still make a profit on the premium 
differential and, in most cases, he will benefit from the 100% reinsurance cover he 
has put in place.  In practice, this means that if a loss occurs, the reinsurer pays 
his reinsured but he is then fully indemnified by his own 100% reinsurer.  This 
leaves him in a neutral position as regards the loss but he will have made a 
benefit from the premium differential.   
The possibility of making a profit purely based on premium differential can tempt 
some reinsurers to charge premium that would be too low to cover the costs of 
future claims.  This type of “arbitrage” was prevalent in the PA Spiral.  Thomas J in 
Sphere Drake describes it as follows: 
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“In a soft market, as existed in the late 1980s and 1990s, it was possible for 
underwriters to obtain reinsurance at such favourable terms that they could 
write insurance at rates where the premium would not cover the losses – or 
using a market phrase, they were writing “below the burn”; the losses would 
be paid by reinsurers who were prepared to write at a loss. (...)  Those who 
obtained such reinsurance at below cost and who wrote their insurance on 
that basis were described as “net underwriting” or “arbitraging” because 
they were, in effect, trading a risk and making their profit on the 
differential in rates. Some did not like the term “arbitrage” as the 
participants were carrying a retention and preferred the term “net 
underwriting” instead; the latter was a term which [Sterling Cooke Brown] 
used during the trial to refer to any approach to underwriting which relied 
on outwards reinsurance to turn gross loss making business into business 
which was profitable when reinsurance recoveries were brought into 
account. 
 
As we have noted earlier, Thomas J’s finding was that arbitrage is an acceptable 
practice as long as it is done transparently.  He further said that: 
“Even though many may have disapproved of this practice, it was a 
practice of the market; it was not either objectively or subjectively 
dishonest to place or write such business provided that full disclosure was 
made.”
360 
Thomas J did express some doubt as to whether any reinsurer would agree to be 
at the losing end of a deal based on arbitrage.  Undoubtedly the PA Spiral could 
not have developed had those involved been acting in good faith by disclosing its 
true nature.  Should Thomas J have gone further and sought to outlaw arbitrage 
within reinsurance markets?   
It is true that arbitrage in its purest form – as it is used in financial markets – has 
no place in reinsurance markets.  However, it seems clear that there exist 
practices within reinsurance markets that are akin to arbitrage.  These may be 
referred to as “net underwriting” or “obtaining an edge” but they are comparable 
with arbitrage in that the underwriters derive profit purely from rate differentials.  
Such practices may seem unsavoury in a market that relies on the long term 
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because the reinsurer who relies on arbitrage is seeking immediate profit with no 
concern for the future health of the relevant account.  Arbitrage also goes against 
the notion of trust as between the parties to a reinsurance contract.  
Nevertheless, it is submitted that it would be unrealistic to outlaw arbitrage in 
reinsurance markets.  Courts cannot control markets and prescribe how an 
underwriter ought to do business, other than to insist it should be done in line 
with the underwriters’ legal duties.  As the Court of Appeal rightly said in Bonner 
v Cox
361, “[T]here is nothing wrong in taking advantage of an advantageous 
contract”
362.  In fact, not doing so would potentially put in the underwriter in 
breach of its obligations to his capital providers, be they the Lloyd’s Names or 
reinsurance company shareholders.   
Thomas J’s ruling is therefore appropriate in that it focuses on underwriters legal 
duties by requiring transparency but it does not seek to interfere with the 
underwriters’ business decisions.  He also rightly noted that full and honest 
disclosure may curb the practice because few reinsurers would knowingly agree 
to be “arbitraged” against.  Conversely, there will always be the few reinsurers 
who are willing to take a gamble, based on their own assessment of the risk.  
Others may also have equally valid reasons to agree to arbitrage to their 
detriment: for instance, because it is the most effective way for them to enter a 
market or to add a sought after client to their portfolio
363.  To conclude, whilst the 
use of arbitrage seems to be at odd with the principles of XL reinsurance, its use 
cannot realistically be outlawed by English courts. 
 
6.3.4  Good Faith is Not the Answer 
We have seen that acting in good faith by making the appropriate disclosure is 
what turns arbitrage into a legally acceptable form of business.  Would good faith 
make any difference in the context of Spiral Business?  By way of brief reminder, 
the duty of good faith inter alia requires reinsureds to disclose material 
circumstances to their reinsurers prior to the conclusion of the contract.  In 
reinsurance what is material includes not only the original risk itself but also the 
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activities of the reinsured
364.  This is particularly true when dealing with XL 
reinsurance where numerous risks are bundled together and the original risk may 
be extremely remote.  In this context, the identity of the reinsured, its reputation 
and underwriting philosophy will be key in assessing the risk
365.  This raises the 
question: since the Reasonable LMX Underwriter understood the type of business 
he was carrying out, was he under a duty to disclose the nature of the business to 
his reinsurer?  If so, what type of disclosure would have been sufficient?  There is 
relatively little case law to guide us on these issues.  Good faith was not raised in 
the cases concerning the LMX Spiral, which is explained by the fact that those 
who brought the disputes to court were not other reinsurers, to whom the duty 
was owed, but the Lloyd’s Names.  There is no duty of good faith between an 
underwriter and its capital provider.  By contrast, good faith was an important 
part of the Sphere Drake decision but those involved were found to have acted 
with dishonesty which makes it an unusual case. 
Under the MIA, the reinsured is required to disclose every material circumstance 
known to him
366.  In the Sphere Drake case, Thomas J took the view that specific 
disclosure had to be made of the fact that the business being presented had a 
“spiral content”
367.  The PA Spiral however was not a market phenomenon but a 
man-made spiral comprising only a few reinsurers engaged in a narrow and 
specific type of business.  A reinsurance spiral that reaches critical mass would 
arguably become common knowledge, at which point no disclosure is required 
under the MIA
368.  Indeed, in Gooda Walker, Phillips J was clear that underwriters 
who specialised in LMX Business ought to have known about the LMX Spiral.  In 
any case, the issue with a reinsurance spiral is not so much its existence but its 
effects.  Some of the more experienced underwriters who wrote LMX Business 
understood the dangers of reinsurance spirals but some clearly did not and 
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could, in theory, be taken advantage of.  Was there a duty on the underwriters 
who understood the business to explain what the “spiral element” might entail?   
The short answer is “no”.  The duty of good faith does not require an underwriter 
to educate others as to the dangers of certain types of business.  Case law makes 
it clear that it is up to the reinsurer to form its own judgment as to the risk 
presented to him and that a reinsured is under no duty to advise him whether or 
not to write the risk
369.  On that basis, disclosure that the reinsurance covered 
Spiral Business would have sufficed to comply with the duty of good faith.  This is 
the extent of the disclosure required in Sphere Drake.  Yet it is doubtful whether, 
in the context of the LMX Spiral, such disclosure would have made any difference 
for the following reasons: 
1.  Firstly, and most obviously, the other party may not have understood what 
this meant.  We have seen in this thesis that even though some 
underwriters understood the risks associated with Spiral Business, those 
who were sued by the Names did not.  This is despite the fact that from 
about 1988 the existence of the LMX Spiral was generally known within the 
London XL Market
370. 
2.  Secondly, it is likely that those who took part in Spiral Business knew that 
they were doing so.  From the second tier of reinsurance, risks within the 
London XL Market were XL on XL, and many within the market associated 
XL on XL with Spiral Business
371.   
 
In Sphere Drake Thomas J was clear that if “the nature of the business was 
properly disclosed, then in my judgment no complaint could be made about the 
writing of gross loss making business on the back of reinsurance.”
372  One cannot 
disagree with this statement.  Once reinsurers have been warned, it is up to them 
to decide whether they decide to take on the business regardless.  The law cannot 
prevent underwriters from making bad business decisions.  On the same basis, it 
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is unlikely that underwriters caught within the LMX Spiral could have relied on 
non-disclosure as a way to avoid the XL reinsurances.  Whilst the LMX Spiral was 
opaque, the market in which it operated was transparent in terms of the nature of 
the business being transacted.  The difficulties arose from underwriters not 
informing themselves about the peculiarities of that business.  English courts 
take the view that those underwriters can only blame themselves for the losses 
their imprudence had engendered.  Again, in Sphere Drake Thomas J noted that 
“No other participant in a market owes a duty to protect those who knowingly 
enter a market but who do not understand it, are imprudent, or who 
miscalculate; indeed, it is likely that a person who is imprudent or foolish or who 
miscalculates in any market will be ruthlessly exploited by those who understand 
the market; he is at risk of having dumped on him risks which no one else 
wants”
373.  For all these reasons, disclosure of the fact that the business included 
a spiral element would have been of little assistance to those imprudent 
reinsurers who chose to participate in the LMX Spiral without understanding the 
risks this entailed.   
Nowadays things might be different.  Many reinsurers active in the market 
remember or have heard about the infamous LMX and PA spirals.  The London XL 
Market is also much more tightly regulated, making it less likely that reinsurers 
would willingly engage in a type of business they do not fully understand.  
Disclosure that the business being reinsured includes a “spiral element” as 
required in Sphere Drake may curb the development of a reinsurance spiral in the 
same way as it would arbitrage although the 9/11 spiral is proof that those 
involved in reinsurance markets can have short memories.  In any case disclosure 
will be most effective if reinsurers understand how treacherous spiral business 
can be: another reason why it is important for English law to contain clear 
guidance on the legal consequences of engaging in such business. 
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6.3.5  Current Legal Position 
Before moving on to the preferred legal solution, it is probably useful to remind 
ourselves of the key findings set out in this chapter.  These are as follows: 
1.  Reinsurance spirals are not automatically illegal.  Depending on 
circumstances, however, it remains possible for a specific spiral to be 
tainted by illegality. 
2.  Participating in a reinsurance spiral is not, per se, a proof of negligence. 
3.  An underwriter who chooses to engage in an XL reinsurance spiral must do 
so with the appropriate level of care and skills.  This requires specialist 
knowledge and specific prudential steps to be followed. 
4.  Because of the Spiral Effects, however, an underwriter who dutifully takes 
all the reasonable steps outlined in the relevant case law is not protected 
against the risk of suffering very substantial losses.  In other words, once 
the Spiral Effects take hold the prudential steps are ineffective. 
5.  Provided full disclosure is made, reinsurers can rely on arbitrage to make a 
profit.  It would indeed be unrealistic for English Courts to outlaw such a 
practice. 
6.  Case law requires reinsurers to disclose the fact that their business 
includes a spiral element but not to explain the risks associated with this 
type of type of business. The impact of such disclosure will depends on the 
sophistication of the market players and their understanding of the Spiral 
Effects.  
 
From the above summary, it can be seen that the only requirement of English 
courts concerning reinsurance spirals is that the “spiral element” of a reinsurance 
contract should be disclosed by the cedant and that underwriter must follow the 
prudential steps prescribed in case law.  We have noted that when the Spiral 
effects take hold those prudential steps are ineffective.  A better legal solution is 
therefore required. 
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6.4  Concluding Remarks 
Due to the ways in which cases concerning reinsurance spirals have been pleaded 
to date, there is a scarcity of legal principles regarding reinsurance spirals.  Yet it 
is important for English courts to provide clear guidance given that reinsurance 
spirals seem to be a likely feature of XL reinsurance markets.   
In this chapter we have considered whether some of the more obvious legal tools, 
including illegality, negligence and good faith, may assist to curb the 
development of future reinsurance spirals, but only to conclude that these tools 
do not provide a satisfactory solution.   
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7  The Preferred Legal Solution 
 
Our analysis has exposed a gap in reinsurance law.  Spirals may develop within XL 
reinsurance markets but there is no suitable legal tool to deal with the very 
specific challenges they present.  In this chapter, we analyse the issue further to 
set out principles applicable to all reinsurance spirals that may develop in the 
future. 
 
7.1  Spiral Contracts Defeat the Purpose of Reinsurance 
7.1.1  Reinsurance Spirals Defeat the Purpose of Reinsurance 
In the first chapter of this thesis we have set out the criteria that help define a 
contract of reinsurance.  We have noted that at its heart, a contract of insurance 
is a contract for the transfer of risk from an insured to its insurer.  A contract of 
reinsurance is a further transfer of that risk or a portion of it.  The aim of 
transferring the risk further is to spread it amongst a larger number of reinsurers.   
One of the better known Spiral Effect is the concentration of losses upon the few.  
This is totally contrary to the very purpose of reinsurance as set out above.  If a 
reinsurance market does lead to concentration to a small extent, this may not be 
a cause for major concern.  However, the concentration of losses in the context of 
the LMX Spiral was extreme and to these days, it remains one of its most striking 
features.  The losses concentrated on the Syndicates that ran out of cover first 
and this happened to such an extent that several of them went into run-off.   
This is what Professor Bain refers to as “PML failure”.  It is his view that such 
failure would happen in any reinsurance spiral.  In fact, he believes that this is 
what characterises a reinsurance spiral
374.  The LMX Working Party came to a 
similar conclusion in its own actuarial study, where it found that in any 
reinsurance spiral the claims circulate until reinsurance programmes become 
exhausted, at which point the losses concentrate on the reinsurer who first runs 
out of reinsurance cover
375.  There is little doubt therefore that reinsurance 
                                           
374 Bain (n 230) as discussed in section 4.4 of this thesis. 
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spirals, by concentrating the losses on the few rather than dispersing them 
amongst the many, operate in a way that defeats the very purpose of reinsurance. 
 
7.1.2  Spiral Contracts at the Root of XL Reinsurance Spirals 
The concentration of loss is only one of the many Spiral Effects identified earlier 
in this thesis.  We have seen that those Spiral Effects add an element of 
uncertainty and risk that increases exponentially as the spiral develops.  It is for 
that reason that a reinsurance spiral is outside the control of individual 
underwriters.  Underwriters can manage their own underwriting but not the 
underwriting of others and the ways in which a reinsurance spiral might expand.  
This is why the concept of the Reasonable LMX Underwriter does not really work.   
Most of the case law concerning reinsurance spirals arises out of the LMX Spiral 
and related Lloyd’s crisis.  Thus the judgments have been shaped by the 
idiosyncrasies of the Lloyd’s market rather than by the specificities of reinsurance 
spirals.  The other major source of law on XL reinsurance spirals is the Sphere 
Drake
376 case but it does not provide a useful precedent either because the PA 
Spiral was unusual in that it had been purposefully set up and it was tainted by 
dishonestly. 
As noted earlier, it is not for English courts to control market behaviour and the 
judges were therefore correct not to seek to impose stricter rules around 
arbitrage or good faith to seek to curb the development of reinsurance spirals.  In 
any case, these legal tools do not deal with the Spiral Risk.  Skilled underwriters 
who comply with the rules on arbitrage and act in good faith may still find 
themselves outwitted by the unpredictability of a reinsurance spiral.   
No suitable legal remedy has been provided to deal with the Spiral Risk because 
to date, the cases have focused on the wrong element of a reinsurance spiral, 
namely, the people.  The judiciaries’ hands were tied by the ways in which cases 
were pleaded.  The Names who took their grievances to Court wanted justice 
from the agents they had entrusted with their money.  However, the problem with 
reinsurance spirals does not lie in the people who built them.  One would hope 
that the majority of these people act with good intentions and with skill.  This 
must be particularly true of the more recent reinsurance spirals mentioned in the 
previous chapter.   
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The problem with reinsurance spirals is the Spiral Risk: that additional risk 
created by the spiral itself.  The only effective way to tackle the Spiral Risk is not 
to focus on the people who create the spirals but instead to focus on the Spiral 
Contracts.  So far, English courts have not had an opportunity to do so. 
 
7.1.3  Are Spiral Contracts Truly Contracts of Reinsurance? 
If the concentration of losses is a distinguishing feature of any reinsurance spiral 
it seems clear that those spirals preclude the Spiral Contracts from fulfilling their 
primary function, which is that of spreading the risk.  This raises some questions 
about the true nature of the Spiral Contracts at the core of a reinsurance spiral.  
Given that they fail to further the primary purpose of reinsurance, can those 
contracts really be considered to be reinsurances?   
At this point it is must be noted that XL reinsurance has yet to be given a 
definitive legal definition.  We have seen in chapter 2 of this thesis that 
reinsurance is commonly defined as “the insurance of an insurer”
377.  This is based 
on the premise that there exists a fixed legal definition of insurance, which is not 
the case under English common law.  In the same chapter we have relied upon a 
case that provides a possible definition of insurance: it referred to contractual 
rights being triggered upon the happening of an uncertain event, to be 
indemnified to the extent of the loss caused by the event
378.  This definition of 
insurance, whilst not definitive
379, will suffice for the purposes of this thesis since 
we are focussing on the LMX Spiral and not on what defines insurance.   
The above definition of reinsurance however is lacking in that it fails to 
accommodate the specific features that make XL reinsurance different from other 
types of reinsurance contracts.  Earlier in this thesis we have identified the 
defining characteristic of XL reinsurance as the splitting of the risk into a 
‘tranche’ (through the use of an excess point and Sum Insured) which allows for 
                                           
377 This is the definition often used in textbooks (see section 2.2.1) but also in the 
European legislation under Directive 2005/68/EC on reinsurance.  The Directive defines 
reinsurance as “the activity consisting in accepting risks ceded by an insurance 
undertaking or by another reinsurance undertaking....” (Article 2.1(a)) 
378 See section 2.1.1 of this thesis. 
379 It must be emphasised for instance that this definition refers to indemnity insurance 
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layering and which, in turns, informs the pricing
380.  Whilst these are not “legal” 
criteria, they must form the basis of the legal definition of an XL reinsurance 
contract because what differentiate between the various types of reinsurance 
contracts are their commercial features and the significant differences between 
proportional and XL reinsurance ought to be legally recognised.  In fact, we will 
see in the next chapter that, when opining on disputes concerning XL reinsurance 
contracts, English Courts have used the features listed above to legally appraise 
XL reinsurance contract
381, for instance by deciding that the legal trigger for the 
risk to attach under an XL reinsurance contract is the point in time when the 
excess point is reached.  It is therefore submitted that XL reinsurance contracts 
are contracts of reinsurance (as defined above in terms of loss caused by an 
uncertain events triggering rights of indemnity) that cover a tranche of a risk 
(delineated through the use of excess points and usually a Sum Insured) for a 
price that reflects the level of risk thus undertaken. 
It may seem far-fetched to query whether Spiral Contracts are XL reinsurance 
contracts but the issue whether Spiral Business is insurance business was 
considered by the Walker committee
382 in the context of the LMX Spiral.  The point 
arose because the committee was asked whether Managing Agents acted outside 
their authority when writing Spiral Business.  Given the very wide ambit of the 
powers granted to the Lloyd’s Managing Agents, such an argument could only 
succeed if one could prove that Spiral Business was not insurance business.  The 
committee concluded that Spiral Business was insurance business because it 
involved: (i) the acceptance and ceding of risk, (ii) payment of a premium, (iii) an 
insurable interest and (iv) a potential loss the occurrence of which was outside 
the control of the parties to the reinsurance contract
383.  It is unclear on what 
basis the Walker committee used these criteria to define insurance business: no 
case law or other reference is pointed to in the report.  In any case this chapter 
will demonstrate how the Spiral Effects distorted most of these criteria which 
means the conclusions of the Walker committee have to be re-considered. 
                                           
380 See section 2.2.4 of this thesis. 
381 See section 8.2.2 of this thesis. 
382 Committee set up to enquire into Lloyd’s Syndicate participations into the LMX Spiral.  
See section 4.2 of this thesis for more detail. 
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There is no doubt that the underwriters who engaged in Spiral Business in the 
heydays of the LMX Spiral in their mind negotiated XL reinsurances and the entire 
market treated those contracts as such.  This, however, does not require the 
judiciary to follow the label.  There are many examples in case law where the 
terminology used by those who wrote the contracts was treated as indicative of 
their intention but it was not conclusive
384.  In fact, there have been several cases 
where contracts described as a contract of insurance or reinsurance were held to 
have been, in fact, something else
385.  Thus we need to appraise the true nature of 
the Spiral Contracts. 
 
7.2  A Study of Spiral Contracts 
7.2.1  How the Spiral Effects distort Spiral Contracts 
We start our study of the Spiral Contracts by considering again some of the basic 
features of XL reinsurance touched upon in the second chapter of this thesis.  We 
have seen that XL reinsurance is a mechanism to spread risk amongst a larger 
number of reinsurers by splitting large risks into smaller parts that can be 
transferred independently of each other.  Its key characteristic is the way the risk 
is layered and sold in tranches.  Each layer then acquires a different risk profile.  
At the two extremes of an XL reinsurance tower are the working layers and the 
catastrophe layers.  The working layers sit at the bottom of the reinsurance tower 
and are expected to be subject to many more claims than the catastrophes layers 
that sit on top of the chain of reinsurances.  Accordingly, the premium for 
working layers tends to be higher than the premium for catastrophe layers.   
                                           
384 For instance in Kler Knitwear Ltd v Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd [2000] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 47, the court found that a term was a suspensive condition even though it was 
headed  “sprinkler  installations  warranty”.    Conversely,  in  HIH  Casualty  and  General 
Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co  [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 596, the Court of 
Appeal  held  that  a  clause  which  stated  that  six  films  would  be  made  constituted  a 
warranty even though it was not described as such in the contract of insurance. 
385  In  Feasey  v  Sun  Life  Assurance  Co  of  Canada  [2003]  EWCA  Civ  885  the  reinsurer 
successfully argued that the underlying contract of insurance was illegal due to lack of 
insurable  interest.    Aside  from  the  issue  of  illegality,  arguably  without  an  insurable 
interest the contract could not have been one of insurance.  In Toomey v Eagle Star (n 69), 
the Court of Appeal found that a contract described as a contract of reinsurance was in 
fact a 100% stop loss policy. Part II/Chapter 7 
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Charging the appropriate rate is essential because, even though reinsurance 
products are becoming more sophisticated, the fundamentals remain unchanged: 
the reinsurer must ensure he has collected sufficient premium to pay claims and 
run his business.   
The layering is not the sole criteria relied upon by reinsurers to set the premium.  
The identity of the reinsured, its underwriting policy and reputation will play a 
part too.  The nature of the risk being underwritten is also key, as well as the 
specifics of the reinsurance policy itself such as reinstatements, the deductible 
and Sum Insured.   
We know that within a reinsurance spiral, some of those factors are distorted.  We 
have already demonstrated how the Spiral Effects make it near impossible for a 
Reasonable LMX Underwriter to properly assess a risk within a reinsurance 
spiral
386.  The same analysis leads to similar conclusions when one considers the 
impact the Spiral Effects have on Spiral Contracts. 
The most significant Spiral Effect from our perspective is the fact that a 
reinsurance spiral renders Sum Insured and layering meaningless
387.  This is 
because, in a spiral with little leakage, even the smallest of claims can reach the 
catastrophe layers, causing claims to exceed the Sum Insured very quickly.  It has 
been said that because of this, within reinsurance spirals the rating structure 
should be flatter
388.  When considering how significant the layering ought to be in 
XL reinsurance markets, the need for a flat rating structure suggests that the 
contracts are not functioning as XL reinsurances.  This links in to the Spiral Effect 
titled the “irrational pricing structure”. 
Another Spiral Effect of significance is the Unpredictability point.  This has been 
explained several times before but to put it simply, it is the effect whereby a 
reinsurer cannot know exactly which reinsurer within the spiral will first exhaust 
its reinsurances.  Arguably this does not impact on the risk at the point when it is 
underwritten under the inward reinsurance. Nonetheless, the possibility that the 
reinsurer may not have reinsurance protection for that particular contract makes 
it more risky for him to write, which ought to be reflected in the premium 
charged.   
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387 See section 4.5.1 of this thesis. 
388 See LMX Working Party (n 108) ch 2 sections 2.1 and 7.5.     Part II/Chapter 7 
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Opacity is another Spiral Effect that is of importance for our purposes.  Given that 
the relationship between the underlying risk and the reinsurer is more remote in 
XL reinsurance, XL underwriters place more reliance on factors other than the 
minutiae of the risk itself.  Most of those other factors are listed above and they 
include, for instance, the identity of the reinsured and its underwriting policy, the 
state of the market, the situation of the contract within the reinsurance tower, 
etc.  In the context of the LMX Spiral, there was such opacity in the market that it 
has been said the only information a reinsurer had at his disposal were the 
deductible, the Sum Insured and the premium
389.  We know that in a reinsurance 
spiral the Sum Insured is meaningless and premium misleading.  This left the 
underwriter with virtually no reliable information, other than the deductible, to 
properly appraise the risk he was underwriting. 
Where does this leave us in our analysis of the Spiral Contracts?  They provided 
for a reinsurer to underwrite a risk at an agreed price.  Other than that, they bore 
little resemblance to XL reinsurance contracts.  In a usual XL contract, the risk is 
delineated by clear parameters including the nature of the risk, the retention, the 
Sum Insured and the layering.  This enables the reinsurer to apprehend the risk 
he is underwriting and to charge an appropriate premium.  It also enables him to 
consider how the contract fits within its underwriting plan.  The Spiral Contracts 
within the LMX Spiral contained those elements.  Nevertheless, the Spiral Effects 
rendered those parameters ineffective such that the scope of the risk being 
underwritten became indeterminate.  The Sum Insured was meaningless and the 
layering irrelevant.  The reinsured’s retrocessionaires may turn out to be 
insolvent.  There was such opacity in the market at that time that the exact nature 
of the risk being underwritten may well have been unknown
390.  The rating in the 
market was also irrational and therefore an unreliable source of information.  All 
of this means that the reinsurer could hardly apprehend the level of exposure he 
had actually taken on.   
Can a contract truly be called an XL reinsurance if the layering is illusory and the 
level of exposure is unknown?  It is the view of the author of this thesis that the 
above analysis demonstrates how the Spiral Effects turned the Spiral Contracts 
into something other than XL reinsurance.  It is also submitted that this would be 
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true of any Spiral Contract within a reinsurance spiral that has developed 
sufficiently for the Spiral Effects to take hold.   
 
7.2.2  How Spiral Contracts are at odds with Reinsurance Principles 
We have argued that once a reinsurance spiral reaches a certain point the Spiral 
Contracts are not, in truth, reinsurance agreements.  Those contracts may have 
the appearance of standard XL reinsurances but the distorting effect of the spiral 
is such that they are turned into something else.  This is not an issue of 
semantics.  In the first chapter of this thesis, we have exposed in some detail the 
key differences between the rules applicable to standard commercial contracts 
and reinsurance contracts.  Because they relate to the transfer of a risk, insurance 
and reinsurance contracts are subject to specific legal principles that aim to 
render the transfer less hazardous by providing safeguards for the (re)insurer.  
This becomes apparent when considering these principles and their purpose. 
 
1.  The indemnity principle dictates that the reinsured can only recover to the 
extent that he has suffered a loss.  This goes to the nature of the contract, 
which aims to give the reinsured protection against the risk of loss but not 
to enable him to make a profit.   
2.  A warranty in reinsurance is a term that provides safeguards surrounding 
the risk to ensure it is not unfavourably altered by the reinsured during the 
lifetime of the contract.   
3.  A major difference between a reinsurance contract and a standard 
commercial contract is the doctrine of utmost good faith.  The most 
significant application of the doctrine is the duty on the reinsured to 
provide full disclosure of material circumstances prior to the contract 
being entered into.  The rationale for the duty lies in the need to protect 
the reinsurer by ensuring he is told everything relevant about the risk 
before he agrees to take it on. 
4.  The requirement for an insurable interest is another legal requirement that 
applies to insurance and reinsurance contracts only.  It aims to protect     Part II/Chapter 7 
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reinsurers against moral hazard by requiring that the reinsured has an 
insurable interest in the subject matter of the reinsurance contract
391.   
It can be seen that all the above doctrines and principles aim to provide legal 
protection to the reinsurer.  The rules also point to a relationship of trust.  It is no 
surprise that the Lloyd’s market’s motto is “fidentia”, which means confidence.  
These notions of trust and confidence are inherent in insurance and reinsurance 
because of the nature of the business being transacted.  It is a risk, an unknown 
quantity, and the parties rely on each other to diminish the impact that risk might 
have.  The parties also enter into a relationship that may last for a number of 
years, depending on the type of cover provided and the nature of the risk being 
underwritten.  A (re)insurance agreement is therefore not designed for short-
termism and profiteering.  Robert Kiln, a well known and respected underwriter in 
the Lloyd’s market famously wrote in his reinsurance textbook: “Reinsurance 
depends on trust and untrustworthy people should not be a part of it.”
392 
This contrasts with some of the attitudes displayed by some of the Spiral 
Participants during the heydays of the LMX Spiral.  At the time, the market 
developed partly through greed and a lack of understanding of the true nature of 
the market and of the potential magnitude of the risks being taken on.  There 
were of course underwriters who knew what they were doing and who acted 
throughout with integrity.  Yet the general “feel” one gets of the market from case 
law and other sources of information is one of carelessness and overtrading.  This 
seems at odd with the principles of insurance and reinsurance law noted above.  
The Spiral Contracts were not entered into with a view to foster long term 
relationship around the sharing of a risk.  This is not to say that the market was 
fraudulent.  As we know, fraud was never established as regards the LMX Spiral 
although it is possible that some Spiral Participants acted fraudulently for 
instance by making representations about the risk they were placing in the 
market, particularly bearing in mind that recklessness can amount to fraud
393.  
This, however, would have been in the context of a few transactions, not the 
entire market. 
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392 Kiln, R. and Kiln,S (n 32365) p 396. 
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If the Spiral Contracts are not contracts of reinsurances, the rules applicable to 
insurance and reinsurance contracts only do not apply to them.  Taking this view 
resolves some of the issues raised in our legal appraisal of reinsurance spirals.  
For instance, the use of arbitrage becomes less objectionable in a market that 
would otherwise be governed by good faith.  The use of arbitrage also makes 
more sense if there is no need to foster long term relationships.  Considering that 
the Spiral Contracts are not reinsurances also means the reinsured is not required 
to have an insurable interest in the underlying risk.  This makes more sense in 
the context of a spiral given the disconnection between the ultimate reinsurer and 
the underlying risk.  The rationale underlying the strict consequences of a breach 
of a warranty also seems out of place in a Spiral Contract given that the reinsured 
has no control over the risk itself, although there may be some warranties 
concerning the coverage he is himself providing to the lower layers.  Finally, 
considering that Spiral Contracts are not reinsurances is consistent with the point 
made earlier that, in the context of the LMX Spiral, full disclosure would have 
made little difference.  In a normal reinsurance market disclosure is significant 
because it ensures the reinsurer is provided with the information he actually 
needs to price the risk.  In the context of the LMX Spiral, no matter how prudent 
the underwriter was, he would have been unable to circumvent the Spiral Effects.   
If disclosure would have made no difference, does that mean fraud becomes 
irrelevant?  Would the fraudulent concealment of the true nature of the contract 
have made any difference if the underwriter would have written the contract 
anyway; or if he would have gone on to write another equally flawed Spiral 
Contracts on the London XL Market?  The answer probably is yes, it would have 
made a difference, because fraud may have drawn in more capacity into the 
market from people who did not want to write LMX Business at all.  At the time of 
the LMX Spiral there were some underwriters who refused to write London Market 
XL Business because they disagreed with the ways of the market
394.  When the 
LMX Spiral was at its height, even some specialist LMX Business underwriters 
chose to limit their exposure to the London XL Market
395.  They did not know of 
the Spiral Effects as such but they could recognise a market that had overheated.  
These underwriters would not have been caught by non-disclosure since they 
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would have known that the risk emanated from the London XL Market, if only 
from the identity of the reinsured.  Fraud, however, could have drawn them into 
the very market they were trying to avoid, fuelling the LMX Spiral even further.  
Admittedly the difference this would have made to the LMX Spiral as a whole is 
probably limited as the London XL Market was rife with underwriters willing to 
write LMX Business.  With or without fraud the LMX Spiral would most probably 
have developed albeit, potentially, at a slower pace in the latter case. 
To conclude, Spiral Contracts make more sense as contracts that are not subject 
to the specific rules that define reinsurance contracts.  There is one exception to 
this: the principle of indemnity.  Indeed, all claims within a chain of XL 
reinsurance are initially issued from the claim made by the primary insured.  This 
principle applies even as the gross claim amount growth and the reinsureds are 
becoming more and more remote from the original loss.  Contracts of 
reinsurance are only subspecies of a contract of indemnity
396.  Thus the Spiral 
Contracts may well provide for an indemnity without being contracts of 
reinsurance. 
 
7.3  The True Nature of Spiral Contracts 
7.3.1  Spiral Contracts Distinguished from Wagers  
Given that we are questioning the true nature of Spiral Contracts, it seems logical 
to consider whether they are, in fact, wager.  The requirement for an insurable 
interest in insurance and reinsurance contracts is often justified on the need to 
distinguish those from wagers.  This is less of an issue now that wagers are 
enforceable under the Gambling Act 2005.  However, at the time of the LMX 
Spiral, wagers were unenforceable under the legislation then in force
397 and the 
Gambling Act 2005 does not have retrospective effect
398.  If the Spiral Contracts 
                                           
396 See section 2.1.3 of this thesis. 
397 This included the Gaming Acts of 1710, 1835, 1845, 1892 and 1968. 
398 Part 17 of the Gambling Act 2005  (the Act) came into force on 1 September 2007.  
Section 334(1) of the Act repeals the Gaming Acts of 1710, 1835, 1845, 1892 and section 
334(2) makes it clear that those repeals do not have retrospective effect.  Section 356 of 
the Act repeals the relevant parts of the Gaming Act 1968 and it is generally accepted that 
this is not retrospective even though there are no express words to this effect.  See Chitty 
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were, in fact, wagers, the consequences could be very significant.  The whole 
purpose of Equitas
399 would be put into question, as well as most of the findings 
from the case law concerning the LMX Spiral.   
There are no doubt similarities between reinsurance and wagers but to consider 
the issue, we need to understand clearly what constitutes a wager.  The best 
known definition is to be found in the case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co
400 
where it was said that: 
“A wagering contract is one by which two persons professing to hold 
opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, mutually 
agree that, dependent upon the determination of that event, one shall win 
from the other, and that other shall pay or hand over to him, a sum of 
money or other stake; neither of the contracting parties having any other 
interest in that contract than the sum or stake he will so win or lose, there 
being no other real consideration for the making of such contract by either 
of the parties.” 
It must be noted that the definition of event is too restrictive.  Even though the 
subject of a wager is often an uncertain future event, the parties may chose 
instead a past event or a fact that is not uncertain, provided they hold opposite 
views on it.  For instance, the following have been found by courts to have been 
the subject of wagering contracts: which horse won the Derby the previous 
year
401, the price of a previous lot of rags
402 or even the question whether the 
earth is flat
403.  The parties to a wager are free to make a bet on everything and 
anything.  We can see from this that wagers are of a wider scope than insurance 
and reinsurance contracts.  They do not relate to the transfer of an existing risk 
from one party to another.  Instead, wagers artificially create a risk of loss for the 
parties that would not exist but for the existence of the wagering contract.  This 
is the point made in the above definition about the parties having no interest in 
the contract other than the sum or stake they may win or lose under the contract.   
By contrast, in reinsurance a reinsured must have some sort of connection to the 
uncertain event.  Legally the connection takes the form of an insurable interest 
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although we have seen in the second chapter of this thesis that, in truth, an XL 
reinsurer high up the chain of XL reinsurances has no real insurable interest in 
the item that was the subject of the primary contract of insurance
404.  
Nonetheless, there remains a connection between the loss suffered by the 
original policyholder and the payment to be made by the reinsurer.  This 
connection is the reinsured’s liability to indemnify its own reinsured under the 
inward reinsurance agreement.  We have seen previously that this very liability 
has been considered by English courts to fulfil the requirement of an insurable 
interest at the reinsurance level
405.  Considering that this is due to the existence 
of an “insurable interest” seems unduly artificial.  It is submitted that this 
“connection” is better viewed as being a consequence of the principle of 
indemnity
406.   
Whichever label it is given, it is undeniable that this liability ties the fortune of the 
reinsurer to that of the original policyholder.  If the event materialises, they both 
suffer loss.  Critically for our purposes, this connection, through the principle of 
indemnity, is one key factor that differentiates XL reinsurance contracts from 
wagers.  Another distinguishing point is the fact that parties to a reinsurance do 
not necessarily hold opposite views on the chances of the event happening.  
Moreover, the subject matter of wagering contracts is potentially much wider.  
Finally, as noted above wagers do not operate a transfer of risk but create a new 
one.  Spiral Contracts, therefore, are of a different nature from wagers. 
 
7.3.2  The Hypothesis: Spiral Contracts as Contracts of Indemnity 
So far we have demonstrated that the Spiral Effects turn Spiral Contracts into 
something other than XL reinsurance.  Our detailed analysis has also highlighted 
the importance of the principle of indemnity.  This principle is a key factor that 
distinguishes the Spiral Contracts from wagers and it remains relevant when the 
Spiral Effects have rendered all other parameters of XL reinsurance redundant.  
                                           
404 See section 2.3.2 of this thesis. 
405 ibid. 
406 This view is consistent with the initial report of the Law Commission and Scottish law 
Commission on insurable interest, where it was noted that the principle of indemnity in 
practice provides the same safeguards as the requirement for an insurable interes t.  See 
Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission (n 13) para 8.4.  See also section 2.1.3 of 
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Even if the gross claim figure in the context of a reinsurance spiral, being the 
cumulated sum of all indemnities paid, is higher than the original loss, there is an 
undeniable connection between the claims made under the many Spiral Contracts 
and the original loss.  The loss payable under each contract is an indemnity for 
the reinsured’ own loss, which is the indemnity he himself had to pay his own 
reinsured.  From one indemnity to the next, going down the chain of contracts, 
we reach the original loss suffered by the policyholder under the primary contract 
of insurance.  The exact parameters of the indemnity may not be those of a 
typical XL reinsurance contract and the Spiral Effects will make payments more 
random that would be expected in an orderly XL reinsurance market.  The 
payments, however, are driven by the duty of the “reinsuring” party to indemnify 
the other party for its loss.   
The proposition of the author of this thesis is therefore as follows: once a 
reinsurance spiral develops, from the moment the Spiral Effects take hold all 
Spiral Contracts are, from the outset, contracts of indemnity.  It is not the case 
that those contracts may first be XL reinsurances that are turned into indemnities 
as the spiral develops.  Rather, from the moment an underwriter is unable to rely 
on the usual criteria that define XL reinsurance to set an appropriate premium, 
the contracts entered into are indemnities because the duty to indemnify is the 
only effective clause of the contract.   
At this point, the legal principles applicable to reinsurance contracts, such as the 
duty of good faith, have no more relevance and the Spiral Contracts are governed 
instead by the general rules of contract law.  This is a simple proposition but it 
has significant consequences.   
In practice there may be difficulties for courts to identify the exact point when the 
Spiral Contracts become contracts of indemnity.  These practical difficulties, 
however, are not insurmountable.  A possible solution would be to take one 
specific criteria, say the Sum Insured, and consider whether it is still, within the 
relevant contract, a reliable parameter.  If small claims reach the Sum Insured in 
what ought to have been a catastrophe layer, this would be a good indication that 
the Spiral Effects have started to take hold.  Of course, it is all a matter of 
degrees, and there will be grey areas where it is unclear whether the reinsurer can 
still rely on the layering and other information usually of relevance in the context 
of XL reinsurances.  The law, however, is no stranger to grey areas; these are a 
necessary side-effect of seeking to apply uniform rules when the reality is diverse.       Part II/Chapter 7 
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These difficulties ought not to detract from the fundamental point being made.  
XL contracts are a specific type of reinsurance defined by clear parameters.  A 
reinsurance spiral blurs those parameters to the point where they become 
irrelevant and the contract stops functioning as XL reinsurance.  Applying the 
usual rules and principles of reinsurance in such cases is flawed, as evidenced by 
the “case law conundrum” described in the previous chapter.  A Reasonable LMX 
Underwriter who dutifully follows the steps set out in case law remains as likely to 
suffer substantial losses as a reckless underwriter.  The “reasonable” steps are 
ineffective because they were prescribed by the courts on the presumption that 
the Spiral Contracts are XL reinsurance contracts.  Recognising that Spiral 
Contracts are of a different nature makes it clear that the skills required to 
succeed in a reinsurance spiral are not specialist underwriting skills.  Those 
underwriters who can identify the change when the contracts they enter into are 
not XL reinsurances any more are probably the ones most likely to succeed.  This 
is what happened to some extent in the context of the LMX Spiral: the more 
sagacious underwriters chose to limit their exposure to the London XL Market to 
avoid the spiral. 
Even though the parties to Spiral Contracts are not a reinsured and a reinsurer 
any more, for ease of reference throughout the rest of this thesis those terms will 
continue to be used to refer to the parties to a Spiral Contract. 
 
7.4  Regulatory Consequences  
7.4.1  The General Prohibition 
Considering that Spiral Contracts are not contracts of reinsurances raises 
important issues from a regulatory perspective.  Before exploring these in detail 
we need to set out briefly the regulatory background.  As noted previously, 
insurance and reinsurance are regulated industries and reinsurers must be 
authorised by the regulator to carry out reinsurance activities in the UK.  
Currently the so called “General Prohibition” against carrying out insurance and 
reinsurance activities without authorisation is set out in section 19 of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).  Previously, at the time of the 
LMX Spiral, a similar prohibition could be found in section 2 of the Insurance Part II/Chapter 7 
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Companies Act 1982 (ICA 1982) and, beforehand, under section 2 of the 
Insurance Companies Act 1974 (ICA 1974)
407.   
The reason the regulatory status of reinsurers is relevant for our analysis of Spiral 
Contracts is that the authorisation relates to a specific class of business.  For 
instance, a reinsurer authorised to write marine business may not write motor or 
personal accident insurance unless he is also authorised to write these other 
classes of business.  Likewise, a reinsurer’s authorisation does not extend to 
agreements that are not reinsurance at all
408.  Thus if Spiral Contracts are only 
contracts of indemnity, the reinsurers who write them are acting in breach of 
their authorization.  This is the case under the current legislation, the FSMA but 
the same reasoning also applies under the legislation in force at the time of the 
LMX Spiral, namely the ICA 1982 and, potentially, the ICA 1974.  A breach of this 
nature entitles the regulator to take disciplinary action including, under Part XIV 
of the FSMA, public censure, financial penalties and the suspension of the 
authorization to write reinsurance business.  More significantly from our 
perspective, the question is what are the consequences of such a breach on the 
legality and enforceability of the Spiral Contracts?  This is explored below. 
 
7.4.2  The Insurance Companies Acts 1982 and 1974 
Under the ICA 1982, the consequences of a statutory breach were the same for 
authorised reinsurers writing the wrong class of business as for unauthorised 
reinsurers.  Initially, there were conflicting authorities as to the effect such a 
breach might have on the rights of the parties to the contract.  In 1984, in 
Bedford Insurance Co. Ltd v Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil
409, Parker J held that 
insurance contracts entered into in contravention of the ICA 1982 were illegal and 
void ab initio.  Therefore the unauthorised insurer/reinsured in the case could not 
recover from its reinsurers.  Alternatively Parker J held that the insurer ought not 
to be allowed to rely on its own illegality to claim against the reinsurers.  By 
contrast, the same year in Stewart v Oriental Fire and Marine Insurance Co Ltd
410 
                                           
407 The ICA 1974, ICA 1982 and the FSMA refer to “insurance” but it is well established 
that under English rules all regulatory obligations of insurers also apply to reinsurers. 
408 See section 16 of the ICA 1982 and section 20 of the FSMA. 
409 Bedford Insurance Co. Ltd v Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil [1984] 3 All E.R. 766. 
410 Stewart v Oriental Fire and Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1984] 3 All ER 777.     Part II/Chapter 7 
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Legatt J decided that a reinsured could recover under a reinsurance from an 
unauthorised reinsurer on the basis that the purpose of the ICA 1982 was not to 
invalidate contracts but to impose criminal penalties on the perpetrators of the 
breach.  The reinsured in that case was the innocent party who was therefore 
entitled to recover.   
The conflict was seemingly resolved in the first instance decision of Phoenix 
General Insurance Co of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co. Ltd
411 where the 
judge took the view, obiter, that a contract entered into in breach of the ICA 1982 
was illegal but an innocent party ought to be able to enforce its terms.  The 
unauthorised insurer, however, could not do so for reasons of public policy.  This 
view reconciled the Bedford and Stewart cases.  In the latter, the reinsured was 
the innocent party and he was therefore able to recover under the unauthorised 
reinsurance but in Bedford, the reinsured was the guilty party without 
authorisation and therefore he could not enforce the reinsurance.  The Court of 
Appeal, however, reversed the position by saying, also obiter, that neither party 
to an illegal insurance contract had any rights under it
412.  This latter judgment is 
dated 1987, the year of the UK windstorm known as “87J”: the first catastrophe in 
a long line that lead to the demise of the LMX Spiral.   
The Court of Appeal’s view on illegality was followed in the 1989 case of Re 
Cavalier Insurance Co Ltd
413 in which policyholders found they had no right to 
claim under policies issued by an unauthorised insurer.  In 1989 therefore for a 
time it seemed that both party to a reinsurance contract entered into in breach of 
the General Prohibition could not enforce that contract.  Under this analysis, 
Spiral Contracts entered into in the context of the LMX Spiral were unenforceable.  
This is obviously a finding that is difficult to reconcile with the practices of the 
London XL Market and the whole purpose of Equitas.   
 
 
                                           
411 Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co. Ltd [1986] 1 All 
ER 908. 
412 Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v ADAS [1987] 2 All ER 152. 
413 Re Cavalier Insurance Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 430. Part II/Chapter 7 
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7.4.3  The Financial Services Act 1986 
The Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA 1986) brought some welcome changes to 
the law.  Section 132 provides that a contract written in breach of section 2 of the 
ICA 1982 is not void but unenforceable by the reinsurer
414.  This is subject to the 
court’s power to allow the reinsurer to enforce the contract if the court is 
satisfied that (i) the reinsurer reasonably believed he was not contravening 
section 2 of the ICA 1982 by entering into the contract and (ii) it is just an 
equitable to do so
415.  The innocent reinsured had a choice.  He could either 
enforce the reinsurance contract or treat it as unenforceable.  In the latter case, 
he was entitled to recover payments he made to the reinsurer under the contract 
and he could claim compensation for loss suffered as a result of having made 
such payments but he had to return any sums received from the reinsurer and he 
could not claim any more benefits under the contract
416.  Thus under the FSA 
1986, illegal contracts were enforceable at the option of the innocent party but 
not the guilty party.  This is similar to the first instance decision of Phoenix v 
Halvanon described above. 
The FSA is dated 1986 but section 132 was held to have retrospective effect
417 
and to apply irrespectively to breaches committed under the ICA 1982 and the 
ICA 1974
418 .  This regime was in place until the FSMA came into force on 1 
December 2001.  It is therefore a reasonable assumption that the legal status of 
nearly all Spiral Contracts within the LMX Spiral, which dates from the 1980s, is 
governed by s 132 of the FSA 1986.  Some of the Spiral Contracts may have 
expired but it seems likely that the provisions of section 132 also apply to 
contracts that have expired
419.  Finally, it is worth noting at this stage that section 
132 expressly states that a contravention of the ICA 1982 does not invalidate the 
reinsurance
420 of the unauthorised contract.  Thus a Spiral Contract subject to the 
                                           
414 Financial Services Act 1986 s 132(1). 
415 ibid s 132(3). 
416 ibid s 132(1) and (4). 
417 Bates v Robert Barrow Ltd [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 680. 
418 See Colinvaux &Merkin (n 7) para A-0109 (R August 2002) for a more detailed 
discussion on the retroactive effect of s. 132 of the Financial Services Act 1986. 
419 ibid para A-0108. 
420 Financial Services Act 1986 s 132(6).     Part II/Chapter 7 
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FSA 1986 would not necessarily break a chain of reinsurances
421.  This is of course 
relevant only as far as the reinsured may choose to enforce the Spiral Contract, in 
which case the reinsurance of the Spiral Contract would be unaffected by the 
illegality.  If the Spiral Contract is treated as unenforceable, then the reinsurance 
does not come into play. 
We have established that the legal status of the Spiral Contracts from the LMX 
Spiral is governed by s. 132 of the FSA 1986 whether the contracts contravene 
the General Prohibition under the ICA 1982 or 1974.  Does this mean that 
reinsureds can now rely upon section 132 to make claims for restitution against 
reinsurers (or Equitas) for premium or other sums paid under Spiral Contracts?  
Could those reinsureds even claim compensation?  Such claims could be tactical: 
a reinsured who had received no indemnity under the relevant contract may then 
decide to recover the premium paid.  However, those claims are likely to be time-
barred.  Under the Limitation Act 1980, the aggrieved party has six years to bring 
a claim from the date a cause of action accrues.  In XL reinsurance the six-year 
period starts running from the date the reinsured’s liability is ascertained.  We 
know from the Equitas
422 case and others like Wasa v Lexington
423 and CX Re
424 
that reinsurance claims can reach the upper layers of reinsurance towers many 
years after the event.  This is even more so for losses that went through the LMX 
Spiral given the “long short tail” effect described earlier in this thesis.   
Nonetheless, the rules of reinsurance law on limitation are irrelevant because we 
are arguing that the Spiral Contracts are contracts of indemnity.  Under standard 
contract law principles, the cause of action accrues when the breach occurs.  The 
breach, here, is the reinsurer writing a contract without the requisite regulatory 
authorisation.  Thus the cause of action accrued on the date the contract was 
entered into.  As noted above, the Spiral Contracts that were part of the LMX 
Spiral date from the 1980s and in some cases the early 1990s, which is well over 
20 years ago.  The Limitation Act 1980 gives no limitation period for claims in 
restitution but if it seems unlikely courts would allow such claims to be brought 
                                           
421 In the context of the LMX Spiral this may have happened if the reinsurance of the Spiral 
Contract was, for instance, a quota share reinsurance and not an XL reinsurance, or if the 
provider of the XL reinsurance cover was not a Spiral Participant. 
422 Equitas (n 1). 
423 Wasa v Lexington (n 70) 
424 IRB Brazil Resseguros SA v CX Reinsurance Company Ltd [2010] EWHC 974 (Comm), 
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more than 20 years after the relevant breach has been committed
425.  In the very 
unlikely case that such a claim could be made, it is submitted that courts ought 
to use their statutory power to allow the reinsurer to enforce the contract.  Whilst 
some of the underwriters were reckless, it is clear from the case law and other 
contemporaneous documents that in their mind they were underwriting XL 
reinsurance business.  There is a strong argument that the reinsurers reasonably 
believed they were not in breach of the statutory obligations and it would be just 
and equitable to enforce a reinsurance contract in the circumstances we have just 
described. 
 
7.4.4  The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
The FSMA applies to all reinsurance contracts entered into on or after 1 December 
2001.  This means that its provisions will govern Spiral Contracts that are part of 
the more recent reinsurance spirals.  The provisions of the FSMA are very similar 
to section 132 of the FSA 1986 except that the FSMA makes a clear distinction 
between contracts of the wrong class of business entered into by authorised 
reinsurers and contracts entered into by unauthorised reinsurers.  This seems fair 
given that it is less objectionable for a reinsurer to make an error as to the type 
of reinsurance he is allowed to write as opposed to not having any authorisation 
in the first place.  Since we are focusing on Spiral Contracts, which is the earlier 
scenario, we do not need to dwell on the consequences of a reinsurer having no 
authorisation at all.  Suffice is to say that under the FSMA an unauthorised 
reinsurer commits a criminal offence if he writes reinsurance contracts
426.  Any 
such contract is unenforceable by the reinsurer and the reinsured can recover the 
premium and other monies paid under the agreement as well as compensation 
(he must also return monies received from the reinsurer)
427.  Courts however 
retain a discretionary power to allow the insurer to enforce the contract on 
grounds similar to the ones set out above in the context of the FSA 1986
428.   
                                           
425 One view is that in the case of a restitutionary claim based on a breach of the duty of 
good faith, which renders the (re)insurance contract void, time would start running on the 
date which the right to avoid arose, which is likely to be the date the contract was entered 
into.  See Clyde & Co (n 33) para 42.10. 
426 FSMA s 23. 
427 ibid s 26(2). 
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Of more relevance to us are the rules that apply when an authorised reinsurer 
writes the wrong class of business, including, according to our analysis, Spiral 
Contracts.  The sanctions in such as case are less severe: not only is the reinsurer 
not committing a criminal offence but also the contract is not rendered void or 
unenforceable and the reinsured has no cause of action for breach of statutory 
duty.  There is a carve out however: the FSMA provides that in “prescribed cases” 
a person who has suffered loss as a result of the breach may have a cause of 
action against the reinsurer
429.  This raises interesting issues from our 
perspective.  Could a reinsured claim it has suffered a loss as a result of Spiral 
Contracts being in breach of the FSMA?  This seems unlikely given the court’s 
findings in the recent case of Re Whiteley Insurance Consultants (A Firm)
430, where 
an intermediary had written insurance policies without authorisation.  We have 
just seen that under the FSMA this is considered to be a more serious breach than 
the scenario we are concerned with and the intermediary in this case had 
committed a criminal offence.  In Re Whiteley, David Richards J nevertheless held 
that the policyholders had not suffered loss because (i) the policies were 
enforceable and (ii) in any case they would have had to pay similar premium to 
obtain similar cover from other insurers.  This is probably true of many 
reinsurance contracts unless the reinsurer is specialised.  For instance, in the 
context of the LMX Spiral, there is no doubt reinsureds could have sourced 
alternative reinsurance given how much overcapacity there was in the London XL 
Market at the time.   
The Re Whiteley ruling makes it difficult to imagine a situation where a reinsured 
could obtain compensation on the ground that a reinsurer was in breach of the 
FSMA when entering into the Spiral Contract.  Moreover, if the reinsured himself 
entered into the contract at a point when it was a Spiral Contract he is himself in 
breach of the FSMA.  It may also be argued that the reinsured is in a better 
position than if he had entered into a reinsurance agreement, given that the duty 
of disclosure will not apply and neither will the reinsurer be able to rely on a 
breach of a warranty to escape liability.  Presuming that the reinsured is most 
concerned with being paid the indemnity when it is due, our view that Spiral 
Contracts are not reinsurance contracts is to the reinsured’s advantage. 
                                           
429 ibid s(20)(2). 
430 Re Whiteley Insurance Consultants (A Firm) [2008] EWHC 1782, [2009] Lloyd's Rep IR 
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For completeness’ sake it is worth noting here that the FSMA is silent as to the 
effect of the breach on reinsurance agreements but it is probable that the 
position would be as it is under the FSA 1986 so that a Spiral Contract would not 
necessarily break a chain of reinsurance contracts
431.   
 
7.4.5  Duties as Between Reinsurers 
We have established that a reinsurer writing Spiral Contracts is in breach of his 
statutory obligations.  However, there is very limited scope for a reinsured to seek 
any form of compensation for the breach given that the contract remains 
enforceable and the reinsured will struggle to show a loss.  In any case, the 
reinsured is likely to have committed the same breach.  This does raise the 
question: is the reinsured himself in breach of his obligations if he is asking the 
reinsurer to underwrite a contract tainted by illegality?  Given the concepts of 
good faith and the traditional view of reinsurance as long-term business based on 
trust, it seems counter-intuitive to consider that reinsurers can enter into 
contracts that contravene legislation without warning each other.  We have set out 
in the previous chapter the views of Thomas J in Sphere Drake that it is 
acceptable for the more astute reinsurers to take advantage of the lack of 
knowledge of some of the other participants
432 in a reinsurance market.  We have 
also noted that the case law does not require a reinsurer to educate others as to 
the dangers of the business he is offering
433.  This can be justified on the basis 
that reinsurers are specialists who ought to have enough understanding of the 
business of reinsurance to protect their own interest.  Yet here the Spiral Contract 
is tainted by illegality.  The duty of good faith requires disclosure of the fact that 
the contract includes a “spiral element” but this is not the same as warning the 
reinsurer that the contract is not one of reinsurance and that it has been entered 
into in breach of the FSMA.  Arguably the latter is a material fact that has to be 
disclosed.  Realistically however most reinsurer will be unaware of this fact unless 
the law develops in this area.  More significantly, since Spiral Contracts are not 
contracts of reinsurance the duty of good faith does not apply. 
                                           
431 For more discussion on this point see Colinvaux & Merkin (n 36) para A-0111. 
432 Sphere Drake (n 1) para 285. 
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What happens however once the contract has been entered into?  Case law makes 
it clear that beyond the duty of good faith, reinsurers do not have to look after 
each other’s interests.  In some circumstances English courts have implied duties 
into contracts of reinsurance requiring the reinsured to act prudently so as to 
protect the reinsurer’s interest.  In the relevant cases the reinsurances were 
proportional and they included an element of compulsory cover, where the 
reinsurer’s hands were tied to the decision-making of the reinsured.  The first 
case, Phoenix v Halvanon
434 concerned a facultative obligatory contract that 
empowered the reinsured to choose the risks that would be ceded to the 
reinsurer; whilst in the second case, Economic v Le Assicurazioni
435 the 
reinsurance was a quota share reinsurance which meant that the reinsurer had a 
share of every single risk underwritten by the reinsured.  In both cases, the court 
agreed to imply a term requiring the reinsured to conduct its business “prudently, 
reasonably carefully and in accordance with the ordinary practice of the market”.   
We know that XL reinsurance is different from proportional reinsurance and this is 
clearly demonstrated by Bonner v Cox
436.  The Court of Appeal had to consider 
whether, in the context of the XL reinsurance contract, a reinsured should be 
under an implied duty to (i) not accept risk if they were indifferent as to whether 
the risk would be profitable without taking into account the reinsurance and (ii) 
exercise the ordinary skill and care of a prudent underwriter when writing risks 
under the cover.  This latter argument is similar to the implied duties described 
above.  The CA however distinguished Phoenix v Halvanon and Economic v Le 
Assicurazioni on the basis that those cases concerned proportional reinsurance as 
it creates a relationship akin to a joint venture as between reinsurers, which 
cannot be said of XL reinsurance. 
In Bonner v Cox the reinsured Lloyd’s Syndicates had written the inward 
reinsurance of an offshore oil and gas contractor (Oceaneering) shortly after the 
aggregate excess under the syndicate’s outward XL reinsurance had been 
exhausted.  This meant the XL reinsurers were bound to pay the first $10 million 
of any loss emanating from the Oceaneering contract.  The CA rejected the 
contention that the reinsured owed duties (i) and (ii) (described above) to their 
reinsurers, noting that in XL reinsurance, each reinsurer owes duties first and 
                                           
434 Phoenix v Halvanon (n 411). 
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foremost to its capital providers and that, as quoted in the previous chapter of 
this thesis “[T]here is nothing wrong in taking advantage of an advantageous 
contract”
437.  The CA nevertheless noted that in some cases reinsurers may be 
entitled to reject risks on grounds of ‘‘dishonesty’’, ‘‘wilful misconduct’’ or 
‘‘recklessness’’ on the part of the reinsured.  Such rejection would be enforceable 
on the basis that the risks do not fall within the terms of the reinsurance
438.  The 
CA felt that the duty of disclosure and a reinsurer’s ability to control the type of 
risk it would cover through contract wording provided enough protection.  It also 
pointed out that it would be nonsensical for a reinsured not to be able to take 
into account its reinsurance protection when deciding whether or not to write 
inward contracts
439.  Yet the CA commented that a cedant who betrays the trust of 
its reinsurer would damage its reputation and would probably lose business as a 
result
440.  In other words, market forces act as a deterrent for bad behaviour 
where the law will not interfere, at least in markets dealing in non-proportional 
reinsurance
441.   
                                           
437 ibid para 105. 
438 ibid para. 110.  In Clyde & Co, Reinsurance Practice and the Law, (n 33) para 19.22 the 
authors point out that the decision of the CA in Bonner v Cox that dishonest or reckless 
behaviours might fall outside the contract of reinsurance sits uneasily to the findings in 
Sphere  Drake  (n  1)  that  arbitrage  is  an  acceptable  business  practice  provided  it  is 
disclosed.  These comments are based on the three examples given by the CA in Bonner v 
Cox of what conduct may qualify as dishonest or reckless, namely (i) an underwriter not 
exercising any judgment at all in accepting a risk, (ii) not caring whether the risk was 
good or bad or (iii) deliberately writing a risk knowing of a loss which would necessarily 
fall on its reinsurers as a result.  Arbitrage properly defined is none of these things: it is 
instead  about  taking  advantage  of  rate  differentials.    This  is  unlikely  to  be  achieved 
without the underwriter exercising judgment (point (i) above).  However, arbitrage may 
result in the underwriter not caring about the quality of a risk (point (ii)) or deliberately 
passing on a loss to reinsurers (iii) and to this extent there is, potentially, a discrepancy 
between the findings of Sphere Drake and Bonner v Cox.  Where the cases concur is when 
arbitrage is done dishonestly, as was the case in Sphere Drake, the relevant transaction is 
unlikely to be enforced by the Courts.   
439 ibid para 112. 
440 Ibid paras 99 to 101. 
441  ibid para.  111.  The CA declined to decide whether its findings should a pply to 
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Arguably, a reinsured who commits a statutory breach by entering into a Spiral 
Contract and then seeks reinsurance for the contract may be reckless.  If he is 
aware of the statutory breach, he may even be guilty of wilful misconduct.  
However, as with the duty of good faith, the ruling of Bonner v Cox is beside the 
point because it applies to XL reinsurances and not to contracts of indemnity 
such as Spiral Contracts.  There is some circularity in this argument: seeking to 
obtain reinsurance for a Spiral Contract may be reckless but the Bonner v Cox 
ruling does not apply because the contract in question is a Spiral Contract.  
Nevertheless, the case law described above is relevant to our analysis because it 
shows how the level of additional legal protection provided to parties to 
reinsurance contracts declines as the contracts change in their nature.  In 
proportional reinsurance, the closeness of the relationship between the reinsurers 
justifies the heavier burden imposed by the law in terms of the reinsured’s 
behaviour.  Since Bonner v Cox, it is clear that in non-proportional reinsurance, 
the reinsured can only be challenged if he has acted with dishonestly, recklessly 
or with wilful misconduct.  We argue that in the context of an XL reinsurance 
spiral, there is a further disconnection between the underlying risk and the 
reinsurer that leads to even less cooperation between reinsurers.  Logically, this 
means an even lesser legal burden needs to be imposed on the reinsured.  There 
is therefore a sliding scale of duties imposed on reinsurers that ends with Spiral 
Contracts.  It is therefore submitted that our analysis of Spiral Contracts as 
contracts of indemnity fits well with the current legal view on reinsureds’ duties.   
 
On that basis, the current position can be summarised as follows: 
 
1.  In proportional reinsurance, where the relationship between reinsurers is 
at its closest, in addition to the duty of good faith the law implies duties on 
the reinsured to act prudently so as to protect the reinsurer’s interest. 
 
2.  In XL reinsurance where reinsurers do not cooperate as closely, the 
reinsured’s duties are limited to the bare essentials in reinsurance terms 
i.e. good faith, honesty, avoiding misconduct and not acting recklessly. 
 
3.  In a reinsurance spiral, where the relationship between reinsurers is 
stretched even further and the XL reinsurances become Spiral Contracts, Part II/Chapter 7 
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the duty of good faith and other additional duties fall away to the point 
where only the usual contractual doctrines apply.  Contract law provides 
some protection to the parties to a contract
442 but not as extensively as 
reinsurance law. 
 
7.5  Concluding Remarks 
Our analysis shifts the focus from the people who build reinsurance spirals to the 
Spiral Contracts.  It shows that they take hold, the Spiral Effects distort the Spiral 
Contracts to the point when those contracts, when entered into, are contracts of 
indemnity rather than contracts of XL reinsurance.  This is a significant finding: it 
means that the specific rules applicable to contracts of insurance and reinsurance 
do not apply to the relevant Spiral Contracts.   
Moreover, under the current and recent regulatory regimes, reinsurers writing 
Spiral Contracts are in breach of their statutory obligations even though the 
contracts remain enforceable.  Such a finding, if known within XL reinsurance 
markets, would probably curb the development of spirals because underwriters 
would seek to avoid writing contracts that are not true contracts of XL 
reinsurance, if only to ensure that they are not putting themselves at risk of being 
subject to disciplinary action by the regulator. 
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PART III: THE NATURE OF XL REINSURANCE  
 
8  Analysis of Excess of Loss Reinsurance 
 
Our detailed analysis of the LMX Spiral has revealed a number of issues to do with 
reinsurance spirals that have been addressed in the previous chapters of this 
thesis.  A close review of the Spiral Contracts has also exposed features of XL 
reinsurance that challenge the traditional legal views of reinsurance as further 
insurance.  This is explored further in this chapter. 
 
8.1  The Mechanics of XL Reinsurance 
It is important to note that at this point of the thesis, the term “risk” is used in the 
wider sense of the term.  It may refer either to the risk of an adverse event 
happening; or the actual subject matter of the insurance, for instance the ship or 
property that is being insured at the primary level of insurance.  The terminology, 
which is a key aspect of our analysis, will be explored later in this chapter. 
 
8.1.1  XL Reinsurance Makes the Underlying Risk More Remote 
In the previous chapters, we have seen that reinsurance spirals seem to be a side 
effect of XL reinsurance.  Even though it is possible for a spiral to develop within 
proportional reinsurance markets, it is difficult to imagine a spiral of the same 
magnitude as the LMX Spiral being created through the use of proportional 
reinsurances.  For a spiral to grow, there have to be numerous contracts 
overlapping.  This is less likely to happen with proportional reinsurance.  XL 
reinsurance is a more effective tool to spread risk: it renders the risk more fluid 
by putting it into a format that makes it more readily transferable.  It is this 
effectiveness that makes XL reinsurance more prone to developing spirals.  The 
risk is spread to many reinsurers, bundled with other risks and transferred 
countless times again.  The result is the creation of complex webs of reinsurance Part III/Chapter 8  
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agreements.  The following description of the LMX Spiral could indeed apply to 
many mature XL reinsurance markets:  
“...a contained space with all the reinsurers in it connected to each other by 
multiple lines, representing a multiplicity of relationships on a multiplicity of 
covers at a multiplicity of levels.”
443 
This complexity is not an issue in itself, unless the market develops a spiral that 
reaches the point where Spiral Effects start to take hold.   
Every time the risk passes hands, the relationship between the reinsurer and the 
underlying risk becomes more remote.  We may now ask the question: what 
connection does the ultimate reinsurer retain to the risk itself?  Given that there 
are no limits to how many times a risk can be reinsured, the issue would arise in 
a straightforward scenario where the whole risk is being transferred from one 
reinsurer to the next, for instance through the use of facultative reinsurance.  
This question however is particularly acute in the context of those complex webs 
of reinsurance we have just described, where the risk has been combined with 
other risks.  In the ‘straightforward scenario’ where a single risk is transferred 
under facultative contracts, the risk remains identifiable.  This is not necessarily 
the case, as we have seen, in the more complex scenario.  The LMX Spiral 
provides good illustration of what happens in the most extreme circumstances 
where the market becomes opaque and the Spiral Effects start to take hold: the 
reinsurances at the heart of the spiral are turned into simple contracts of 
indemnity.  With each turn of the spiral, the contracts shed an attribute of XL 
reinsurance until their sole remaining feature remains the duty on the reinsurer to 
indemnify the reinsured.   
Not surprisingly, as we have already noted in the first chapter of this thesis, when 
faced with the evidence, Courts have acknowledged the disconnection between 
the ultimate XL reinsurer and the primary insurance.  In Hill and ors v Mercantile 
and General Reinsurance Company
444, the House of Lords has held that the 
relevant settlement to consider for the purposes of a follow the settlement clause 
was not the settlement of the original claim made by the original insured but the 
settlement made at the level just below the reinsurance being litigated.  In 
practice, this means that a reinsurer sitting on the 10
th layer of an XL reinsurance 
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tower needs to assess the settlement made at the ninth layer to decide whether 
he is under a liability to pay.  This aspect of the judgment was endorsed in 
Equitas
445 and, more recently, in CX Re 
446.  These decisions establish that the 
settlement made by the original insured is, in law, irrelevant to establish the 
liability of the XL reinsurer.  In fact, the loss of the original insured remains 
fundamental: without it, there would be no liability payable at the ninth layer.  
However, there is no legal appraisal of the settlement of that original claim or of 
any claim below the ‘ninth layer’ to use our example.  In Equitas v R&Q, the fact 
that sums had been wrongly aggregated in the lower layers was a relevant factor 
but only as far as it impacted on the sums recoverable under the layers of the 
reinsurance that were in dispute.  Clearly, this view sits uneasily with the principle 
that the reinsurance is an independent contract covering the subject matter of the 
original contract of insurance.   
The level at which the settlement remains relevant in an XL chain of reinsurances 
was most recently explored in the case of Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v 
Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd
447.  This is an interesting case in that it 
analyses a facultative XL reinsurance that was only one step removed from the 
primary insurance contract.  The dispute arose from property damage suffered by 
a subsidiary of Tesco as a result of the severe floods that had occurred in 
Thailand in 2011.  The reinsurer Tokio Marine had subscribed a share to the 
proportional facultative reinsurance (the TM Reinsurance) of the primary insurers 
who were local companies from the ACE European group (ACE).  The TM 
Reinsurance had then been placed with Novae under a facultative XL reinsurance 
(the Retrocession).  This situation is very different from the ones described 
above in the context of the LMX Spiral where there were layer upon layer of 
reinsurances.  In fact, when considering the impact of the “follow the settlement 
clause” in Tokio Marine, Hamblen J distinguished Hill v Mercantile on the basis 
that the latter “concerned a reinsurer under the LMX Spiral who was truly remote 
                                           
445 See n 80. 
446 CX Re (n 424).  The case was an appeal against an arbitral award under section 69 of 
the Arbitration Act 1996.  Some of the grounds for appeal centred on a double proviso 
“follow the settlement” clause and the standard of proof required to establish liability 
under the Hill v Mercantile and Equitas cases.  The court concluded that the arbitrators 
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447 Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd v Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd [2013] EWHC 
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from the direct insurance and at the end of a long chain of reinsurances.  In this 
case Novae was only one step removed from ACE…
448.   
Tokio Marine had paid its share of the settlement for the losses agreed by ACE 
but Novae was disputing its liability to follow that settlement.  Hamblen J found, 
inter alia, that (i) the Retrocession reinsured Tokio Marine in respect of its liability 
to the ACE companies both under local policies and under the Master Policy; (ii) 
the term “Loss Occurrence” in the Retrocession had to be construed in the same 
manner as the term “Occurrence” in the primary policy (not the TM Reinsurance); 
(iii) Novae had agreed to follow the settlement of ACE under the primary 
insurance policies (rather than that of its reinsured Tokio Marine); (iv) the burden 
of proof was on Tokio Marine to show that the claim so recognised by ACE was 
one that arguably fell within the terms of the Retrocession as a matter of law and 
that (v) Novae was bound by a determination by ACE as to issues of aggregation.  
Those findings show a close correlation between the Retrocession and the 
primary insurance at the expense of the TM Reinsurance.  Not only is the meaning 
of the word “Occurrence” imported directly from the primary insurance into the 
Retrocession but also decisions taken by the primary insurer ACE as to settlement 
and aggregation bind the retrocessionaire Novae.   
This decision, however, was based on the very specific facts of the case.  Firstly, 
as noted above the Retrocession was only one step removed from the primary 
insurance.  Critically, it was a facultative contract that was expressly intended to 
follow the “original policy wording” rather than the TM Reinsurance and which 
identified “Tesco” as the insured, as opposed to Tokio Marine.  Thus whilst 
Hamblen J agreed with Tokio Marine that “follow settlement clauses often refer to 
an obligation on a reinsurer to follow his immediate reinsured”, in this case he 
found that this was overridden by the clear language of the Retrocession
449.  
Moreover, the “follow the settlement” clause in Tokio Marine was not the same as 
the “double proviso” clause used in Hill v Mercantile.  The latter expressly 
requires the reinsured to prove that the claim is covered by both the insurance 
and the reinsurance.  In Tokio Marine, the “follow the settlement” clause in the 
Retrocession that was similar to the one examined in the case of Insurance 
Company of Africa v Scor Reinsurance
450, described by Hamblen J as the 
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“unqualified” clause.  The judge felt bound to follow the finding in the case of 
Generali
451 that under such a clause the determination of the claim by the primary 
insurer establishes liability under both the primary insurance and the reinsurance 
(this provides the ratio for point (v) above). 
Some may argue that Hill v Mercantile and Equitas can be distinguished on the 
basis that the losses could not be tracked down to the original insurance because 
they had been through the LMX Spiral.  However, the case of CX Re concerned an 
XL reinsurance programme covering US liability policies that had no connection to 
the LMX Spiral
452 and yet it follows Hill v Mercantile and Equitas by finding that 
the relevant settlement to establish liability is that of the inward reinsurance.  A 
key differentiating factor between those cases and Tokio Marine was the type of 
follow the settlement clause being used.  Another significant factor was the much 
greater distance between the XL reinsurer and the primary insurer.  The more 
remote the XL reinsurance, the more difficult it is to connect legal findings made 
at the level of the primary insurance and liability under the XL reinsurance.   
Difficulties in tracking down risks arise in XL reinsurance towers whether or not a 
spiral develops.  This seems unsurprising when considering the “complex webs of 
reinsurance” that are created within reinsurance markets.  In the context of a 
large number of overlapping contracts with remote connections to the underlying 
loss, the current legal view that every single one of the reinsurances is, in fact, a 
further insurance of the subject matter of the original insurance seems archaic.  It 
is worth pointing out here that the only recent case on the nature of reinsurance 
was WASA v Lexington which concerned a proportional facultative reinsurance 
and not an XL treaty.  XL reinsurance, by its very nature, makes the underlying 
risk more remote to the reinsurers sitting on top of the reinsurance tower.  There 
are situations as in Tokio Marine where the XL reinsurance does, in fact, connect 
to the primary insurance but these are unusual, as Hamblen J himself pointed out.   
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8.1.2  A Typical XL Contract 
In order to consider the issue we have just raised, we need to understand exactly 
how an XL reinsurance contract works.  There is, at Appendix C of this thesis a 
typical slip policy and abbreviated policy wording from the London XL Market in 
the heydays of the LMX Spiral (the Example).  The Example does not set out a full 
contract wording but it contains some of the key information we require for our 
analysis.  The Example was the one attached to the LMX Working Party Report
453 
which is dated 1988.  As such, it may be a little outdated but it still reflects 
current practices as regards XL reinsurance.  Wordings may evolve but XL 
reinsurance has not changed fundamentally.  It is also important for us to review 
a wording from that era since in this thesis we set out to analyse the LMX Spiral.  
Our analysis of the Example will therefore inform us as regards XL reinsurance 
generally, not just XL reinsurance as it was in the late 1980s.   
For ease of reference, some of the key clauses of the Example are set out below 
in italics, together with comments explaining the overall structure of a typical XL 
Reinsurance.   
 
“STANDARD XL REINSURANCE WORDING  
REINSURED:   
(As Appropriate - the Reinsured)” 
The purpose of the above clause is self evident.  Any XL slip policy will then 
set out some of the key parameters of the risk, including the period of 
cover (usually 12 months) the type (XL) the territorial scope and the 
number of reinstatements, as shown in the Example. 
“CLASS:  
To indemnify the Reinsured for all losses of whatsoever nature in respect of 
all business allocated to their (sic) Casualty Account.” 
In the Example, what is called “Class” is also what is often termed the 
“Reinsuring Clause” of the “Insuring Clause” in other wordings.  This is a key 
provision as it is the basis upon which the reinsuring liability arises.   
 
                                           
453 LMX Working Party (n 108) Appendix 4.   Part III/Chapter 8 
  205     
“LIMIT: 
£125,000 or US or C$250,000 each and every loss 
IN EXCESS OF AN ULTIMATE NETT LOSS OF 
£75,000 or US or C$150,000 each and every loss.” 
The limit, also sometimes known as Sum Insured is, as we have seen, a key 
parameter in XL reinsurance as it caps the reinsurer’s liability.  In the 
Example, the excess is also set out in the same clause and again, this is a 
key piece of information as is represents the bottom line below which there 
will be no liability for the reinsurer. 
PREMIUM 
Premium hereon shall be calculated at 10.20% of the Reinsured's Nett (sic) 
Premium Income on the business protected "accounted for" during the period 
of this reinsurance. Subject, however, to a Minimum and Deposit Premium of 
£10,938 plus US$70,000 payable in four instalments as follows: 
25% at 1.1.88 
25% at 31.3.88 
25% at 30.6.88 
25% at 30.9.88 
To be adjusted no later than 90 days after expiry. 
The premium is, of course, a key element of an XL reinsurance agreement.  
The above shows that the premium charged in this case was a premium 
based on the reinsured’s earnings during the period of the reinsurance 
subject to a minimum deposit as set out above.  This is one of the many 
ways in which a premium could be charged at the time of the LMX Spiral
454. 
 
The Slip in the Example then lists General Conditions by reference to 
standard clauses in use in the London XL Market at the time.  This includes 
the Ultimate Net Loss (UNL) Clause (UNL Clause) which is set out below. 
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“ULTIMATE NETT (sic) LOSS CLAUSE. 
This is defined as the sum actually paid by the Reinsured in settlement of 
losses or liability after making deductions for all recoveries, all salvages, 
and all claims upon other reinsurances, whether collected or not, and 
includes all adjustment expenses arising from the settlement of claims 
(other than employees' salaries and the Reinsured's office expenses).” 
The UNL is a standard clause that can be found in most XL Reinsurance.  It is 
key in understanding how XL Reinsurance works as it is the clause that 
delineates the liability of the reinsured.  The UNL Clause is discussed further 
below.   
 
The Example then sets out a number of clauses from the wording, including 
the following: 
“Definition of "Each and Every Loss” 
Each and every loss and/or occurrence and/or catastrophe and/or disaster 
and/or calamity and/or series of losses and/or occurrences and/or 
catastrophes and/or disasters and/or calamities arising out of one event.” 
The above is a typical aggregation clause.  Its aim is to clarify how a 
multitude of losses potentially covered by the reinsurance may be 
aggregated together until the total sum reaches the excess point.  In this 
particular case, aggregation is only allowed for 
losses/occurrences/catastrophes/disasters/calamities or series of any of 
those provided they all arise out of the same “event”
455.   
 
What does our Example tell us about a typical XL reinsurance?  The reinsurance 
provides cover for losses arising from the reinsured’s casualty account that 
exceed £75,000, up to a cap of £125,000.  The policy also contains temporal and 
geographical limits so as to restrict the reinsurer’s exposure.  The “Each and 
Every Loss” clause indicates how the losses may be aggregated and the UNL 
clause sets out how it is to be computed.  Neither clause however tells us what 
the “loss” actually is.  We therefore need to rely on the clause headed “Class” that 
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refers to losses suffered by the reinsured arising from its casualty account.  From 
this, we can deduct that the policy works as follows: the reinsured’s loss 
materialises when he receives a number of claims from his own casualty 
policyholders.  The net amount of those claims will be aggregated as per the 
“Each and Every Loss” clause and calculated in accordance with the UNL Clause.  
Once those aggregated claims exceed £75,000, presuming they otherwise fall 
within the terms of the reinsurance, the reinsured can seek to recover from its XL 
reinsurer.  Once the aggregated claims reach the upper limit of £125,000 then 
there is no more cover under this particular policy.   
Casualty insurance is usually liability insurance but this is irrelevant for our 
analysis of XL Reinsurance.  If the cover provided were first party insurance, such 
as property, the Example would work in exactly the same way.  The word 
“casualty” in the clause titled “Class” could be replaced by the word “property” so 
that it would read: “To indemnify the Reinsured for all losses of whatsoever 
nature in respect of all business allocated to its Property Account.”  The loss 
would materialise as the multitude of claims received by the reinsured from the 
policyholders in his property account.  The point is, even if the law regards the 
“loss” covered as being somehow the original loss, in reality the loss reaches the 
XL reinsurance layer indirectly through the medium of claims being made against 
the reinsured.  Is this still the same “loss”, as some say, “looking for a home”, or 
does the loss undertake some form of transformation in the process?   
 
8.1.3  A Mathematician’s Perspective 
Reinsurance spirals have been studied by a number of professionals, including 
the American mathematician Dr Thomas Kabele.  He published an article in 
August 2000
456 touching upon a number of issues concerning reinsurance, one of 
which was reinsurance spirals.  His article refers to both the PA Spiral and the 
LMX Spiral but he rightly points out that reinsurance spirals, which he calls 
“circles”, may develop in any reinsurance market.  His article refers to the Walker 
Report
457 and some of the case law referred to earlier in this thesis
458.  Thomas 
Kabele notes some of the Spiral Effects, most particularly the magnifying effect 
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and the fact that within a reinsurance spiral, the layering and Sum Insured 
become meaningless.  The point of significance for our purposes, however, is his 
proposed solution to prevent the development of future reinsurance spirals.  His 
proposal is perfectly logical if one considers that the loss being reinsured is the 
original risk.  Being a mathematician, Dr Kabele simply seeks to give effect, in 
practice, to the legal principle by ensuring the XL reinsurances do provide cover 
directly for the underlying loss.  The fact that his proposed solution does not 
work illustrates neatly why, in reality, XL reinsurance is not a further insurance of 
the subject matter of the original insurance policy. 
In his article, Dr Kabele reviews a number of standard XL reinsurance clauses, 
described as the “LMX PA.1.1992” and concludes that the wording does not 
achieve the intended result.  In his own words: the “author believes that the circle 
arises from what is not in the LMX.P.A.1.1992.  The author could find no clause 
which ties the reinsurance claims-amounts into the primary claims-amounts.”
459  
He therefore suggests some changes to make it clear that the reinsurance 
provides cover for the underlying loss.  These are set out below
460.   
 
“Article 6. Reinsuring Clause.   The Agreement subject to its provisions is to 
indemnify the Reinsured for all losses which may be sustained by the Reinsured in 
excess of an Ultimate net Loss of the Retention specified in the Schedule attached 
hereto . . .” 
Dr. KABELE: “In Article 6, replace “for all losses” with “for the cedent’s share of 
all primary losses.””     
 
Article 9. Ultimate Net Loss Clause.   The term “Ultimate Net Loss” shall mean the 
sum actually paid by the Reinsured in settlement of losses or liability after 
making deductions for all recoveries, all salvages and all claims upon other 
                                           
459 Kabele (n 456) p 9. 
460The wording of the policy relied upon by Thomas Kabele is set out in the order in which 
it would appear on the policy, and the comments he makes are  set out directly below the 
relevant clause.  This does not follow the presentation of those arguments in his article 
but this makes our analysis easier. 
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reinsurances whether collected or not and shall include all adjustment expenses 
arising from the settlement of claims. (…)  
Dr. KABELE: “Article 9 should be improved.  It should say “in settlement of the 
cedent’s share of the original primary loss amounts or liability.”” 
 
“Article 12. Settlements Clause.  All loss settlements by the Reinsured including 
compromise payments shall be unconditionally binding upon Reinsurers provided 
that such settlements are within the terms and conditions of the Original Policies 
[meaning primary and reinsurance assumed business]  … and Reinsurers shall 
pay the amounts due from them upon presentation of reasonable evidence of the 
amounts paid by the Reinsured.  (emphasis added)” 
Dr. KABELE: “That clause needs clarification.   It should say “Reinsurers shall pay 
the amounts due from them upon presentation of reasonable evidence of the 
amounts paid for the cedent’s share of the original primary loss.”  The first 
sentence should say “within the terms and conditions of the Original primary 
policies and reinsurance contracts – except that “circle” claim amounts 
resulting from the same primary claim being ceded and reassumed shall be 
regarded as zero.”” 
 
Whilst Dr Kabele is not a lawyer and therefore not the best qualified person to 
comment on contract wording, his viewpoint is of interest.  He is clearly seeking 
to propose a practical solution to what he considers to be a real problem faced by 
reinsurance markets.  His idea does not work under English law partly because it 
falls foul of the principle of indemnity.  We have seen that this principle requires 
the XL reinsurer to indemnify the reinsured (Reinsured A) for his loss.  It is 
irrelevant for the purposes of the XL reinsurance whether another indemnity has 
already been paid to another reinsured (Reinsured B) as regards the same 
insured event.  If the reinsurer does not indemnify Reinsured A for the entirety of 
Reinsured A’s loss under the terms of the XL reinsurance, then the reinsurer is in 
breach of the XL agreement.  The loss suffered by Reinsured A is not reduced by 
any payment made to Reinsured B for the simple reason that it is not the same 
loss.   
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Dr Kabele further proposes to include a clause in reinsurances requiring all claims 
to be “traced to and measured by the primary claim amounts, even claims 
covered by aggregate or catastrophe covers” to ensure that the gross claim 
amount does not exceed the “primary claim-amount” or the “cedent’s share of the 
primary claim-amount”.  The clause would also specify that “the claim amount 
[would not] increase as it passes from cedent to cedent”.  This is not, of course, 
how reinsurance works.  We have seen earlier that an increase in the gross claim 
value is a normal feature of reinsurance
461.  This is because two claims (one by the 
insured and one by the primary insurer to its reinsurer) will be made as regards 
the same loss and these necessarily overlap.  This aspect of reinsurance is 
inevitable and generally not considered to be detrimental unless the number of 
claims goes to such extremes that, as was the case in the LMX Spiral, the gross 
claim amount ends up bearing no resemblance to the original loss figure. 
As noted above, Dr Kabele’s ideas are interesting because they show how 
reinsurance would work if what was being reinsured truly were the subject matter 
of the underlying insurance.  Dr Kabele’s purpose is to somehow connect the 
amount of the claim made at the reinsurance level with the actual loss suffered by 
the primary policyholder.  His suggestions are unsuitable because they treat 
reinsurance as a form of co-insurance.  Reinsurance, in reality, is not a mean to 
split the underlying loss horizontally but it is a way to share the loss vertically, 
causing several overlapping claims to be made as regards the same loss.  Dr 
Kabale’s article illustrates with some cogency how the traditional legal view that 
reinsurance is a further insurance of the underlying subject matter is untenable.  
It is, at best, a legal fiction. 
 
8.2  XL Reinsurance Wordings: the Case Law 
As noted on several occasions in this thesis XL reinsurance is a relatively new 
form of reinsurance.  English Courts, however, have had to analyse XL wordings.  
How did the Courts reconcile the traditional view of reinsurance as further 
insurance and the reality of the “loss” reaching the reinsurance in the form of 
“claims” against the reinsurer?  This is explored below. 
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8.2.1  Charter Re v Fagan 
There are very few cases where English Courts have had the opportunity to opine 
specifically on issues concerning XL reinsurance wording.  One of the few cases 
that focuses on XL wording is Charter Reinsurance Company Ltd v Fagan
462, 
which went all the way to the House of Lords.  The issue in this case was whether 
the word “actually” in the UNL meant that the reinsured Charter Re had to have 
paid its own policyholders before he could claim under the relevant XL 
reinsurance.  The reinsurers, a number of Syndicates represented by Fagan, 
contented that the words “actually paid” in the UNL created a condition precedent 
to liability.  Charter Re was in liquidation and therefore unable to make the 
requisite payments.  The House of Lords found against the reinsurers and held 
that Charter Re could make a claim under the reinsurances.  Based on a close 
analysis of the wording (the Charter Reinsurance), its history and its commercial 
background, the Lords concluded that the primary purpose of the UNL was not to 
require payment by the reinsured but to provide a measure of the indemnity 
payable.  This was an important decision for the market at the time because it 
came just after the collapse of the LMX Spiral when many reinsurers were having 
financial difficulties and the UNL Clause was standard wording used in most XL 
reinsurances.  A finding that actual payment by the reinsured was required would 
have brought many recoveries to a standstill.  For our purposes, the decision is 
significant because their Lordships and the preceding courts analysed the Charter 
Reinsurance in great detail.   
Before going any further, it is worth setting out the key clauses that are at the 
heart of the decision.  Whilst the headings and configurations of the clauses in 
the Charter Reinsurance are different from the Example, it will be seen that both 
reinsurances are in fact nearly identical. 
 
“1. REINSURING CLAUSE 
This Reinsurance is to pay all losses howsoever and wheresoever arising 
during the period of this Reinsurance on any Interest under Policies and/or 
Contracts of Insurance and/or Reinsurance underwritten by the Reinsured in 
their Whole Account. 
Subject however to the following terms and conditions. 
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2.(a) LIABILITY CLAUSE 
The reinsurers shall only be liable if and when the Ultimate Net Loss 
sustained by the Reinsured in respect of interest coming within the scope of 
the reinsuring Clause exceeds £3,000,000 or U.S. or Can. $6,000,000 each 
and every loss and/or Catastrophe and/or Calamity and/or Occurence 
and/or Series of Occurences arising out of one event and the reinsurers 
shall thereupon become liable for the amount in excess thereof in each and 
every loss, but their liability hereunder is limited to £2,000,000 or U.S. or 
Can $4,000,000 each and every loss and/or Catastrophe and/or Calamity 
and/or Occurence and/or Series of Occurences arising out of one event. 
(...) 
ULTIMATE NET LOSS CLAUSE 
(c) The term ‘Net Loss’ shall mean the sum actually paid by the Reinsured in 
settlement of losses or liability after making deductions for all recoveries, all 
salvages and all claims upon other Reinsurances whether collected or not 
and shall include all adjustment expenses arising from the settlement of 
claims other than the salaries of employees and the office expenses of the 
Reinsured. 
(d) All Salvages, Recoveries or Payments recovered or received subsequent 
to a loss settlement under this Reinsurance shall be applied as if recovered 
or received prior to the aforesaid settlement and all necessary adjustments 
shall be made by the parties thereto.  Provided that nothing in this clause 
shall be construed to mean that losses under this Reinsurance are not 
recoverable until the Reinsured’s Ultimate Net Loss has been ascertained.” 
 
Lord Mustill, who gave one of the two speeches that comprise the judgment, 
analysed the Charter Reinsurance as follows:  
Clause 1.  Lord Mustill held that the “Reinsuring Clause”, together with other 
terms of the policy, described the nature and geographical scope of the “perils 
insured against”.  The Charter Reinsurance provided “Whole Account” cover which 
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Reinsurance covered losses by perils insured under the “original policies” 
provided these fell within the scope of the period clause.  
 
Clause 2.  Lord Mustill pointed out that this was a key clause because it helped 
“establish the measure of indemnity” once a loss by an insured peril has 
materialised.  Each sub-clause had a particular purpose, as set out below. 
Clause 2(a).  His Lordship described this clause as the one that fixed “the 
level at which financial prejudice suffered by Charter under the inward 
policies in consequence of a loss by a peril insured under [the Charter 
Reinsurance] cause[d] a liability to attach.”  This is, in simple terms, the 
layering.  The loss, calculated in accordance with the UNL, had to exceed £3 
million to fall under the terms of the Charter Reinsurance, but cover was 
only provided up to a maximum of £2 million.   
(...) 
Clause 2(c).  Lord Mustill found that this clause gave “meaning to clause 
2(a) by defining ultimate net loss”.  Its purpose was to make it clear that the 
loss was to be calculated net of all recoveries, salvage and the like “when 
ascertaining whether, and if so by how much, the relevant liabilities of 
Charter cross the boundary into the layer covered by [the Charter 
Reinsurance].”  It is interesting here that Lord Mustill refers to the liabilities 
of Charter Re and not its losses.   
Clause 2(d).  His Lordship then commented that the first sentence of clause 
2(d) simply aimed to make it clear that calculations concerning the UNL were 
provisional and open to re-computation should the need arise.  The second 
sentence specified that once it reached the bottom of the layer covered by 
the policy (£3 million in this case), the UNL became recoverable “even if a 
subsequent recalculation when all the figures are in may lead to an upward 
or downward adjustment, or even to the elimination of any recovery at all.” 
 
Lord Mustill’s overall conclusion was that the policy required the satisfaction of 
only two conditions before an indemnity fell due: (i) the occurrence of an insured 
event within the period of the policy (Clause 1) and (ii) a loss of sufficient 
magnitude for the UNL to breach through the relevant layer (Clause 2).   Part III/Chapter 8  
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The decision was based on the premise that the Charter Reinsurance was a 
further insurance on the original subject matter rather than a form of liability 
insurance.  Lord Mustill contended that this added strength to his argument.  The 
fact that the Charter Reinsurance covered the underlying risk in his view meant 
that the liability of the reinsurers could not depend on any actual payment made 
by Charter to its own policyholders.  Conversely, Lord Mustill recognised that 
there was some doubt concerning the nature of reinsurance when he opined that 
this case was “not the place to discuss the question, perhaps not yet finally 
resolved, whether there can be cases where a contract of reinsurance is an 
insurance of the reinsured’s liability under the inward policy or whether it is 
always an insurance on the original subject-matter, the liability of the reinsured 
serving merely to give him an insurable interest.”
463  
The other significant speech, by Lord Hoffman, is not so pertinent because it 
focuses on what his Lordship considers to be the meaning of the words “actually 
paid”.  Lord Hoffman concurs with Lord Mustill that no payment is required to 
trigger the reinsurers’ duty to indemnify under the Charter Reinsurance.  He only 
refers to insurance as being an independent contract on the same subject matter 
as the primary insurance in the context of the re-telling of the history of 
reinsurance to set the development of the UNL clause in context.   
On a cursory reading, Charter Re v Fagan seems to reinforce the view that XL 
Reinsurance works in the same way as the traditional forms of proportional 
reinsurance.  The decision is clearly based on the premise that the Charter 
Reinsurance is a further insurance of the subject matter of the primary insurance.  
However, their Lordships did not need to delve into the issue of the true nature of 
XL reinsurance to deal with the very specific point raised in the case.   
It is submitted that, on a closer look, Charter Re v Fagan supports an alternative 
view of XL Reinsurance.  Firstly, the House of Lords did not specify the nature of 
the risk being reinsured.  Lord Mustill noted that the payment by the reinsured 
was not the insured event under the Charter Reinsurance
464.  Instead, he said the 
policy covered “the occurrence of a casualty suffered by the subject-matter 
insured through the operation of an insured peril”.  It is correct that the loss at 
the XL reinsurance level will only materialise if the peril insured under the 
underlying insurance, an earthquake for example, does occur.  The point that is 
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not addressed in his Lordship’s judgment is the mechanism through which the 
“casualty suffered” reaches the XL reinsurer.  The original loss itself does not 
make its way up the chain of reinsurances.  As we have seen, this occurs through 
claims being made by reinsureds to their reinsurers.  The judgment therefore sets 
out the parameters for a loss to be covered under the Charter Reinsurance but it 
does not consider what the very essence of that loss might be. 
 
8.2.2  Further Case Law on XL Reinsurance 
Whilst few English law judgments contain detailed analysis of XL reinsurance 
wordings, what it clear from a number of cases is that, when considering liability 
under XL contracts, the focus of the court has been on the liability of the 
reinsured and not on the underlying loss.   
We have already set out how the findings of Hill v Mercantile
465 and Equitas
466 
make it clear that the relevant loss at the reinsurance level is the liability of the 
reinsured and not the original loss suffered by the original insured.  This view 
was endorsed in the case of IRB Brazil v CX Re
467.  This was an appeal of an 
arbitration award on a number of issues concerning an XL reinsurance 
programme.  Burton J found that the arbitrators had not erred in law as regards 
the “follow the settlement” clause since they had followed the relevant principles 
set out in case law, including Hill v Mercantile and Equitas.  Burton J therefore 
confirmed that to recover under an XL reinsurance that contains the double 
proviso “follow” clause, a reinsured only needs to prove that its own liability 
under the inward claims has been established on the balance of probabilities.  
The case also confirms that proof of loss is established on the “basis of the claim 
as compromised”
468 and therefore there is no need to re-investigate the 
underlying facts.  The case therefore very clearly draws the line below the inward 
claim as settled by the reinsured.  Burton J also endorsed the following passage 
from the arbitrators’ award: 
                                           
465 Hill v Mercantile (n 78). 
466 Equitas (n 1). 
467 CX Re (n 424). 
468 This is often referred to as the “arguable claim” after the case when this test was first 
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“...in the present context, being excess of loss reinsurances, the “perils insured 
against” are the reinsured suffering a claim (from the portfolio of business 
protected) in excess of the priority...” 
Allegedly, the quote was included in the context of a discussion on what 
constituted a “single event” for the purposes of the XL programme.  The 
arbitrators’ comments are therefore probably “obiter dicta” in the context of the 
judgment.  The point of interest is that Burton J did not seek to contradict the 
arbitrators’ clear statement that the peril insured against in XL reinsurance is not 
the underlying loss, but the risk of the reinsured suffering loss through claims 
from its policyholders. 
Other cases too point to the liability of the reinsured as being the focus of the 
court’s attention when deciding on liability issues under XL reinsurances.  Thus in 
North Atlantic v Bishopsgate
469, the court had to consider exactly when the excess 
point had been reached
470.  The reinsured had to establish that the excess point 
had been reached prior to the expiry of the relevant limitation period.  In theory, 
there are several possibilities: from the very latest, being actual payment by the 
reinsured; to the earliest possible trigger, being the occurrence of the peril 
insured against.  Timothy Walker J held that the issue had to be determined by 
reference to the date when the reinsured’s liability to pay the inward claim had 
been established.  His decision was based on the fact that under English law, for 
time to start running, the cause of action of the claimant has to be complete and 
it was established law that a reinsured’s cause of action arises as soon as its 
liability has been ascertained by means of a judgment, arbitral award or 
agreement
471.  The focus, therefore, was on the liability of the reinsured.  The 
parties never contemplated the possibility that the claims sitting below the inward 
layer may have any relevance.  This makes sense given the mechanics of XL 
reinsurance: the reinsured can only claim under the reinsurance when it has 
suffered losses and those losses take the form of its liability to pay claims to its 
policyholders.  The fact that time starts running when his liability has been 
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470 The case also raised issues of construction concerning an adjustable net premium 
income clause which are irrelevant for the purposes of this thesis. 
471 See for instance In re Eddystone Marine Insurance Co., ex parte Western Insurance Co. 
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ascertained is a legal acknowledgement that the relevant trigger for the 
reinsurance to attach is the reinsured’s liability and not the occurrence of the 
peril insured against. 
Another enlightening case concerning the workings of XL insurance is Teal v 
Berkley
472, a recent decision of the Supreme Court on allocation of losses.  Teal 
was seeking recoveries under a “top and drop” policy that sat on top of three XL 
insurances, all four policies underwritten by Teal.  The issue was that some of the 
claims made to Teal were covered under the XL insurances but not the “top and 
drop” policy because the latter excluded claims from the USA.  The defendants 
reinsured 50% of the “top and drop” policy.  The Supreme Court affirmed the 
decisions made in the lower courts, that Teal could not chose the order in which 
it would allocate losses to the various insurances so as to maximise recovery.  
Instead, the losses would be allocated in the order that Teal’s liability had been 
ascertained.  In this case, this meant Teal had to pay for the non-US claims that 
were first ascertained and fell within the XL insurances but it could not recover 
for the US claims that were ascertained later and which would have fallen under 
the “top and drop” cover had they not been excluded
473.   
As with North Atlantic v Bishopsgate , this decision clarifies the exact point at 
which the loss attaches to the relevant XL insurance layer and again, this was 
found to be the point when the insured’s liability is ascertained.  It is interesting 
to note here that Teal was not a reinsurer but an insurer, providing XL cover 
above a self insured retention and a primary insurance layer placed with 
Lexington.  Teal, therefore, was not one step removed from the loss as XL 
reinsurers typically are.  Yet despite the relative closeness with the underlying 
risk, still the relevant trigger for liability to attach was found to be the point when 
Teal’s liability to his policyholder was ascertained.  Again, this is logical given 
how XL reinsurance works: Teal had to suffer a loss itself before it could claim 
under its own reinsurance. 
                                           
472 Teal Assurance Co Ltd v W R Berkley Insurance (Europe) Ltd and Another [2013] UKSC 
57, [2014] Lloyd's Rep IR 56. 
473 Although the context is different, this decision is in line with Cox v Bankside (n 289), 
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One case seems to contradict our analysis is Allianz v Frankona (the “Treasure 
Bay”)
474.  The point in dispute in this case was whether a US$5 million deductible 
had to be applied to the gross settlement figure (US$17,857.90) or the reinsured 
Allianz’s 45.238% share of the settlement figure (US$8,078,557) under an XL 
reinsurance contract.  The Court decided that the deductible ought to be applied 
to the gross settlement figure, allowing Allianz to recover the highest amount of 
US$5, 816,657.74.  The decision was partly based on a review of the “follow the 
settlements” clause which stated “To follow the original settlement of the 
reassureds in all respects (...) but only to pay claims in excess of USD 5,000,000 
each vessel, each accident”.  A key issue for the court was whether the word 
“claims” referred to (i) the original claims of the insured on its insurers or (ii) the 
claims by the reinsured Allianz on its reinsurer Frankona.  If the XL reinsurance 
covered the Allianz’ liability, then option (ii) would have to be the correct one.  
The judge, Christopher Clarke J, concluded instead that the “claim” being referred 
to was the original claim.  His decision, however, was based on the fact that in all 
the 80 declarations that had preceded this one as between the same parties, 
references to “claim” were understood to refer to the original claim.  Interestingly, 
the judge commented that he would have hesitated to reach this conclusion had 
there not been such a history between the parties.  Therefore this decision is very 
much based on its own facts.   
The same can be said about the recent case of Tokio Marine which is discussed at 
length earlier in this chapter
475.  Hamblen J found that the retrocessionaire was in 
fact bound to follow the settlement of the primary insurer (ACE) rather than that 
of the reinsurer (Tokio Marine) that sat in between the primary insurance and the 
retrocession.  However, the judge himself acknowledged that this aspect of the 
decision is based on its unusual facts (a “back to back” facultative XL 
retrocession) and on the clear wording of the relevant clauses.  Moreover, the first 
finding from Hamblen J is that the XL Retrocession reinsured the Tokio Marine in 
respect of its “liability” to its policyholder ACE which suggests that in his view the 
retrocession was akin to liability insurance rather than being an independent 
contract covering the subject matter of the primary insurance contract.   
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To conclude, there is a growing body of cases on XL reinsurance that is consistent 
with our description of the workings of XL contracts where the focus is on the 
liability of the reinsured under the inward policies.    
 
8.2.3  Concluding Remarks 
XL reinsurance contracts make the risk more remote which puts into the question 
the traditional view of reinsurance as a further insurance of the subject matter of 
the primary insurance.  When analysing XL reinsurance wordings it seems 
undeniable that what is being covered is, in fact, the liability of the reinsured to 
its policyholders.  This is reflected in the case law concerning XL reinsurance 
wordings as English Courts cannot give complete disregard to the realities of the 
contracts they are dealing with.  Yet none of the cases reviewed in this chapter go 
as far as providing a new analysis of the nature of XL reinsurance.  
   Part III/Chapter 9 
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9  The Nature of XL Reinsurance 
 
Despite our findings in the previous chapter of this thesis, the current legal view 
remains that all reinsurances are a further independent insurance contract of the 
underlying risk and reinsurers are legally deemed to provide cover for the 
underlying risk, as opposed to reinsuring the liabilities of the reinsured.  In this 
chapter we make the case for an alternative view of XL reinsurance. 
 
9.1  Challenges to the Traditional View 
9.1.1  Facultative Reinsurance as Liability Insurance 
English Courts consider that reinsurance cannot be equated with liability 
insurance
476.  This may work in the context of the more traditional forms of 
proportional reinsurance where the reinsurer actually shares the risk with its 
reinsured.  However, this view seems out of step with the ways in which XL 
reinsurance markets operate as described in the previous chapter.   
A number of leading academics have raised doubts about the suitability of this 
legal doctrine.  Some of these criticisms have been set out in the first chapter of 
this thesis, including comments from Professor Robert Merkin, O’Neill and 
Woloniecki, McGillivray and Dr Özlem Gürses.  Those doubts concern not only the 
suitability of the legal view in today’s complex international reinsurance markets 
but also the legal grounds upon which the legal fiction rests.  Thus in her book 
“Reinsuring Clauses”, which is based on her doctoral thesis, Dr Gürses makes a 
compelling argument that facultative reinsurance is in reality a form of liability 
insurance.  
 She points out that: 
1.  This view was more or less endorsed by English courts in a couple of 
cases, namely DR Insurance Co v Seguros America Banamex
477, where the 
court rejected the traditional view of reinsurance as described above and 
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Home Insurance Company of New York v Victoria Montreal Fire Insurance 
Company
478 where the court described reinsurance as liability insurance. 
2.  In reinsurance contracts there is no privity of contract between the 
assured and the reinsurer.  This means that the original insured has no 
cause of action against the reinsurer and, by the same token, the reinsurer 
cannot obtain a declaration of non liability as regards the reinsured’s 
liability to the original policyholder
479.   
3.  The reinsured has no insurable interest in the subject matter of the 
original insurance.  As noted earlier in this thesis, the case law treats the 
reinsured’s liability under the inward reinsurance as its insurable 
interest
480.  In line with the argument also deployed in this thesis, Dr 
Gürses considers that, in truth, what is reinsured under a facultative 
reinsurance is the reinsured’s liability
481.   
4.  Dr Gürses further points out that if reinsurance were a further insurance of 
the original subject matter, then arguably it would be a form of co-
insurance or double insurance.  The fact that this is not the case proves 
that the reinsurance cannot be intended to provide cover for the original 
risk
482.   
5.  The early cases that established reinsurance as a further insurance were 
decided at a time when legislation prohibited reinsurance.  Parties were 
therefore actively seeking to draft reinsurance contracts as “further 
insurances” to ensure they would be legally enforceable
483. 
6.  Dr Gürses notes that under current reinsurance law the reinsured’s cause 
of action against the reinsurer arises only once the reinsured’s liability to 
its policyholder has been ascertained: something we have explored in the 
previous chapter of this thesis.  She argues that therefore the reinsured is 
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480 See section 2.3.2 of this thesis. 
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only concerned with the original loss because it established his liability, 
rather than because he has an insurable interest in the loss.
484 
7.  One of the key factors leading to the conclusion that reinsurance was a 
further insurance of the original loss in Wasa v Lexington was the House of 
Lord’s construction of the clauses in the reinsurance titled “INTEREST” 
and “SITUATED”, which both referred to the original insured's property 
rather than the liability of the reinsured.  Dr Gürses disagrees with this 
approach, arguing that the above clauses were not meant to define the 
subject matter of the reinsurance.  She also points out that the review of 
the reinsurance as a whole shows the parties intended to achieve back to 
back cover.  She emphasizes that when reviewing a reinsurance it is 
important to consider the entire wording and not just clauses in isolation. 
8.  When computing limitation period in reinsurance, time starts running from 
the date when the reinsured’s liability has been established and quantified.  
Dr Gürses believes that if the reinsurance provided cover for the underlying 
loss, time would start running from the same date for both the original 
insured and the reinsured
485. 
9.  Finally, Dr Gürses notes that if a reinsurance really were to be a further 
insurance of the original risk, then a cancellation of the original insurance 
contract would not impact on the reinsurance.  By contrast, because 
reinsurance is a form of liability insurance, such a cancellation 
automatically renders the reinsurance redundant
486. 
 
All of the above arguments are valid in the context of XL reinsurance and the 
author of this thesis gratefully adopts them.  Dr Gürses’ analysis, however, 
focuses on facultative reinsurance and nowadays XL reinsurances tend to be 
treaties rather than facultative contracts
487.  As she points out, in proportional 
facultative reinsurance, there is a presumption of back to back cover, as was the 
case in WASA v Lexington.  This presumption does not usually apply in XL 
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reinsurance
488.  This was made clear in the case of Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v 
Field
489 where Lord Mustill in the House of Lords disagreed with the views taken 
by the Court of Appeal when he stated: 
“[There] is an assumption that where a direct insurer takes out reinsurance, 
and where both policies contain provisions enabling the amount of losses to 
be added together, the parties are likely to have intended their effect to be 
much the same. This assumption may very well be correct where the 
reinsurance is of the proportionate kind, under which the reinsurer is 
sharing the risk assumed by the direct insurer. In such an event it is indeed 
likely that the treatment of multiple losses, and hence the outcome of the 
parallel contracts, was meant to be the same. But where a reinsurer writes 
an excess of loss treaty for a layer of the whole account (or the whole of a 
stipulated account) of the reinsured I see no reason to assume that 
aggregation clauses in one are intended to have the same effect as 
aggregation clauses in the other. The insurances are not in any real sense 
back-to-back. Thus, for example, a direct insurer may issue many policies on 
terms as to deductible and limit of liability which he can fix according to his 
knowledge of the policyholders and of the likely size and incidence of the 
kind of casualties which are insured. (…) 
The strategy of the underwriter who takes a line on a layer of an excess of 
loss treaty is not necessarily the same. He cannot rate the individual 
policyholders and individual risks directly, and must take a much broader 
view. For him, the relationship between the inward and outward policies is 
essential to profitability.” 
The above quote highlights the disconnection between the primary insurance and 
the XL reinsurance that will apply in most situations.  It also explains why in such 
a case the XL reinsurer necessarily focuses on the inward reinsurance rather than 
the primary insurance. 
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Because Dr Gürses wrote about proportional reinsurance, her theory does not 
fully resolve our issue.  We still need to clarify the nature of the loss being 
covered by an XL reinsurance to assess whether XL reinsurance ought to be 
equated with liability insurance. 
 
9.1.2  The Case Law Terminology is Confused 
We have established in the previous chapter that the subject matter of an XL 
reinsurance is not a direct share of the underlying loss.  This is illustrated by Dr 
Kabele’s flawed suggestion.  Nevertheless, the case law states that what is 
covered by an XL reinsurance is, somehow, the subject matter of the underlying 
insurance all the way down the chain of reinsurances.  How can these two 
propositions be reconciled? 
The first instance decision of Teal v Berkley
490 includes some comments on XL 
reinsurance as being the insurance “of the same risk as the original insurance, in 
which the insurer had an insurable interest because of his exposure under the 
original insurance”
491.  Yet in the same judgment Andrew Smith J also confirms 
the principle that reinsurance losses arise when the reinsured’s liability to the 
assured have been established and quantified so that in XL reinsurance the 
reaching of the excess point depends on the date when the reinsured’s liability 
has been ascertained
492.  It is arguable that those two statements are not 
inconsistent.  The first concerns the nature and purpose of the reinsurance 
contract, the second is simply about the practicalities of finding the exact point in 
time when the loss attaches to the reinsurance.  One is conceptual and purposive, 
the other sets out practical guidance to deal with a specific issue.  It is perfectly 
possible to contend that whilst a reinsured only needs to establish its liability to 
its own policyholder (and the ascertainment of that liability starts time running 
and governs allocation of losses), the loss still links back to the original insured 
peril.  Whether on abides by this view depends on what is the actual “loss” under 
consideration: is it the reinsured’s liability or the loss of the primary insured?  
Interestingly the case law brings no clarity on this issue: the terminology used by 
the judiciary to date has been inconsistent.  This lack of exactitude makes it 
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difficult to understand exactly what the English judiciary has had in mind all these 
years when seeking to define reinsurance. 
The most recent case on the point is the House of Lords’ decision in WASA v 
Lexington, where their Lordships refers to the “subject matter” of the original 
reinsurance being the same as the reinsurance
493.  This is the language also found 
in Charter Re.  In the early case of British Dominions General Insurance Co 
Ltd v Duder
494 the court simply referred to “the thing originally insured” which 
seems consistent with the idea of a “subject matter”.  In fact, in WASA v Lexington 
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers used similar language when stating that “under 
English Law a contract of reinsurance in relation to property is a contract under 
which the reinsurers insure the property that is the subject of the primary 
insurance”.  Therefore in those cases the item that is being insured and reinsured 
in parallel under the independent contract of reinsurance seems to be the 
property or asset or even liability that is being insured under the original contract 
of insurance. 
Yet Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal decision on the same case referred to the 
“fiction that reinsurance covered the primary risk”
495.  In Charter Re v Fagan, Lord 
Hoffman also talked of the “subject matter” of the primary insurance being the 
“…the risk to the ship or goods or whatever might be insured.”
496  “Risk” is also 
the term used in the first instance decision of Teal v Berkley and in the very first 
case on the point, Delver
497.  Risk in its natural sense means an exposure to 
dangers or the potential for suffering a loss
498.  This is clearly the meaning 
intended in the above quote from Charter Re v Fagan.  The “risk to the shop or 
                                           
493 Wasa v Lexington (n 70).  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers described a contract of 
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goods” here means the potential for loss.  However, in insurance and reinsurance 
the term “risk” is also sometimes used to refer to the subject matter of the 
contract, usually when it is a tangible asset such as a property.  For instance a 
refinery being insured and then reinsured may be described as “the risk”.  This 
may be what Sedley LJ had in mind in WASA v Lexington when referring to the 
“primary risk” being also covered by the reinsurance.  In this second scenario, the 
use of the term “risk” is not necessarily inconsistent with the “subject matter” 
phraseology noted above.  Regardless, these views are only conjectures on what 
the courts meant and the cases offer little clarity. 
To confuse matters further, the Court of Appeal in Toomey v Eagle Star
499 defined 
reinsurance as the “insurance of an insurable interest in the subject matter of an 
original insurance
500”.  Likewise, section 9 of the Marine insurance Act refers to 
the “risk” of the insurer but then goes on to specify that it is the insurer’s 
insurable interest in the risk that may be reinsured.  Here we have shifted from 
the item that is the subject of the original insurance to move onto the interest of 
the insurer.  In a way this seems closer to liability insurance which is ironic, given 
that in Toomey v Eagle Star
501 the Court of Appeal empathetically rejected the 
contention that reinsurance could be equated with liability insurance. 
Finally, in another early case, Forsikringsaktieselskabet National (of Copenhagen) 
v Attorney-General
502, the court referred to the original “loss” being reinsured.  
Likewise, Lord Mustill, in Charter Re v Fagan, said the policy covered “the 
occurrence of a casualty suffered by the subject-matter insured through the 
operation of an insured peril”.  Did his Lordship mean “casualty” in the sense of 
“loss”?  The terms casualty implies some sort of damage or injury having actually 
happened which seems closer to the concept of loss than that of risk where the 
casualty is only a mere possibility.  Once more, the judgments themselves provide 
no clarification. 
We now need to consider the various options highlighted above in turn.  Taking 
first the concept of the same “subject matter” being reinsured or the “risk” used 
in the wider sense
503, it is difficult to imagine how this could be covered by two 
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policies without it being co-insurance.  We have already explained that a claim 
made on the reinsurance contract necessarily overlaps with the insurance claim 
so that the gross claim amount increases with each reinsurance claim.  This is 
because reinsurance, unlike co-insurance, operates transfers up a chain of 
contracts where the loss is spread “vertically”.  As noted by Dr Gürses, the 
primary insured has no direct cause of action against any of the reinsurers.  There 
is also the limitation point: time would start running as soon as the event causes 
the loss if the reinsurance were truly an insurance of the property or subject 
matter insured at the primary level.  Our review of Dr Kabele’s work in the 
previous chapter also shows that in truth the reinsurers are not providing direct 
cover for the property of the original insured.   
As regards the insurable interest being the item that is reinsured;  in the first 
chapter of this thesis, we have pointed out that the reinsured cannot be said to 
have an interest in the property insured at the primary level given that he has no 
proprietary or other rights in that property.  His interest can only arise from his 
liability under the inward reinsurances.  This is also the view of Dr Gürses and it 
has been recognised in case law
504.  If the insurable interest of the reinsurer arises 
from his own liabilities to his own policyholders, the parameters will change from 
one reinsurer to the next.  The insurable interest therefore cannot be the item 
covered by both the primary insurance and the reinsurance simultaneously 
because each (re)insurer will have a different interest. 
This leaves us with the notion of “loss” which is discussed below. 
 
9.2  The Preferred View 
9.2.1  The Parameters: Loss and Insured Event 
In Charter Re v Fagan, it was said that a typical XL reinsurance required the 
satisfaction of only two conditions before an indemnity fell due: (i) the occurrence 
of an insured event within the period of the policy and (ii) a loss of sufficient 
magnitude for the UNL to breach through the relevant layer.   
                                           
504 For instance in Fagan v Charter Re (n 76), it was said that the difference between a 
contract of insurance and its reinsurance “…lies in the nature of the insurable interest, 
which in the case of the primary insurer, arises from its liability under the original 
policy.” per Lord Hoffman, 419.  See also Skandia International v NRG Victory (n 76).   Part III/Chapter 9 
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Starting with the latter criteria: what is that “loss” which is covered under the 
reinsurance?  We have already seen that it is not a share of the original loss 
suffered by the underlying policyholder.  If it were, reinsurance would be co-
insurance and XL wordings would have to be completely re-drafted as per Dr 
Kabele’s suggestions.  North Atlantic v Bishopsgate and Teal v Berkley provide 
some guidance: both cases confirm the basic principle that the loss in question 
attaches to the reinsurance from the date when the reinsured’s liability has been 
ascertained by way of an agreement, arbitration award or judgment.  This is 
consistent with the point made earlier in this thesis that the “loss” materialises in 
the form of claims being made to the reinsured by its policyholders.  The loss is 
therefore the reinsured’s liability under those claims: the reinsured’s cause of 
action indeed arises only when he has suffered damages which is the loss caused 
by his liability to his policyholders.  Hill v Mercantile, Equitas and CX Re further 
confirm that there is no need to look beyond that liability.  In fact, CX Re may 
even go further in stating that the insured peril is in fact the risk of a claim being 
suffered by the reinsured although in truth the judge did not opine on this 
particular point.   
Now we move on to the first point, the requirement under the ruling of Charter 
Re, that there be the occurrence of an “insured event” within the period of the 
policy.  This event, being for instance the earthquake, is also covered by the 
original policy of insurance.  It is important to emphasize here that the event is 
not the loss suffered by the primary insured.  We have seen in the first chapter of 
this thesis that a contract of insurance has been defined as: 
“an agreement to confer upon the insured a contractual right which, prima facie, 
comes into existence immediately when loss is suffered by the happening of an 
event insured against, to be put by the insurer into the same position in which the 
insured would have been had the event not occurred, but in no better position.”
505 
Under this definition, the happening of the event presents a risk of loss to the 
insured and it is that risk of loss that is being transferred to the insurer in 
exchange of the payment of the premium.  The insurer’s duty is then to 
indemnify the insured for any loss suffered as a proximate cause of the 
happening of the event.  The aim of the indemnity is to put the insurer in the 
same position he would have been had the event not occurred.  This payment 
triggers the chain of indemnities that will ultimately reach the reinsurer.  Lord 
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Hoffman in Charter Re was therefore correct to identify the event as one of the 
conditions for an indemnity to fall due under the reinsurance.   
Whilst it triggers the chain of indemnities, however, the happening of the event is 
not what is actually being insured under both the primary insurance and the 
reinsurances.  As explained above, the event causes loss and it is that loss which 
is covered under the insurance policy.  If for some reason no loss is caused by the 
happening of the event, the insured is not entitled to recover anything from his 
insurer.  The extent of the indemnity, which is the measure of the loss, is also 
very personal to the insurer because it is the amount of money required to put 
that insurer into the position he would have been had there been no adverse 
event.  It is submitted that it is not the insured’s “loss” that is being reinsured.  
This is consistent with the point we have just made that the term “loss” in the XL 
reinsurance wordings is the loss of the reinsured under the inward reinsurance 
and not the primary loss.  To answer a question posed earlier in this chapter
506, 
the loss that is being reinsured under an XL reinsurance is not the loss of the 
underlying insured “looking for a home”.  It is the loss of the reinsured that is 
made of the reinsured’s liabilities to its own policyholders.  The loss, therefore, 
does undergo a transformation as it makes its way up the chain of XL 
reinsurances. 
This view is consistent with the findings of Hamblen J in Tokio Marine which is the 
most recent case of relevance for this thesis.  When analysing the wording of the 
XL Retrocession, Hamblen J found that it covered Tokio Marine’s exposure to 
losses suffered by the primary policyholder Tesco.  The judge quite rightly did 
not say that Tesco’s loss was the loss of Tokio Marine but rather that Tokio 
Marine was exposed to the loss suffered by Tesco and that this exposure was, as 
noted previously, based on Tokio Marine’s liability to its own policyholder ACE 
under the terms of the TM Reinsurance. 
 
9.2.2  The Proposition 
Before developing our analysis, it is important to ascribe a specific meaning to 
each of the following terms to ensure clarity. 
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1.  The subject matter is the item insured under the primary insurance e.g. 
the property, ship or good
507 in which the primary insured has an insurable 
interest. 
2.  For consistency with case law, as previously noted, the term risk is used in 
the wider sense i.e. as the property or asset insured at the primary level.  
However, when the context indicates it is also used in its more natural 
meaning i.e. as the uncertainty. 
3.  The peril is the potential dangers insured against e.g. the earthquake. 
4.  The event is the happening of the earthquake. 
5.  The term loss has been described above.  This is an obvious term which 
does not require a definition other than to specify that by “loss” in this 
thesis we mean an amount that is unique to the insured and each insurer 
and reinsurer in the chain of XL reinsurances. 
 
Having clarified the terminology, we now need to consider the legal position.  
Where have we got to, in terms of the connection between the original insurance 
and the reinsurer further up the chain of XL reinsurances?  We have established 
that the subject matter or risk or loss covered by the primary insurance is not the 
same as the subject matter, or risk or loss covered by the XL reinsurance.  Neither 
does the reinsured have an insurable interest in the subject matter of the primary 
insurance that could be covered by the XL reinsurance.   
There are, however, a couple of items listed above that are relevant to both the 
primary insurance and the reinsurance, namely, the peril and the event.  It is 
indeed the happening of the peril, in other words the event, that may cause loss 
to the primary insured, the payment of which triggers the chain of indemnity.  We 
have argued that the event is not what is actually being insured but we must 
recognise that it causes the primary loss, which is at the start of everything.  Lord 
Mustill’s analysis in Charter Re v Fagan is therefore nearly correct because it 
requires an insured event as well as a loss.  However the loss referred to in 
Charter Re is that of the primary policyholder whilst we have demonstrated that 
the loss must be that of the reinsured.  
The English Courts’ reluctance to discard the traditional doctrine is 
understandable.  It would seem odd to consider reinsurance as being totally 
                                           
507 In case of liability insurance at the primary level, the subject matter is the insured’s 
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disconnected from the original loss.  After all, for the reinsurance to come into 
play, the event insured against at the primary level of insurance has to happen.  It 
is only then that the claim of indemnities will be triggered.  Nonetheless, the 
chain depends on each (re)insurer suffering a loss within the parameters of its 
own (re)insurance cover.  Even at the primary level, the original insured will only 
be indemnified to the extent of his own loss.  Thus arguably it is not the 
happening of the event that is covered but the risk of the insured suffering loss 
as a result of the happening of the event.  The event may be the subject of the 
insurance, but the extent of the coverage is dictated by the level of loss suffered 
by the (re)insured.  This analysis favours the reinsured’s loss as being the key 
factor of the two identified in Charter Re, suggesting the “insured event” may not 
be as pertinent. 
At first sight the above analysis seems particularly apposite in the context of XL 
reinsurance.  Facultative XL reinsurance contracts, that would cover for instance 
one specific property such as a refinery, do exist but they are few and far 
between.  More usually XL contracts provide cover for an entire portfolio of 
business or for “whole account” covering the entire book of business of the 
reinsured.  In such case a multitude of original insureds, who might suffer loss 
from a large amount of events, are bundled together and ultimately reinsured 
under the reinsurance.  In this context, can it still be said that there is an insured 
event at the primary layer that operates as a unifying factor?   
Maybe surprisingly, the answer is yes.  There is often a recognised event, or 
catastrophe, that will be identified in claims made under XL reinsurances.  Taking 
the LMX Spiral as an example, many of the catastrophes that caused the demise 
of the London XL Market were given a code recognised throughout the market, 
such as “87J” for the 1987 UK windstorm or “90A” for the North European 
Windstorms of January 1990.  The aggregation clauses in XL Reinsurance 
Contracts require a unifying factor for losses to be aggregated be it a “cause”, an 
“event” or “occurrence”.  The reinsured can obtain cover for unrelated risks as 
long as they belong to the portfolio covered under the XL reinsurance (for 
instance “hull” or “cargo”).  However, when it comes to making a claim to his 
reinsurers, he can only aggregate claims that originate from the same event.   
Therefore, considering that it is a loss unique to each reinsurer which is being 
covered by each (re)insurance is not necessarily inconsistent with the idea that 
there is an over-reaching factor that unifies all the reinsurance contracts with the   Part III/Chapter 9 
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primary layer of insurance.  It is submitted that the unifying factor is the peril that 
happens to be covered by the XL reinsurance.  The aggregation clauses in XL 
reinsurances refer to an “event” or an “occurrence” but an event as stated above is 
only the happening of the peril and it is more usual to think of a (re)insurance 
policy as providing protection against a peril.  Thus the “peril” is a more obvious 
parameter to use though “insured event” would not be entirely incorrect. 
The peril or insured event is not necessarily what courts had in mind when they 
referred to the reinsurance being a further insurance of the same “subject matter” 
or “risk”  as the original insurance policy.  They usually meant the property, for 
instance, as per the quote in Charter Re, the “risk to the ship or good or whatever 
might be insured”.  This is unrealistic in the context of XL reinsurance.  XL 
contracts usually cover a multitude of “properties” but the common point those 
“properties” have is their vulnerability to whatever peril the reinsurance covers.  It 
is interesting that the XL reinsurance does not necessarily identify the peril.  It 
may refer only to the nature of the business or portfolio (e.g. “hull” or “cargo” or 
“whole account” as noted above) in which case coverage is not restricted to a 
specific type of event (e.g. earthquakes).  It is the aggregation clause that 
requires a unifying event, usually a catastrophe, for a claim to be made.  The 
nature of the portfolio of business being covered by the XL reinsurance will 
probably dictate the type of perils the reinsurance may respond to.  For instance, 
a “whole account” protection of a reinsured exposed to the American East Coast 
will cover windstorms. 
Hence even in XL reinsurance, where the underlying risk is extremely remote, 
there remains a link between the original insurance and the XL reinsurance in the 
form of the peril that is covered by the reinsurance.  It is important to note here 
that the relevant peril has to be the one covered by the reinsurance, which may 
be different in scope from the range of perils covered under the original 
insurance and intermediary reinsurances.  An overlap is sufficient for the link to 
operate.  For instance, the primary insured may have property cover for its own 
buildings which happens to cover damage caused by earthquake.  The reinsured 
further up the chain may have obtained XL reinsurance for his whole account and, 
under the XL wording, he is entitled to aggregate claims from several original 
insureds caused by the same earthquake, defined as the “event” or “occurrence” 
or “cause” whether the claims relate to property damage or, say, business 
interruption. Part III/Chapter 9 
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9.2.3  The Case for the Unifying Factor 
Is it necessary to focus on the unifying factor?  Arguably, the principle of 
indemnity operates as a link from the original loss as it is that original loss that 
leads to claims being made to the reinsurers.  The reinsurers’ payment of those 
claims causes the reinsurers’ loss which turns into further claims on the 
retrocessionnaires and so on.  No indemnity will fall due at the reinsurance level 
without an indemnity having been paid at the primary level of insurance.  
However, stripping down the concept of insurance and reinsurance to the 
principle of indemnity is not particularly satisfying.  As set out in the first chapter 
of this thesis, insurance and reinsurance contracts are not distinguished simply 
on the basis that they are indemnity contracts.   
At the heart of insurance and, therefore, reinsurance, there is the transfer of a 
risk, an unknown quantity.  Allegedly, this could be the risk of financial loss.  
Thus we could simply say that XL reinsurance is akin to liability insurance in that 
the risk being covered is that of the reinsured being liable to his policyholders.  
This argument is not new and the market, if it had agreed, could easily have 
redrafted reinsurances as liability insurance contracts.  Yet it has not done so.  
Many underwriters still consider that they underwrite a risk other than the 
reinsured’s exposure to its policyholders.  This is why XL reinsurance 
underwriters specialise in different types of risk, such as marine or property.  
They spend time analysing the risks based on other criteria relevant to their areas 
of specialism.  Surely a marine whole account of a reinsured exposed to the 
American East Coast is not the same as the reinsurance of a cyber risk specialist?  
Those underwriters active in the market would more likely agree with the 
statement that they underwrite the risk of the reinsured’s exposure to claims 
resulting from a peril insured under both the reinsurance and the original 
insurance contract.   
To conclude, the preferred view of the author of this thesis is that the XL 
reinsurance contracts provide coverage for the liability of the reinsured 
arising from perils that have caused the original loss and are covered under 
both the original insurance contract and the XL reinsurance.  This hypothesis 
is consistent with the case law on XL reinsurance described above which makes it 
clear that the relevant loss is that of the reinsured and that parties do not need to 
look beyond the inward reinsurance to establish liability or to deal with issues of 
allocation of losses or limitation.  Nevertheless, it is legitimate for reinsurers to   Part III/Chapter 9 
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consider that the peril which caused loss to the original insured remains relevant.  
The loss did not occur in a vacuum, and since insurance and reinsurance is all 
about the transfer of a risk, it remains important to retain the notion that 
coverage at all levels of XL reinsurance still relates to that original insured event: 
the earthquake that started it all. 
 
9.3  Concluding Remarks 
XL reinsurance is more akin to liability insurance.  However, this does not mean 
that an XL reinsurance contract is totally divorced from the loss suffered by the 
original insured.  The original loss is “personal” to the original insured but it 
triggers the chain of indemnities that ultimately reaches the XL reinsurance.  In 
addition, it is the view of the author of this thesis that the insured peril acts as a 
unifying factor between the primary insurance and the ultimate reinsurance.   
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10  Conclusion 
This thesis initially set out to explore the LMX Spiral from a legal perspective and 
consider its impact on the Lloyd’s crisis of the early 1990s.  The research showed 
that spirals are a potential side effect of XL reinsurance markets and therefore the 
thesis provides a legal appraisal of all reinsurance spirals.  The last couple of 
chapters also propose an alternative legal analysis of XL reinsurance contracts.   
 
Part I sets out the legal and factual background to the LMX Spiral.  The LMX 
Spiral was built upon XL reinsurance contracts, a relatively new form of 
reinsurance that became more prominent from the 1950s onwards.  The 
traditional legal view of reinsurance under English law, which still prevails today, 
is that reinsurance contracts are further independent contracts of insurance 
covering the same subject matter as the primary insurance.  This means that all 
the specific legal rules applicable to insurance contracts under English law also 
apply to reinsurance contracts.  These are the principle of indemnity, the 
importance of warranties, the duty of good faith and the need for an insurable 
interest.  The distinguishing factor between insurance and reinsurance is that in 
the latter the insured is an insurer or a reinsurer.   
The London XL Market has been at the heart of the development of XL 
reinsurance and a number of reinsurance spirals have developed within that 
market.  The LMX Spiral, which grew in the 1980s, is by far the most significant: 
its collapse in the early 1990s caused major disruption to the London XL Market 
and it precipitated the Lloyd’s crisis.   
Some of the underwriters and other professionals embroiled in the LMX Spiral 
debacle argued that a number of catastrophes in the late 1980s/early 1990s 
caused its collapse.  The catastrophes were the proximate cause of the very 
significant losses suffered by the relevant reinsurers.  However this thesis 
demonstrates that the LMX Spiral was unsustainable because of its inherent flaws.  
All that was required was for a few losses, not necessarily very significant ones, to 
start making their way through the market for the LMX Spiral to start unwinding.  
This is because of the Spiral Effects, which apply to all reinsurance spirals once 
they reach a certain point.  The Spiral Effects distort the relevant XL reinsurance 
markets, creating an additional Spiral Risk that would not exist but for the 
reinsurance spiral.   Conclusion  
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Part II provides the detailed legal appraisal of reinsurance spirals.  With one 
exception, all of the cases concerning reinsurance spirals relates to the LMX 
Spiral.  A review of the case law shows that there is a scarcity of legal principles 
concerning the LMX Spiral itself.  English Judges were very critical of its 
development but because of the ways the cases were pleaded, the judgments 
focus on the duties of the underwriters and agents who engaged in, or advised 
on, Spiral Business.  The case law therefore created the concept of a Reasonable 
LMX Underwriter who would follow certain prudential steps.  These steps however 
are ineffective because the Spiral Effects make it near impossible for an 
underwriter, inter alia, to assess the risk he is undertaking and to price it 
accordingly. 
There is therefore a gap in English reinsurance law: reinsurance spirals are a 
potential side effect of XL reinsurance markets but there are no legal rules to deal 
with the very specific challenges they present.  The thesis applies a number of 
legal tools to seek to fill the gap including illegality, negligence and good faith, 
but only to conclude that these tools are equally ineffective because they do not 
reduce the Spiral Risk.   
The proposed solution is to shift the focus from the people who create 
reinsurance spirals to the Spiral Contracts at the heart of those spirals.  A scrutiny 
of the impact of the Spiral Effects on the Spiral Contracts shows that once they 
take hold, the Spiral Effects turn Spiral Contracts into something other than 
contracts of XL reinsurance.  This is based on the premise that XL reinsurance can 
be legally defined by reference to the commercial features that differentiate XL 
from other types of reinsurance contracts, namely the splitting of a risk into 
tranches that allows for layering and which informs the pricing.  Once they have 
fully developed the Spiral Effects render those features redundant, at which point 
the duty to indemnify remains the sole effective feature of the contract.  The 
thesis therefore submits that once the Spiral Effects take hold, the Spiral 
Contracts are contracts of indemnity rather than contracts of XL reinsurance.  
This applies from the outset to all contracts entered into from that point in time. 
This is a significant finding: it means that the specific rules applicable to 
contracts of insurance and reinsurance do not apply to the relevant Spiral 
Contracts.  Furthermore, even though the contracts most probably remain 
enforceable, reinsurers writing Spiral Contracts are committing a statutory     Conclusion 
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breach, putting themselves at risk of being subject to enforcement action by the 
regulator.  For these reasons, this finding may curb the development of 
reinsurance spirals if it becomes known within XL reinsurance markets. 
 
Part III expands the field of analysis to consider the true nature of XL 
reinsurance.  Whether or not a spiral develops, XL reinsurance contracts make 
the risk more remote than other types of reinsurance, which puts into the 
question the traditional view of reinsurance as further insurance of the underlying 
risk.  A close review of XL reinsurance wordings shows that what is being covered 
is, in fact, the liability of the reinsured to its policyholders.  The duty of the 
reinsurer to indemnify under an XL reinsurance contract is indeed triggered when 
the amount of payments the reinsured must make to its own policyholders under 
the relevant inwards contracts reaches the excess point of the XL reinsurance.  
The case law concerning XL reinsurance wordings confirms this.   
This does not mean, however that XL reinsurance is simply a form of liability 
insurance.  The difficulty is in finding what links the primary insurance to the 
reinsurance because of inconsistencies in the terminology used by English courts 
when seeking to identify what aspect of the primary insurance is being reinsured.  
Is it the subject matter, the event, the peril, the insurable interest or the loss?   
This thesis submits that the element of the primary insurance that is being 
reinsured is the peril.  The peril causes the loss to the original insured that 
triggers the chain of indemnities which will ultimately reach the XL reinsurance in 
the forms of the reinsured’s liability to its own policyholders.  More significantly, 
the nature of the peril remains relevant to the underwriting exercise at the 
reinsurance level.  Given that insurance and reinsurance is all about risk: it seems 
apposite to consider that the coverage offered at all levels of XL reinsurance still 
relates to the original insured event which is the source of the uncertainty insured 
against.  This thesis therefore submits that XL reinsurance is the insurance of the 
reinsured’s liability arising from perils that have caused the original loss and that 
are covered under both the original contract of insurance and the XL reinsurance. 
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To conclude, this thesis proposes two new ideas relevant to the field of 
reinsurance law.  The first, which concerns the legal view of the contracts at the 
heart of reinsurance spirals, may curb the development of reinsurance spirals in 
the future by acting as a deterrent.  The second, which is about the true nature of 
XL reinsurance contracts, may impact on the ease with which reinsureds can 
recover under XL reinsurance contracts, since it is easier for a reinsured to prove 
its own liability than to prove the liability of the insured sitting much further 
down the chain of reinsurance contracts.  This thesis also highlights the risk of 
spirals developing in XL reinsurance markets in the future and it illustrates the 
need to apprehend XL reinsurance contracts differently from other more 
traditional forms of reinsurance contracts.   
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 Appendix A – LMX Questionnaire 
  244 
     Appendix A – LMX Questionnaire 
  245     
 Appendix A – LMX Questionnaire 
  246 
     Appendix A – LMX Questionnaire 
  247     
 Appendix A – LMX Questionnaire 
  248 
     Appendix A – LMX Questionnaire 
  249     
 Appendix A – LMX Questionnaire 
  250 
     Appendix A – LMX Questionnaire 
  251     
 Appendix A – LMX Questionnaire 
  252 
     Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
  253     
Appendix B  
THE LLOYD’S LITIGATION 
The list below is based on the list of cases included at Appendix 1 of Society of 
Lloyd’s v Jaffray [2000] EWHC 51 (Comm) (first instance decision) which 
comprised 102 cases.  This was said to be the entirety of the Lloyd’s Litigation at 
the time.  In addition, this appendix includes judgments delivered after the 
Jaffray case that are of relevance because they relate to the Lloyd’s Litigation, the 
LMX Spiral, the PA Spiral or R&R. 
All cases in bold relate to the LMX Spiral.  For completeness’ sake, this includes: 
  the key cases concerning the LMX Spiral, defined as the Core LMX Cases in 
Chapter 5 of the thesis; 
  the other cases referred to in Chapter 5 of the thesis;  
  cases that stem from the above litigation even though the issues in dispute 
concerned other, procedural issues (e.g. quantum); and 
  all cases that contain references to the LMX Spiral even if the LMX Spiral 
only provided the factual background and is not discussed in any detail. 
 
  Date  Title of Action  Description 
1.    29.11.90  Lark v Outhwaite [1991] 
LRLR 1 
Hirst  J.  Trial  of  preliminary  issues. 
Wellington  Agreement  (re.  asbestos 
liabilities).  
2.    11.03.90   Hiscox v Outhwaite [1991] 
LRLR 93 
HL.  “Follow  the  Settlement”  issue 
concerning the Wellington Agreement.  
3.    10.91   Stockwell v Outhwaite  The first Names' action to go to trial. It 
settled  in  January  1992  without 
judgment being delivered. 
4.    03.03.92   Boobyer v David Holman 
& Co Ltd and the Society 
of Lloyd's [1992] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 436 
Mervyn  Davies  J.  Transfer  to  the 
Commercial Court. Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
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  Date  Title of Action  Description 
5.    1.04.92   Ashmore and Others v 
Corporation of Lloyd's 
[1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1 
HL.  Appeal  from  decision  of  CA 
(20.9.91) allowed. Order of Gatehouse J 
that preliminary points of law should be 
ordered, upheld. 
6.    16.04.92   Boobyer v David Holman 
& Co Limited and The 
Society of Lloyd's (No. 2) 
[1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 96 
Saville J. Rejected Names' application 
to  restrain  members'  agents  from 
giving  notices  required  to  use  their 
personal  reserves  and  securities  at 
Lloyd's to meet unpaid cash calls. 
7.    14.05.92   Napier & Ettrick and Others 
v R.F. Kershaw Ltd and 
Others  
Saville  J.  The  Premium  Trust  Deed  did 
not  embrace  sums  recovered  in 
litigation  against  agents  (Outhwaite)  in 
respect of negligent underwriting. 
8.    22.05.92   R v Lloyd's of London ex 
parte Briggs and Others  
Beldam LJ and Laws J.  Names' claims 
for  an  interlocutory  injunction  to 
restrain Managing Agents rejected. 
9.    12.06.92   Napier & Ettrick and Others 
v R.F. Kershaw Ltd and 
Others [1993] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 10. 
Saville  J.  Judgment  concerning  in 
subrogated  claims  to  Outhwaite 
settlement  moneys  advanced  by  Stop 
Loss  Underwriters  (see  9.7.92  and 
10.12.92 below). 
10.    02.07.92   Ashmore and Others v 
Corporation of Lloyd's (No. 
2) [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 620 
Gatehouse  J.  Judgment  on  preliminary 
points of law concerning alleged duties 
owed  by  Lloyd’s  (dispute  re.  Oakeley 
Vaughan syndicates). 
11.    9.7.92   Napier & Ettrick and Others 
v R.F. Kershaw Ltd and 
Others [1993] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 10 
CA. Dillon LJ, Staughton LJ and Nolan LJ. 
Partially successful appeal by stop loss 
insurers against the decision of Saville J 
on 12.06.92 (see 10.12.92 below).     Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
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  Date  Title of Action  Description 
12.    17.07.92   R v Lloyd's of London ex 
parte Briggs and Others 
[1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 176 
Leggatt  LJ  and  Popplewell  J. 
Successful  application  by  Lloyd's  to 
set  aside  leave  to  move  for  judicial 
review granted by Potts J on 19.05.92 
in relation to cash calls on Names (see 
22.05.92 above). 
13.    10.12.92   Napier & Ettrick and 
Another v Hunter and 
Others [1993] AC 713 
[1993] LRLR 305 
HL.  Names  not  entitled  to  be 
indemnified  out  of  the  settlement 
moneys until the stop loss insurers had 
been  indemnified  in  full  pursuant  to 
their right of subrogation. 
14.    16.12.92   R v Corporation of Lloyd's 
ex parte Lorimer 
Pill  J.  Application  to  quash  decision  of 
Lloyd's  Members'  Hardship  Committee 
refused. 
15.    15.03.93   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Morris and Others  
Tuckey  J.  Recoveries  under  Personal 
Stop  Loss  Policies  taken  out  by  Names 
at Lloyd's are not subject to their Lloyd's 
Premium  Trust  Deed  (See  28.05.93 
below). 
16.    13.05.93   Feltrim and Gooda Walker 
actions 
Saville  J.  Judgment  on  "pay  now,  sue 
later" clauses. (See 30.07.93 below). 
17.    28.05.93   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Morris and Others [1993] 
LRLR 217  
CA.  Bingham  MR,  Steyn  LJ  and  Sir 
Christopher  Slade.  Appeal  re.  personal 
stop loss recoveries and Premiums Trust 
Deed. 
18.    05.07.93   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce and Others. 
[1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 579 
Saville J. Held that the only substantive 
defence  to  a  claim  by  Lloyd's  as 
beneficiary  under  letters  of  credit  was 
that there was fraud of a relevant kind. 
19.    20.07.93   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce and Others 
Saville J. Summary judgment for Lloyd's. 
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20.    30.07.93   Feltrim and Gooda Walker 
actions [1994] LRLR 168 
[1996] LRLR 135 
CA. Bingham MR, Steyn LJ and Hoffman 
LJ. Appeal of Saville J decision 13.05.93 
dismissed. 
21.    12.10.93   The Merrrett, Gooda 
Walker and Feltrim Cases 
[1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep 193 
Saville  J.  Judgment  on  certain 
questions of law as to the existence, 
nature  and  scope  of  alleged  legal 
obligations  of  Managing  and 
Members' Agents. 
22.    20.10.93   Sheldon and Others v 
R.H.M. Outhwaite 
(Underwriting Agencies) 
Ltd and Others. [1995] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 197 
Saville J. In a further Outhwaite Names' 
action,  defendants'  strike  out 
application  refused  re.  preliminary 
ruling on limitation issue. 
23.    13.12.93   The Merrett, Gooda 
Walker and Feltrim Cases 
[1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep 468 
CA.  Bingham  MR,  Hoffman  LJ  and 
Henry  LJ.  Unsuccessful  appeal  of 
Managing  and  Members'  Agents 
against Saville J decision of 12.10.93. 
24.    16.12.93   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Clementson The Society 
of Lloyd's v Mason  
Saville  J.  Preliminary  issues 
concerning  compatibility  of  Lloyd’s 
Central  Fund  with  European 
competition rules. 
25.    12.04.94   Sword-Daniels v Pitel and 
Others Brown v KMR 
Services Ltd [1994] LRLR 
10 
Gatehouse  J.  Members'  Agents  held 
negligent  in  advising  two  individual 
Names as to portfolio selection. 
26.    26.05.94   Arbuthnott v Feltrim 
Underwriting Agencies Ltd 
and Others 
Cresswell J. Plaintiff Names' application 
successful  for  the  discovery  and 
production  by  the  Members'  Agents  of 
seven  transcripts  of  evidence  given  by 
them  to  the  Feltrim  Loss  Review 
Committee. 
27.    26.05.94   Brown v KMR Services Ltd 
Sword-Daniels v Pitel and 
Others 
Gatehouse  J.  Response  to 
representations made since judgment 
of 13.04.94.      Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
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28.    21.06.94   Arbuthnott v Fagan and 
Others. [1996] LRLR 143 
CA. Brown LJ, Staughton LJ and Rose LJ. 
Appeal  from  Cresswell  J  (26.05.94) 
dismissed. 
29.    27.06.94   Sword-Daniels v Pitel and 
Others 
Costs  judgment  (and  assessment  of 
damages). 
30.    30.06.94   Sheldon and Others v RHM 
Outhwaite (Underwriting 
Agencies) Ltd and Others 
[1995] LRLR 20 
CA.  Bingham  MR  and  Kennedy  LJ, 
Staughton  LJ  dissenting.  Successful 
appeal by defendants against judgment 
of  Saville  J  of  20.10.93  on  preliminary 
ruling on the limitation issue.  
31.    25.07.94   The Merrett, Feltrim and 
Gooda Walker Cases 
[1995] 2 AC 145 
HL. Affirmed the decision of the Court 
of Appeal (13.12.93) on duties of care 
owed  both  to  Direct  and  Indirect 
Names. 
32.    23.09.94  Yasuda Fire & marine 
Insurance Co of Europe 
Ltd v Orion Marine 
Insurance Underwriting 
Agency Ltd and Orion 
Insurance Co Plc [1995] 4 
Re LR 217 
Colman  J.  Right  to  inspect 
documents/agency  agreement.  Orion 
was an underwriting  pool that  wrote 
LMX Business.   
33.    04.10.94   Deeny v Gooda Walker 
Limited [1996] LRLR 183 
Phillips  J.  Landmark  judgment 
concerning  the  LMX  Spiral  in  the 
Gooda Walker action.   
34.    14.10.94   Hallam-Eames and Others v 
Merrett Syndicates Ltd and 
Others 
Gatehouse  J.  Certain  limitation  issues 
decided under RSC Order 14A. 
35.    10.11.94   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Clementson; The Society 
of Lloyd's v Mason [1995] 
LRLR 307 
CA.  Bingham  MR,  Steyn  LJ  and 
Hoffman  LJ.  Appeal  from  Saville  J 
(16.12.93) as to alleged implied terms 
dismissed.  Appeal  as  to  the 
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36.    25.11.94   R v Chairman of the 
Regulatory Board of Lloyd's 
ex parte Macmillan and 
Another 
Macpherson  J.  Application  for  judicial 
review  of  a  decision  of  the  Regulatory 
Board  refusing  to  suspend  the  loss 
review of syndicate 80, dismissed. 
37.    07.12.94   Deeny and Others v 
Littlejohn & Co (a Firm) 
and Others 
Arden  J.  Transfer  to  the  Commercial 
Court. 
38.    08.12.94   Bates and Others v Robert 
Barrow Ltd and Others 
[1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 680 
Gatehouse  J.  Section  132  Financial 
Services Act 1986. 
39.    11.01.95   Deeny and Others v 
Gooda Walker [1995] STC 
439 
Potter J. Taxation issues. 
40.    13.01.95   Hallam-Eames and Others v 
Merrett and Others  
CA. Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Hoffman LJ 
and Saville LJ. Appeal against Gatehouse 
J  decision  of  14.10.  94  (section  14A 
Limitation Act 1986) allowed.  
41.    16.01.95   Cox and Others v Bankside 
Members' Agency Ltd and 
Others [1995] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 437. 
Phillips  J.  Judgment  concerning  'First 
past the post' issues and construction of 
E&O policies. 
42.    10.02.95   Aikens and Others v 
Stewart Wrightson 
Members Agency Ltd and 
Others [1995] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 618 
Potter J. Judgment on preliminary issues 
concerning  duty  of  care  of  Managing 
and  Members’  Agents  and  limitation 
issues.  
43.    10.03.95   Arbuthnott and Others v 
Feltrim Underwriting 
Agencies Ltd and Others. 
[1995] CLC 437 
Phillips  J.  Feltrim  (LMX)  action.  1594 
Names  brought  similar  claims  to 
those in Gooda Walker (04.10.94) and 
succeeded. 
44.    21.03.95   Barrow v Bankside   Phillips  J.  Application  to  strike  out 
portfolio  selection  claim  against 
members' agent refused.      Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
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45.    06.04.95   Deeny and Others v 
Gooda Walker Limited 
and Others [1995] LRLR 
117, [1996] LRLR 176 
Phillips  J.  Damages  awarded  in 
respect of claims that had been paid. 
That  part  of  claim  relating  to 
anticipated claims reserved for future 
determination. 
46.    11.04.95   Caudle and Others v Sharp 
[1995] LRLR 389 
CA.  Nourse  LJ,  Evans  LJ  and  Rose  LJ. 
Appeal  from  Clarke  J  allowed:  E&O 
losses under 32 run off contracts could 
not be aggregated.  
47.    04.05.95   Sheldon and Others v RHM 
Outhwaite (Underwriting 
Agencies) Ltd and Others 
[1996] 1 AC 102 
HL.  Claimant's  appeal  from  CA 
(30.06.94) on limitation issue allowed.  
48.    05.05.95   Hallam-Eames and Others v 
Merrett Syndicates Ltd and 
Others. 
Cresswell  J.    Application  for  orders  in 
relation  to  privileged/confidential 
material. 
49.    12.05.95   Cox and Others v Bankside 
Members Agency Limited 
and Others [1995] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 437 
CA. Bingham  MR, Gibson LJ and Saville 
LJ.  Dismissed  the  appeal  on  'first  past 
the post' ruling (16.01.95). 
50.    25.05.95   Deeny v Gooda Walker 
Ltd (No.3) [1996] LRLR 
168 
Phillips  J.  Basis  on  which  interest 
ought to be awarded. 
51.    28.06.95   Arbuthnott and Others v 
Feltrim Underwriting 
Agencies Ltd and Others 
(1993 Folio 1191). 
Gatehouse  J.  Judgment  for  the 
claimants  against  Managing  Agents 
for  damages  to  be  assessed  with 
interest. 
52.    12.07.95   Brown v KMR Services 
Limited [1995] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 513 
CA.  Stuart  Smith  LJ  (dissenting  in 
part),  Hobhouse  LJ  and  Gibson  LJ. 
Appeal  from  Gatehouse  J  (12.04.94) 
on  portfolio  selection  partially 
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53.    31.07.95   PCW Syndicates v PCW 
Reinsurers [1995] LRLR 
373 
CA. Staughton LJ, Rose LJ and Saville LJ. 
Appeal from Waller J sitting as a judge-
arbitrator on Sections 18 and 19 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 dismissed. 
54.    09.08.95   Arbuthnott and Others v 
Feltrim Underwriting 
Agencies Ltd and Others 
Phillips  J.    Judgment  on  issues 
concerning measure of damages.  
55.    21.08.95   Cox v Deeny [1996] LRLR 
288 
H.H.J.  Diamond  Q.C.  E&O  policy 
proceeds. Determination of issues. 
56.    05.10.95   Deeny v Gooda Walker 
Ltd 
[1995] LRLR 361, [1996] 
LRLR 109 
CA.  Simon  Brown  LJ,  Gibson  LJJ  and 
Saville  LJ  (dissenting).  Taxation 
issues. Dismissed appeal from Potter 
J (11.01.95). 
57.    20.10.95   Rew and Others v Cox and 
Others. 
Cresswell  J.  Professional  indemnity 
insurances.  Application  for  stay 
pursuant  to  section  4  Arbitration  Act 
1950 refused. 
58.    24.10.95   Marchant & Eliott 
Underwriting Limited v Dr 
Higgins [1996] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 313 
Rix J. Summary judgment for Managing 
Agent re. cash calls based on "pay now 
sue  later"  provision  in  agents' 
agreement. 
59.    31.10.95   Henderson and Others v 
Merrett Syndicates Ltd and 
Others [1997] LRLR 265 
Cresswell J. Liability judgment in action 
concerning  run-off  contracts  and RITCs 
covering Long-tail liabilities. 
60.    07.11.95   Barrow v Bankside 
Members Agency Ltd and 
Another [1996] 5 Re LR 1 
CA. Bingham MR, Peter Gibson LJ and 
Saville  LJ.  Appeal  from  decision  of 
Phillips J (21.03.95) dismissed.  
61.    04.12.95   Deeny v Walker and 
Others 
Deeny v Littlejohn & Co 
and Others [1996] LRLR 
276 
Judgment  of  Gatehouse  J.  Whether 
pleadings  against  brokers  and 
auditors should be struck out.     Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
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62.    20.12.95   Arbuthnott & Others v 
Feltrim Underwriting 
Agencies Ltd & Others. 
Gatehouse J. Feltrim claim of negligence 
against members' agent. 
63.    21.12.95   Marchant & Eliott 
Underwriting Limited v Dr 
Higgins [1996] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 31 
CA.  Leggatt  LJ,  Rose  LJ  and  Roch  LJ. 
Appeal by Dr Higgins against judgment 
of 24.10.95 dismissed. 
64.    01.01.96   Arbuthnott & Others v 
Feltrim Underwriting 
Agencies Ltd & Others 
[1996] CLC 714 
Judgment  of  Longmore  J.  Further 
issues  as  to  damages,  following 
judgments  of  Phillips  J  10.03.95  and 
09.08.95. 
65.    21.02.96   Henderson and Others v 
Merrett Syndicates Ltd and 
Others [1997] LRLR 247  
Cresswell  J.  Following  on  from  main 
judgment  of  31.10.95.  Issues  of 
Limitation,  misrepresentation  /  non-
disclosure,  general  principles  as  to 
damages  and  contribution  considered. 
Interim payment ordered. 
66.    07.03.96   Deeny and Others v 
Gooda Walker Ltd and 
Others [1996] LRLR 109 
HL.  Taxation issues. Appeal from CA 
(05.10.95) dismissed. 
67.    19.03.96   Berriman and Others v 
Rose Thomson Young 
(Underwriting) Limited 
[1996] LRLR 426 
Morison  J.  Rose  Thomson  Young 
Names action (LMX).  Judgment as to 
liability in favour of Names.  
68.    16.04.96   Wynniatt-Hussey and 
Others v R.J. Bromley 
(Underwriting Agencies) 
PLC and Others. 
Longley  J.    Bromley  Names  action 
(LMX).  Judgment  as  to  liability  in 
favour of Names.  
69.    19.04.96   Judd and Others v Merrett 
and Others [1997] LRLR 21 
CA. Leggatt LJ, Waite LJ and Sir 
Glidewell. Appeal from Gatehouse J. 
Leave to defend conditional on interim 
payments. Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
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70.    07.05.96   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Clementson [1997] LRLR 
175 
Cresswell J. European Community Law 
issues.  Central  Funds  arrangements 
held valid (not void by reason of art. 
85 of the Treaty of Rome). 
71.    16.05.96   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Woodward and Another 
Sir  Richard  Scott  VC.  Litigation 
recoveries and the Premium Trust Deed. 
72.    22.05.96   Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd 
v Fagan [1997] AC 313 
HL. Meaning of the words "actually paid" 
in the context of the UNL Clause. 
73.    23.05.96   Wilde Sapte and Deeny v 
The Society of Lloyd's 
Sir Richard Scott VC.  Application under 
O.85 rule 2 to authorise the distribution 
of  litigation  recoveries  to  Names 
rejected. 
74.    20.06.96   Axa Reinsurance (UK) Plc 
v Field [1996] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 233 
HL.  Aggregation  issues:  construction 
of “originating cause" and "event". 
75.    23.03.96  Cohen v David Holman & 
Co Ltd [1996] Re LR 387 
Morison J. Judgment concerning arbitral 
award under Lloyd’s procedure given by 
one  arbitrator  without  notice  and 
without a full hearing. Award quashed. 
76.    06.07.96   Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd  
Cresswell  J.  Provision  of  documents  to 
the Council of Lloyd's. 
77.    16.07.96   Aiken and Others v Stewart 
Wrightson Members 
Agency Ltd and Others 
CA.  Neill  LJ,  Otton  LJ  and  Ward  LJ 
dismissing  the  appeal  from  Potter  J 
ordering  interim  payments 
(10.02.95/31.07.95). 
78.    24.07.96   Hill and Another v The 
Mercantile & General 
Reinsurance Co Plc [1996] 
LRLR 341 
HL. Seminal judgment on the “double 
proviso”  follow  the  settlements 
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79.    15-
16.08.96  
R v The Council of Lloyd's 
ex parte Susan Rachel 
Johnson & Others. 
Brooke LJ. Application for Judicial Review 
of  R&R  dismissed  on  grounds  of  delay 
and  merits.  Lloyd's  were  acting  within 
their power in putting forward the R&R 
proposals. 
80.    02.08.96  Nederlandse 
Reassurantie Groep 
Holding NV v Bacon & 
Woodrow Ernst & Young 
[1997] LRLR 678 
Colman  J.  Case  re.  disastrous 
acquisition of Victory Reinsurance by 
NRG.    Victory  was  grossly 
underserved for LMX losses. 
81.    24.10.96   Napier and Ettrick and 
Another v Kershaw Ltd 
Lloyd's v Woodard and 
Another [1997] LRLR 1 
CA. Nourse LJ, Hobhouse LJ and Pill LJ. 
Appeal  in  Napier  v  Kershaw  (14.5.92). 
and  Lloyd's  v  Woodward  (16.5.96) 
allowed. 
82.    20.02.97   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Leighs and Others [1997] 
CLC 759 
Colman J. Claim by Lloyd's (assignee) for 
recovery  of Equitas premium. Summary 
judgment granted on preliminary issues.  
83.    24.03.97   Fawkes – Underwood v (1) 
Hamiltons and (2) 
Hereward Phillips 
Goudie  QC.  Defendants  in  breach  of 
duty  in  failing  to  advise  Mr  Fawkes-
Underwood  that  he  should  not  allow 
himself to be on certain syndicates.  
84.    23.04.97   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Leighs and Others [1997] 
CLC 1012  
Colman  J.  Further  preliminary  issues 
arising  out  of  Lloyd's  claim  for  the 
Equitas premium.  
85.    08.07.97   Re Yorke v Chataway 
(1997) TLR 451 
Lindsay  J.  Executors  are  at  liberty  to 
distribute  deceased's  estate  to  the 
beneficiaries. 
86.    31.07.97   Manning v Lloyd's, Lloyd's 
v Colfox and Others, 
Philips v Lloyd's [1998] 
LRLR 186 
Mance J.  Judgment  in  favour  of  Lloyd's 
concerning R&R. 
87.    31.07.97   The Society of Lloyd's v 
Leighs and Others 
[1997] CLC 1398 
CA.  Saville  LJ,  Ward  LJ  and  Phillips  LJ. 
Names'  appeal  against  decisions  on 
20.02.97 and 23.04.97 dismissed. Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
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88.    01.08.97  Aneco Reinsurance 
Underwriting Ltd v 
Johnson & Higgins Ltd 
[1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 565 
Cresswell  J.  Judgment  about  the 
Bullen  treaty  not  being  defined  as 
‘fac/oblig’.  
89.    03.12.97   Lloyd's v Fraser and Others  Tuckey  J.  An  abuse  of  process  for 
Names to seek to advance allegation of 
bad faith relating to R&R. 
90.    16.01.98   Yasuda Fire & Marine 
Insurance v Lloyd's 
Syndicates 229, 356, 462, 
571, 661 and 961, [1998] 
LRIR 285 
Cresswell J. Aggregate Extension Clause. 
Construction. 
91.    27.01.98   Lloyd's v Daly.  Tuckey  J.  Judgment  re.  Equitas 
premiums. 
92.    06.02.98  Brown and others v Gio 
Insurance Ltd [1998] Re 
LR 201 
CA.  Waller  LJ,  Chadwick  LJ  and  Sir 
Brian  Neill.    Clause  giving  reinsured 
sole  judge as to  what constitutes an 
event.   
93.    05.03.98   Denby v English and 
Scottish Maritime Insurance 
Co Ltd and Others, Yasuda 
Fire & Marine Company of 
Europe Ltd v Lloyd's 
Underwriting Syndicates 
Nos 209, 356 and Others 
[1998] LRIR 343 
CA.  Hobhouse  LJ,  Brooke  LJ  and 
Chadwick  LJ.  Aggregate  Extension 
Clause.  Construction.  Appeal  from 
Cresswell J (16.01.98) dismissed. Appeal 
from Waller J [1996] LRIR 301 allowed. 
94.    16.03.98  Skandia International Corp 
& Anor v NRG Victory 
Reinsurance Ltd [1998] 
EWCA Civ 467 
CA.  Wolf  MA,  Potter  LJ  and  May  LJ.  
Follow the settlement issues arising out 
of coverage for Exxon Valdez loss. 
95.    08.06.98   Norwich Union Life 
Insurance Society v 
Qureshi 
[1999] LRIR 263 
Rix  J.  Summary  judgment.  Norwich 
Union  did  not  owe  alleged  duties  to 
Name.     Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
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96.    31.07.98   Aldrich and Others v 
Norwich Union Life 
Insurance Co Ltd 
[1999] LRIR 276 
Rimer J. Case similar to the one above.  
Names' case struck out on the basis of 
the Qureshi ruling. 
97.    31.07.98   Lloyd's v Fraser and Others 
[1999] LRIR 156 
CA.  Hobhouse  LJ,  Pill  LJ  and  Judge  LJ. 
Leave  to  appeal  against  decisions  on 
03.12.97,  27.01.98  and  04.03.98 
(Quantum) refused. 
98.    23.11.98   Aldrich and Others v 
Norwich Union Life 
Insurance Co Ltd [1999] 
LRIR 453 
CA.  Morritt  LJ  and  Tuckey  LJ.  Leave  to 
appeal  from  08.06.98  and  31.07.98 
granted. 
99.    02.12.98   McAllister v Lloyd's [1999] 
LRIR 487 
Carnwath  J.  Hardship  Agreement. 
Arguable  case  that  the  debts  were 
disputed on substantial grounds. 
100.    02.01.99   Lloyd's v Jaffray [1999] 
LRIR 182 
Colman  J.  Lloyd's  application  to  stay 
proceedings  because  of  failure  by 
Names  to  pay  sums  ordered  by  the 
Court, dismissed. 
101.    23.03.99   Lloyd's v Robinson [1999] 
LRIR 329 
HL. Appeal from CA (24.10.96) allowed 
in part.  
102.    10.06.99   Garrow v Lloyd's [1999] 
LRIR 482 
Jacob J. Lloyd's statutory demand served 
on a Name set aside. 
103.    30.07.99   Aldrich and Others v 
Norwich Union Life 
Insurance Co Ltd [2000] 
LRIR 1 
CA.  Evans  LJ,  Ward  LJ  and  Mummery 
LJ. Appeals from Qureshi and Aldrich 
cases  dismissed  (see  08.06.98, 
31.07.98 and 23.11.98). 
104.    13.10.99   Garrow v The Society of 
Lloyd's [2000] LRIR 38 
Appeal  by  Lloyd's  dismissed  (see 
10.06.99). 
105.    22.10.99   Price v Lloyd's [2000] LRIR 
453 
Colman J. Claim.  Summary judgment in  
Lloyd's favour re. Equitas premium.  
106.    16.12.99   Jones v Lloyd's   Rattee  J.  R&R.  Penalty  argument 
rejected. Appendix B – The Lloyd’s Litigation 
  266 
  Date  Title of Action  Description 
107.    03.03.00   Lloyd's v White and Others   Cresswell J. Anti-suit injunction granted 
re. proceedings in Australia. 
108.    23.03.00   Lloyd's v Twinn and 
Another 
CA.  Sir  Richard  Scott  V-C,  Chadwick  LJ 
and  Buxton  LJ.  Appeal  from  Jacob  J 
(10.06.99) allowed.  
109.    20.01.00  Avon Insurance Plc and 
others v Swire Fraser Ltd 
and another [2000] Re LR 
535 
Rix  J.    Unsuccessful  misrepresentation 
case  by  stop  loss  insurers  against 
brokers.   
110.    14.06.01  Noel v Poland and Poland 
[2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 30  
Toulson J. Summary judgement awarded 
against  litigant  in  person  seeking  to 
establish  personal  liability  on  the 
chairman  and  director  of  Members’ 
Agent.   
111.    03.11.00  Society of Lloyd’s v Jaffray 
and ors [2000] EWHC 51 
(Comm) 
Cresswell  J.    Threshold  fraud  issue. 
Names  failed  to  establish  that  Lloyd’s 
had been dishonest or reckless.   
112.    26.07.02  Jaffray and ors v Society of 
Lloyd’s [2002] EWCA Civ 
1101 
CA.    Waller  LJ,  Robert  Walker  LJ  and 
Clarke  LJ.    Unsuccessful  appeal  by 
Names  against  decision  of  Creswell  J 
(03.11.00). 
113.    08.07.03  Sphere Drake Insurance v 
Euro International 
Underwriting [2003] EWHC 
1636 (Comm) 
Thomas LJ. Findings of dishonest breach 
of  fiduciary  duties  and  fraudulent 
misrepresentation. PA Spiral. 
114.    10.05.04.  King  v  Brandywine 
Reinsurance  Co  (UK)  Ltd 
[2004]  EWCH  1033 
(Comm). 
Colman  J.  First  instance  decision 
concerning  coverage  issues  relating  to 
Exxon Valdez losses. 
115.    10.03.05  King  v  Brandywine 
Reinsurance  Co  (UK)  Ltd 
[2005] EWCA Civ 235. 
CA.  Waller  LJ,  Rix  LJ  and  Sir  Martin 
Nourse.    Appeal  against  decision  of 
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116.    11.05.05  Society  of  Lloyd’s  v 
Henderson  and  others 
[2005] EWHC 850 (Comm). 
Andrew  Smith  J.  Claim  by  Names 
against  Lloyd’s  for  misfeasance  in 
public office. 
117.    08.11.06  Frederick  Thomas  Poole 
and others v Her Majesty’s 
Treasury  [2006]  EWHC 
2731 (Comm) 
Langley LJ. Names sued the government 
for failing to regulate Lloyd’s and ensure 
compliance with EU directives.   
118.    27.07.07  Stockwell & ors v Society 
of  Lloyd’s  [2007]  EWCA 
Civ 930 
Unsuccessful  appeal  by  some  of  the 
Names against decision in Henderson.   
119.    11.11.09  Equitas  v  R&Q 
Reinsurance  Company 
(UK) Limited [2009] EWHC 
2787 (Comm) 
Gross  J.  Equitas  could  rely  on 
actuarial model to verify losses under 
reinsurance  contracts  that  were 
within the LMX Spiral.   
120.    28.10.13  Equitas  Ltd  &  Anor  v 
Walsham  Brothers  & 
Company Ltd [2013] EWHC 
3264 (Comm) 
Males  J.  Equitas  seeking  recoveries  of 
unremitted  sums  owed  by  Walsham 
Brothers  as  brokers  of  Lloyd’s 
Syndicates. 
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Glossary 
APH  This abbreviation stands for “Asbestos, Pollution and Health”, 
the long term liabilities that, together with the demise of the 
LMX Spiral, caused the Lloyd’s crisis at the beginning of the 
1990s (see section 3.4.1). 
Combined 
Agent 
Lloyd’s agents who acted as both Managing Agent and 
Members Agent for the same Name (see section 3.1.2). 
Corporation of 
Lloyd’s 
An unregistered company that provides and regulates the 
Lloyd’s insurance market (see also “Society of Lloyd’s”) as 
described in section 3.1.1. 
Council  The Council was established by the Lloyd’s Act 1982 to 
govern and regulate Lloyd’s (see section 3.1.3). 
Direct Name  A Name that was the client of a Combined Agent (see section 
3.1.2). 
Equitas Model  The most sophisticated actuarial model of the LMX Spiral 
created by the expert Mr R. Bulmer for the purposes of the 
Equitas v R&Q [2009] EWHC 2787 (Comm) case.  See section 
3.4.4. 
Equitas 
Settlement 
The settlement offer made by Lloyd’s to the Names to create 
Equitas and end the Lloyd’s crisis.  See section 3.4.3 of this 
thesis for more information on the settlement. 
Excess of Loss  A type of insurance or reinsurance that is triggered only once 
the loss exceeds a specific level (the “excess point”), usually 
up to an agreed cap (the “Sum Insured”), as described in 
section 2.2.3. 
External 
Members 
The Names who do not work within the Lloyd’s insurance 
market (see section 3.1.2). 
Finality Bill  Total estimated amount owed by Names to settle all their 
outstanding losses and contribute to the costs of setting up 
Equitas (see section 3.4.3). Glossary 
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Foreign XL 
Reinsurer 
Reinsurers based outside the London XL Market that 
participated in the LMX Spiral (see section 3.2.2). 
Gross Claim  Total amount paid by all reinsurers from all layers (see 
section 3.2.1). 
IBNR  Incurred But Not Reported losses i.e. future potential claims 
under policies of insurance or reinsurance. 
Indirect Names  Names who were clients of Members’ Agent and who 
therefore had no direct contractual relationship with the 
Managing Agents (see section 5.3.1) 
Litigating 
Names 
The Names that rejected the Equitas Settlement offer and 
continued to sue Lloyd’s (see section 5.1.3). 
Lloyd’s  The Lloyd’s insurance market situated in London, as 
described in section 3.1 of this thesis. 
Lloyd’s 
Litigation 
The large number of court proceedings initiated in the wake 
of the Lloyd’s crisis of the early 1990s (see section 5.1) 
Lloyd’s 
Members 
A Names or, since 1994, a corporation admitted to be a 
Lloyd’s Member (see section 3.1.2). 
LMX  London Market Excess of Loss.  This term is used in case law 
and other publications that related to the LMX Spiral.  In this 
thesis, the term “London XL Market” is used instead to clarify 
that the LMX Spiral was only a part of the London XL Market. 
(see section 3.2.2). 
LMX Business  The XL reinsurance of a London XL underwriter, as explained 
in section 3.2.2. 
LMX 
Questionnaire 
The standard form (but not compulsory) questionnaires used 
in the London XL Market by underwriters to assess the risk 
(see section 4.3.2 and Appendix A).     Glossary 
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LMX Player  A reinsurer that took on LMX Business although such 
business may or may not be part of the LMX Spiral (see 
section 3.2.4). 
London XL 
Market 
The reinsurance market within London that traded XL 
reinsurance including Lloyd’s, the LUC and the wider 
companies market.  Section 3.2.2 of this thesis explain how a 
risk entered the London XL market when it was first insured 
or reinsured on an XL basis, at which point it was not yet part 
of the LMX Spiral. 
LUC  London Underwriting Centre, a competitor to the Lloyd’s 
market set up by a number of reinsurance companies in 
1983 (see section 3.1.3) 
Managing Agent  The individuals in charge of managing the Syndicates.  See 
section 3.1.2 for more information on their role within 
Lloyd’s and section 5.3.1 for an explanation of their legal 
duties. 
Members’ Agent  The individuals whose role it was to advise the Names and to 
look after their interest.  See section 3.1.2 for more 
information on their role and section 5.3.1 for an explanation 
of their legal duties. 
Names  The individuals who are the Lloyd’s members and who use 
their own means, with unlimited liability, to fund 
underwriting activities at Lloyd’s (see section 3.1.2). 
OPL  Overall Premium Limit: the maximum amount of business a 
Lloyd’s Member could underwrite (see section 3.4.2 for the 
full definition). 
PA Spiral  The reinsurance spiral that developed in the early 1990s that 
comprised XL reinsurance contracts covering Personal 
Accident insurance policies from the US (see section 6.1.2) Glossary 
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PML  Probably Maximum Loss: the maximum amount of loss a 
Syndicate may suffer based on the underwriter’s analysis of 
the risk of several policies being impacted by the same event 
(see section 2.2.4) 
R&R  Reconstruction and Renewal, which is the name given to the 
plan put together by the Society of Lloyd’s to enable the 
market to overcome the Lloyd’s crisis of the early 1990s.  See 
section 3.4 of this thesis which provides a detailed account 
of the R&R project and its implementation. 
Reasonable LMX 
Underwriter 
The underwriter who follows the reasonable steps set out in 
case law when writing LMX Business (see section 5.3.3)  
RITC  Reinsurance to close, which is the term used to describe the 
reinsurance of one Syndicate year to enable it to close its 
accounts for that year (see section 3.1.2). 
Society of 
Lloyd’s 
An unregistered company created by the Lloyd’s Act 1871 
that provides and regulates the Lloyd’s insurance market (see 
also “Corporation of Lloyd’s”) as described in section 3.1.1. 
Spiral Business  LMX Business that had become part of the LMX Spiral, as 
explained in section 3.2.2.   
Spiral Contracts  The XL reinsurance contracts that were within the LMX Spiral 
(see section 6.1.3). 
Spiral Effects  The effects any reinsurance spiral has on the XL reinsurance 
market it inhabits ones it reaches a specific point.  Those 
effects have been identified in a number of reports and they 
are listed in section 4.5.1 of this thesis. 
Spiral 
Participant 
A reinsurer that participates in the LMX Spiral.  Section 3.2.4 
explains in some detail the approach taken in this thesis to 
identify Spiral Participants. 
Spiral Risk  The element of risk added by the LMX Spiral.  This is 
explained in section 6.1.3 of this thesis.     Glossary 
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Syndicate  A Lloyd’s Member or a group of Lloyd’s Members 
underwriting insurance business at Lloyd’s through the 
agency of a managing agent (see section 3.1.2). 
Syndicate 
Members 
The Names or corporations that are members of a relevant 
Syndicate (see section 3.1.2). 
Working 
Members 
The Names who work within the Lloyd’s insurance market 
(see section 3.1.2). 
XL  Abbreviation commonly used for “Excess of Loss”. 
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Interviews  
As part of the research carried out to write this thesis, the author has conducted a 
number of interviews with individuals who had an interest in, or who had been 
involved in the development of the LMX Spiral and related case law.  The 
interviewees are listed below. 
Professor 
Andrew Bain 
Professor Bain is a professor of economics who published the 
paper “Insurance Spirals and the London Market” in 1999 
when he was at the university of Glasgow. 
Tony Berry  Mr Berry has been described as a “doyen” of the LMX Spiral
508, 
having been involved in the XL market for over 30 years, 
most notably as the active underwriter and managing 
director of Syndicate 536 (Cotesworth & Co Limited), a 
marine XL syndicate. 
Mr Berry has acted as an expert witness in many cases and 
arbitrations concerning the LMX Spiral and he has also given 
presentation on the topic of the LMX Spiral or the London XL 
Market (see bibliography). 
Paul Brockman  Mr Brockman worked in-house at Equitas where he was 
heavily involved in the Equitas
509 case. 
Reg Brown   Mr Brown is a Fellow of the Chartered Insurance Institute who 
was the underwriter of syndicate 702 from 1984 until 2000 
as well as being a director of Managing Agent Octavian 
Syndicate Management Limited and its successor company 
Market Syndicate Management Ltd and Pool Reinsurance Ltd.   
                                           
508 In the case of Equitas (n 1) para 24, where he appeared as an expert witness to provide 
evidence in relation to the LMX Spiral. 
509 ibid. Interviews 
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Julian Burling  Mr Burling is a barrister at Serle Court Chambers who 
practised in-house at the Corporation of Lloyd’s 1985 to 
2010 and was Counsel to Lloyd’s 1995 to 2010, where, inter 
alia, he dealt with issues of reinsurance, regulation and 
insolvency.  Julian is the author of “Lloyd's: Law and Practice” 
and joint editor of “Research Handbook on International 
Insurance Law and Regulation”. 
Clive O’Connell  Mr O’Connell is an English Solicitor who is now a partner at 
law firm Goldberg Segalla Global LLP.  He is a leading 
insurance and reinsurance legal professional, having focused 
his practice on reinsurance law since qualifying as a solicitor 
in 1982. 
John Emney  Mr Emney has been described as a “doyen” of the LMX 
Spiral
510 having been, amongst other things, one of the three 
founding members of Charter Reinsurance Company in 1986 
where he became the Chief Underwriter and then the Chief 
Executive.  Mr Emney worked in the London reinsurance 
market for almost 40 years initially as a broker and then as 
an underwriter. 
Mr Emney has been called upon to act as an expert witness 
on the LMX Spiral on several occasions and he has given 
many talks on the topic (see bibliography).  He was also the 
first Chairman of the Joint Excess of Loss Committee, a body 
created by the Lloyd’s Underwriting Association and the 
Institute of London Underwriters. 
Jim Gregory  Mr Gregory is an underwriter who specialised in XL 
reinsurance and worked in the London XL Market before 
being employed by Equitas to assist with R&R. 
                                           
510 ibid.     Interviews 
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Barbara Merry  Ms Merry is a former member of the Lloyd’s Council and she 
was general manager in the Corporation of Lloyd’s regulatory 
division at the time of the LMX Spiral.  She then went on to 
become Hardy Underwriting’s Chief Executive, a post she 
held from 2002 until February 2014. 
Adam Raphael  Mr Raphael is a well known journalist who was, before 
retiring, executive editor of the Observer and presenter of 
BBC’s Newsnight as well as reporter for The Economist and 
correspondent for the Guardian.  He was a Lloyd’s Name at 
the time of the LMX Spiral, which led him to write the book 
“Ultimate Risk The Inside Story of the Lloyd’s Catastrophe”. 
Philip Rocher  Mr Rocher is an English solicitor who is now senior partner in 
the Dispute Resolution Group of law firm Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher. Mr Rocher led the legal team that represented the 
Names in the landmark Gooda Walker
511 case. 
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